Short Explanation of Asha'ri and Maturidi Aqeedah

12 Differences Between the Asha'ris and the Maturidis

Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Asha‘ri is the Imam of the Ahl as-Sunnah wa al-Jama’ah and at their forefront, followed by Imam Abu al-Mansur al-Maturidi. Some of the shuyukh have mentioned that the companions of Imam ash-Shafi‘i and his followers follow Imam al-Asha’ri in matters of doctrine and follow Imam ash-Shafi‘i in matters of law whereas the companions of Imam Abu Hanifa follow Imam al-Maturidi in doctrine and follow Imam Abu Hanifa in law.

There is no contention between the two scholars and their followers except in twelve issues. Sheikh Sa‘id Fawdah wrote in Sharh Risalah al-Ikhtilaf bayn al-Asha‘ira wa al-Maturidiyya,

It is not hidden to the reader that the scholars mentioned more than this number of issues over which there is disagreement. It seems, however, that the author chose to limit them to this number due to their obvious nature.

Firstly, Imam al-Maturidi said that takwin, creation, is an Eternal Attribute that subsists with Allah’s Being, as do all of His Attributes, and that it is distinct from that which is brought into existence, mukawwan, and that it is linked with that which is brought into existence in the world and every part of it from the time of its inception. Just as Allah’s Will is Eternal and linked with that which is willed at the time of its existence, so too is His Omnipotence Eternal and linked with that which is decreed.

Sheikh Sa‘id Fawdah wrote in Sharh Risalah al-Ikhtilaf,

In other words, takwin is a Pre-Eternal Attribute that subsists with Allah and has a contingently effective lineage with that which is brought into existence at the time it is brought into being. 

For this reason, the scholars say that takwin is different from that which is brought into existence, mukawwan, because takwin is a Pre-Eternal Attribute and that which is brought into existence is contingent. 

For this reason, the claim of some of the Rashawi that the Maturidis agree with them that contingents subsist within Allah’s Entity is incorrect. This is fallacious because according to the Maturidis, takwin is Pre-Eternal and not contingent. It is not to be called an Attribute in an unrestricted manner; rather it is an Attribute from which actions issue forth.

Imam al-Asha‘ri said that it is a contingent Attribute that does not subsist with Allah’s Being and according to him, it is from the Attributes of Action and not from the Eternal Attributes. As he saw it, the Attributes of Action are all contingent, such as takwin and bringing into existence and the emergence of the world with the Statement, “Be.” Therefore, according to Imam al-Asha‘ri, Takwin is a description for the self-same effective linkage of power by taking note of its effect, whereas according to Imam al-Maturidi, it is the Pre-Eternal Attribute from which the creation and that which is brought into existence come.

Secondly, Imam al-Maturidi said that the Speech of Allah, the Exalted, is not heard. rather, what is heard is that which points to it. Imam al-Maturidi said that which is heard, masmu‘, only applies to that which connects with the sense of hearing. According to him, that which connects with it are the sounds that points and indicates towards the Pre-Eternal Attribute. As for the actual Pre-Eternal Attribute, both Imam al-Maturidi and Imam al-Asha‘ri held that it has no connection with the senses and that the senses have no connection with it. The disagreement is regarding whether a Pre-Eternal Attribute being heard or not. For Imam al-Maturidi, hearing is conditioned upon the connection of the senses, and for that reason he denied that Inner Speech, kalam nafsi, can be heard.

Imam al-Asha‘ri said that it is heard – as is well known in the story of Moses. Sheikh ibn Furak said,

Two things are heard during the recitation of the reader: the voice of the reader who is reciting and the Speech of Allah the Exalted.

Qadhi Abu Bakr al-Baqillani said, “Allah’s Speech is not heard in the conventional sense; rather, it is possible for Allah to allow any of His creation that He wills to hear it, contrary to customary means and contrary to it being with the medium of letters and sound.”

Imam Abu Ishaq al-Isfarayini and those who follow him said, “Allah’s Speech is not heard at all.” This was the chosen view of Imam Abu al-Manswur al-Maturidi as found in al-Bidayah.

Thirdly, Imam al-Maturidi said that the Creator of the Universe is described with wisdom, hikmah, whether that wisdom takes the meaning of knowledge. ‘ilm, or the meaning of perfection or mastery, ihkam. The Imam said that Allah is described with wisdom and that wisdom is a description of Allah’s Entity. This refers either to the knowledge of the precise or perfected actions or it refers back to the Pre-Eternal Attribute of Takwin that he affirmed. This means that mastery and precision are from the implications of Takwin.

Imam al-Asha‘ri said that if wisdom takes the meaning of knowledge then it is an Eternal Attribute that subsists with Allah’s Entity, and if it takes the meaning of perfection or mastery, then it is a contingent quality akin to Takwin, and the Entity of the Creator is not described with it.

Fourthly, Imam al-Maturidi said that Allah wills obedience or disobedience for all beings, be they essences or accidents; however, obedience occurs by Allah’s Will and Decree and His Pre-Ordainment and Predestination, Pleasure, Love and Command whereas disobedience occurs by Allah’s Will and Decree and His Predestination and Pre-Ordainment but not with His Pleasure, Love or Command. Imam al-Asha‘ri said that Allah’s Love and Pleasure are inclusive of all things just as His Will.

Sheikh Sa‘id Fawdah wrote in Sharh Risalah al-Ikhtilaf,

As for Imam al-Asha‘ri, the Ustadh reported that he believed Allah’s Love is inclusive of every accident, be it an act of obedience or an act of disobedience. This general statement suggests that Allah the Exalted loves disobedience. The correct view is that this is not the doctrine of al-Asha‘ri. 

On the contrary, he said that Allah loves disobedience insomuch as He punishes on account of it, just as He loves obedience insomuch as He Rewards on account of it. There is a distinction between this and what Ustadh ibn Kamal Basha and others mentioned and ascribed to al-Asha‘ri.

Fifthly, according to Imam al-Maturidi, being legally ordered with that in which there is no capacity to endure is impermissible, whereas being burdened with that which cannot be borne is permissible. Imam al-Maturidi distinguished between being legally ordered and being burdened. According to Imam al-Asha‘ri both are permissible.

Sixthly, Imam al-Maturidi said that some of the rulings that relate to legal responsibility, taklif, are known by the intellect, because the intellect is a tool by which the goodness and evil of some things can be comprehended, and it is a tool by which the obligation of faith is comprehended, as well as the obligation of gratitude to the Giver of Bounties. The One Who makes this known and obligatory is Allah the Exalted; however, it is through the medium of the intellect, just as the Apostle made the obligations known and the One Who made things obligatory in reality is Allah the Exalted, but it was through the medium of the Prophet. Imam al-Maturidi said,

No one is excused by ignorance of his Creator due to whatever that he sees in the design and creation of the Heavens and the Earth.

He also said,

Had Allah not sent a Messenger, still it would have been obligatory for creation to know Him through their intellects.

Imam al-Asha‘ri said that nothing is made an obligation or a prohibition except by the Sacred Law – not the intellect, even if the intellect is able to comprehend the goodness and evil of some things. According to Imam al-Ash‘ari, all of the rulings that relate to legal responsibility are taken from Revelation.

Seventhly, Imam al-Maturidi said that the wretched person could become felicitous and the felicitous person could become wretched. Imam al-Asha‘ri said that there is no consideration given to either felicity or wretchedness except during the End, Death, and Requital.

According to Imam al-Maturidi, felicity is defined as Islam and wretchedness is defined as disbelief.
According to Imam al-Asha‘ri, felicity is dying upon Islam and wretchedness is dying upon disbelief.

Eighthly, Imam al-Maturidi said that it is rationally impermissible for disbelief to be pardoned. Imam al-Asha‘ri said that it is rationally permissible but textually impermissible. Imam al-Ash‘ari’s view is based upon a rational judgement alone, whereas Imam al-Maturidi’s view is based on observation of Allah’s Will.

Ninthly, Imam al-Maturidi said it is rationally and textually impermissible for the believers to abide eternally in the Hellfire and for the disbelievers to abide in Paradise. Imam al-Asha‘ri said that it is rationally quite permissible, but textually impermissible.

Tenthly, some of the Maturidis say that the name and the thing named, al-ism wa al-musamma, are one and same. Imam al-Asha‘ri believed that there is a distinction between the two and the “act of naming,” tasmiya. Some of them divided a name into three categories: itself, other than itself, and a third category that is neither itself nor other than itself. There is agreement that the act of naming, tasmiya, is other than them, the name and the thing named, and it is what is established with the one named. This is taken from Bidayah al-Kalam.

Eleventhly, Imam al-Maturidi said that being male is a condition for Prophethood, and consequently, he said, it is absolutely impermissible for a woman to be a prophetess. Imam al-Ash‘ari said that being male is not a condition for it, and that being female does not negate it. This is taken from Bidayah al-Kalam.

Twelfthly, Imam al-Maturidi said that the action of the servant is called an acquisition and not creation, and that the Action of the Real is called creation and not acquisition – and both are inclusive of action. Imam al-Asha‘ri said that “action” denotes the Real bringing into existence and the acquisition of the servant is called “action” only figuratively. It has been said, “That which is permissible for the Almighty to be singularly is called creation, and that which is impermissible for the Almighty to be described with is acquisition.”

The gist of this disagreement is that Imam al-Asha‘ri held that the word “action” is literal when applied to Allah since He is the Doer, and is figurative when applied to the servant. Imam al-Maturidi on the other hand, held that the word “action” is also literal when applied to the servants.



— Imam Shamsuddin Ahmed ibn Sulayman ibn Kamal Pasha, The Disagreements Between Asha'ris and Maturidis, exegesis by Sheikh Sa‘id Fawdah from Sharh Risalah al-Ikhtilaf bayn al-Asha‘ira wa al-Maturidiyya, transmitted via Sidi Terence Helikaon Nunis of A Muslim Convert Once More

Creed of the Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama'ah

The word for creed in Arabic is ‘aqidah. Linguistically, it means to bind a knot firmly and tightly. And in the terminology of the sciences, it is a belief held strongly and with conviction in the hearts of humans, whether it be true or false. This strong belief is a motivator to action, such as is the case with the belief of a Muslim in the absolute necessary existence of Allah subhana wa ta'ala and the veracity of the Prophet sallallahu wa alayhisalam.

History attests to the fact that all peoples at all times have had an ideology or religious creed to which they assent, which moves them to action and which has an impact on their behavior and conduct. The Islamic creed consists of a firm belief that Allah, Lord of the Worlds, is the Creator of the Heavens and the Earth; that there is only one Allah Who can be characterized by all perfections, Who Transcends all deficiencies, and Who is unlike any other being; that Muhammad is His Prophet and Messenger to the Worlds, and that he fulfilled this mission in the most perfect and complete manner; that the Qur’an is His Book, truthful and untouched by any falsity; and that what it conveys of matters unseen – for example, Angels, other Prophets, Paradise, and Hell – is all true.

The Messenger believeth in what hath been Revealed to him from his Lord, as do the men of faith. Each one believeth in Allah, His angels, His books, and His Messengers: "We make no distinction between one and another of His Messengers." And they say: "We hear and we obey; We seek Thy Forgiveness, Our Lord, and to Thee is the end of all journeys." 

On no soul doth Allah place a burden greater than it can bear. It gets every good that it earns and it suffers every ill that it earns. Pray: "Our Lord! Condemn us not if we forget or fall into error; our Lord! Lay not on us a burden like that which Thou didst lay on those before us; Our Lord! Lay not on us a burden greater than we have strength to bear. Blot out our sins and grant us Forgiveness, and have Mercy on us, Thou art our Protector; Help us against those who stand against faith."
[Quran 2:285-286]

This set of beliefs moves he who possesses them to hold fast to the rules of the shari’ah and the commands and prohibitions of the Qur’an and the sunnah.

The first tenet of belief is the belief in tawhid, that is, to believe in the Oneness of Allah, worshiping Him alone, and affirming this belief of His Essence, His Qualities and His Actions. It is also to affirm that there is no entity which resembles His Indivisible Essence; that there are no qualities which resemble the Divine Qualities, in which plurality is not possible such that one can say Allah has two Wills or two independent sets of Knowledge, for example; and that His Actions do not admit of any association – there is, that is to say, no action other than His, and any action of another is to be regarded as acquisitive, kasb.

What has been said by the theologians with regards to monotheism can be simplified as follows: It is the belief that Allah is other than anything that can be conceived by the imagination; it is the belief that His Essence in no way resembles other entities, nor does It compromise His Qualities; tawhid is, in fact, a developed science derived from certain and definitive proofs since it enables one to establish religious beliefs via argumentation and repelling doubts; and it is concerned with the Essence of Allah, and what is necessary, impossible, or permissible to affirm of It. It is also concerned with the Messengers, what they brought affirming the existence of a Creator. Finally, it treats Revelatory Data, and the necessity to believe in it.

The benefit of the science of tawhid is that it leads to knowledge of Allah through definitive proofs, and the attainment of eternal happiness as a result. Because it is connected to the knowledge of Allah and His Prophets, it is the most noble of sciences. As the Arabic saying goes: Things are ennobled by that which they are connected to.

Learning this science is an individual obligation for every person, male or female, as established by the verse which directs all to:

Know, therefore, that there is no god but Allah... [Quran 47:19]

Technically, the obligation is to know the creed in a general way, i.e. it is wajib 'ayni; while a knowledge of the particulars and details is a communal obligation, i.e. it is wajib kifa'i.

The science of tawhid discusses three matters:

1. Divinity – that which has to do with Allah,
2. Prophecy – that which has to do with Prophets and Messengers, and,
3. Revelation – that which treats matters which cannot be proven except through revelatory reports.

Regarding proofs, these are of two types: purely rational, such as that which establishes the Existence of a Creator through the Creation of the Heavens, the Earth and ourselves; and the Revelatory, which is in fact a combination of rational and revelatory premises, because the veracity of a report can be established only by reason. These proofs may establish definitive certainty in shari’ah matters when they are mass-transmitted or accompanied by empirical evidence. However, in cases where they do not accord with a reason-based proof, the latter is given priority, for to disregard reason would be to disregard both types of proofs since the latter is a hybrid.

Let us first look at the argument from epistemology and ontology. The philosophers say that that which may be known are either non-existent, existent in the mind, or existent in the world. And that which has extra-mental, worldly existence is either necessarily existent, i.e. it is impossible that it not exist, or it is contingently existent.

The theologians say that the existent is that which has a reality in the world, and it is either Eternal or it is Created. The Created is further divided into two: the Substance and the Accident. The contingent, al-mumkin, is that which is necessarily in need of a cause. It may be either existent or non-existent, in equal probability. The contingent is always Created, never Eternal.

The Essentially Necessary is Allah, Who is Simple, not compound. This is because to be compound means to be contingent, created and admitting divisibility. This also means He does not admit association because that would entail being compound. Allah transcends all and every similitude. His Qualities include Life, Knowledge, and Power. These Qualities are Eternal, and do not compromise His Necessity of Being, nor do they render Him needy of anything, for His Qualities are not other than Him.

To be created means to be preceded by non-existence. The world is everything other than Allah the Exalted. The world is made of substances and accidents. Substances are entities that are independent of place. Accidents are qualities that are connected to substance, such as color, taste, smell, life, death, will, power, and knowledge.

The Createdness of the World is proven as follows: All of existence can be classified as either Eternal or Created. The Eternal is that which is preceded by nothing else. It is necessary of existence. It is impossible for the eternal to not be, for eternality contradicts non-existence. The Created is that existent which is preceded by another. It may both exist and not exist. So, when it is distinguished by existence rather than non-existence, it is in need of something that performs that distinguishing for it. This Entity is a Creator characterized by Volition and Power.

All that is not void of created entities is Created. Nobody in the world is void of Created accidents and changeable states. The qualities of the bodies change, and they move from one state to another. The reality of changeable entities is that in fact one state is annihilated and another is created. This is known in the case of the new state by observation, and in the case of the old state because, if it were eternal it would not have become non-existent.

Therefore, it is necessary to believe firmly that the world, all its bodies, including all sorts of vegetation and animals; all actions; all utterances; and all beliefs are Created. They came to exist after non-existence.

Belief in the Existence of the Creator is the first pillar of Islamic doctrine. All other doctrinal principles are built upon it. And believing in this existence is the only path to attaining a correct understanding of Creation, and the meaning of existence in this world.

The world that we see is contingently existent which means that the mind precludes neither its existence nor non-existence. Therefore, there must be some external cause which made it existent, and distanced it from non-existence. In its default mode, the world and its entities are possible of both states. And the Cause that made it existent and not non-existent is what we call Allah, the Exalted.

Every rational person, through observation, has the ability to know necessarily that Creation came into existence after non-existence, i.e. it was Created. That which is Created is in need of a Creator. An infinite regression of such creators is impossible, as all rational people agree. Infinite regression means that a created entity has a creator, and that creator has its own creator, and on and on with no end. This infinite regression, on whose impossibility all rational people agree, cannot be avoided except by positing an Eternal Creator, Who is in need of no other, Whose Existence needs no Originator. This is Allah, the Necessarily Existent, Who is not a compound being nor multiple. He is One.

If all existences were simply contingent, and none of them were necessary, this set of contingently existent entities – which encompasses all existent entities – would be in need of an Originator. This is because the set is itself contingent, a compound entity made of a set of contingent entities. However, the Necessary of Existence is Independent in His Existence. He does not need any other entity for His Existence. And He is outside of this set. Therefore, He is the Creator.

Contemplating and knowing Allah is an obligation by consensus, whether it is by Revelatory means as the Ash’ariyyah say, or by rational ones as the Mu’taziliyyah say. The primary obligation is to know Allah, and the means to achieving it is speculation so it is also an obligation. However, speculation is not possible without an intent to engage in it. Therefore, the intention is also an obligation, indeed the first obligation. By contemplation it is meant as the tools and methodologies through which knowledge is organized so as to lead from one piece of information to another. Alternatively, it is defined as abstracting the mind away from insignificant matters and orienting it to the objects of reason. When this is done properly, what results is necessary knowledge.

This is an obligation, because in matters of doctrine, following another based on his or her authority is a sin for someone who is capable of engaging in theoretical and rational thought. If he is not capable of this, it is not a sin. Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi says,

"Our companions agree that the masses are believers and knowers of Allah, and they will populate Heaven, as we are informed in reports and as is agreed upon by scholars. For their natural state leads them to Monotheism and belief in the Creator’s Eternality and the Createdness of all else, even if they are unable to articulate this in the terminology of the theologians."

Imam Saifuddin al-Amidhi reported agreement that those who attest to the correct doctrine based on authority are not disbelievers.

The difference of opinion obtains when we turn to the judgement in the Hereafter. In matters of this world, there is no disagreement that we are to judge based on apparent attestations alone. So, he who attests to the doctrine of Islam is to be treated as a Muslim, and not pronounced a disbeliever. So, he may marry other Muslims; he may lead the prayer; his slaughtered meat may be consumed; Muslims may inherit from him, and he from them; and he is to be buried in their cemeteries.

Now let us move on to the subject of belief, Imaan, which is to attest to all that is brought by the Prophets and is known necessarily to be of the religion, both in generalities and particulars, everything brought forth by Muhammad constitutes submission to Allah, Islam, outside of which there is no Salvation. As Allah says in the Qur'an:

Say: "Truly, my prayer and my sacrifice, my life and my death are for Allah, the Lord of the Worlds: No partner hath He: this am I Commanded, and I am the first of those who bow to His Will."
[Quran 6:162-163]

It is necessary that one submit to this, for there is no salvation in the eyes of Allah except by entering into Islam:

Say: "We believe in Allah, and in what has been Revealed to us and what was Revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and in (the Books) given to Moses, Jesus, and the Prophets, from their Lord; we make no distinction between one and another among them, and to Allah do we bow our will (in Islam)." If anyone desires a religion other than Islam (submission to Allah) never will it be accepted of him; and in the Hereafter he will be in the ranks of those who have lost.
[Quran 3:84-85]

Islam is the Religion of Allah with which all other Messengers had been sent:

Abraham was not a Jew nor yet a Christian, but he was true in faith and submitted his will to and joined not gods with Him. [Quran 3:67]

The formula of testimony is:

I bear witness that there is no god but Allah;
And I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.

For one who is capable of uttering it, it is obligatory for the validity of his faith. It may be uttered in a language other than Arabic, though it is better to use the Arabic wording. Simply uttering the words is not sufficient if the speaker does not understand the meaning of what he is reciting.

Articulating the formula of testimony is a condition of one being considered a Muslim in legal matters, such as inheritance, marriage, leading prayer, being eligible for the funeral prayer, burial in Muslim cemeteries, and being subject to the demand to pray and pay the zakat. This is because silent affirmation in one’s heart, though it constitutes belief, is hidden, and we are in need of a visible sign of one’s Islam.

He who attests with his tongue, but not his heart, is a hypocrite. Though he is not a Muslim in the eyes of Allah, he is to be regarded as a Muslim in this world, provided he does not betray any visible indication of his disbelief, such as prostrating to an idol or abusing a copy of the Qur’an.

The rejecter is one who refuses to utter the formula of testimony. He is a disbeliever both in the eyes of Allah and in the consideration of people in this world. An affirmation of the heart is of no consequence. He who is confronted by doubts must seek to dispel them either through rational speculation or by asking someone of knowledge. He who is confronted by temptations should seek refuge in Allah, and say “I believe in Allah and His Messenger.” Concerning the children of Muslims are considered believers, and are to be treated as such in this world even if they never articulate the formula of testimony their whole lives.

Regarding the Nature and Attributes of Allah, there are some things that cannot be affirmed of Allah. In short, He is Transcendent, and free of anything that indicates createdness or deficiency of any sort. Therefore, one may not attribute to Him accidental attributes like taste, color, smell, or pain. Nor is He restricted to directionality. Nor can we ascribe to him adjacency, for He is not bound by area. Neither the Earth nor the Heavens surround Him. He has neither limits nor measure.

Anything that is distinguished by directionality is restricted to a space, and therefore is capable of being joined to substances and separate from them. Anything that admits such a joining and separation with substance is connected to substance, and not void of it. Anything that is not void of substance is created like the substance it is connected to. In contrast, Allah transcends space, and connection to bodies.

We believe that the Creator of the world cannot be restricted by space, nor can He have an end. For a thing may not be so restricted except by something else, nor can he have an endpoint except by imposing a limitation on him by another entity. But the Creator is neither created, nor restricted, nor limited in any way. As Allah says:

Seest thou not that Allah doth Know (all) that is in the Heavens and on Earth? There is not a secret consultation between three, but He makes the fourth among― them nor between five but he is the sixth nor between fewer nor more, but He is with them, wheresoever they be: in the end will He tell them the truth of their conduct, on the Day of Judgment. For Allah has Full Knowledge of all things.
[Quran 58:7]

It is impermissible to attribute to Allah movement or rest, going and coming, being in a place, connectedness and disconnectedness, physical proximity and distance, size, body, form, measure, directions, or sides.

There are the Attributes which Subsist in the Divine Essence. They number seven or eight, the difference in number being due to scholarly disagreement. These attributes are eternal like His Names. If they had been created, this would mean affirming something created of the Divine Essence. It would also mean that Allah was once without them. Finally, it would indicate the need for something to endow the Divine Essence with this quality, which contradicts His Absolute Self-Sufficiency, His lack of need of anything other than Him. These are in contrast to the attributes of action which are not eternal according to the Ash’ariyyah.

The Attributes of the Divine Essence are of neither the essence, nor of other than it. The former is obvious, for it is well known that the Reality of the Essence is not the same as that of its Attributes, otherwise they would be identical. As for the latter, what is meant is that They are not of a separable other. For these Attributes are not separable from the essence, even though Their Reality is not that of the essence itself.

Whoever directs his worship to the Attributes alone has committed disbelief. And whoever connects his worship to the Essence alone has sinned. The correct path is to worship the Divine Essence characterized by Its Attributes.

These Attributes are,

1. Existence: This means the Existence of His Essence, uncaused by any other. It is impossible that He did not Exist. This sort of Perfect Existence is affirmed only of Allah. All others partake in a subordinate mode of existence, both preceded and succeeded by non-existence. This is an Affirmative Attribute, affirmed of the Essence Itself.
2. Eternality: This is a Negative Attribute, which is to say that it negates that which is not worthy of Allah – in this case, createdness, and so previous non-existence. What is meant is the Eternality of the Essence – that It never came into existence. For if It were not Eternal, It would be created, and thus in need of a creator, which creator would itself be in need of a creator. This would regress infinitely. As such, He must be Eternal. We believe that Allah has always been. A report in the Sahih of Imam Muhammad ibn Hibban has it that, "There was Allah, and there was none other than Him."
3. Everlastingness: This is also a Negative Attribute intended to exclude non-existence from His Essence. Just as we may not contemplate a cause for the generation of the Necessary Existent, we may not admit a cause for Its destruction. If we were to admit such a cause, there would be no Necessary Existent. The proof that Allah’s Existence has no end is that It would then not be Eternal, because Eternality contradicts non-existence. The existence of all other creation has both a beginning and end, except for Paradise and Hell, which had a beginning but no end. We know this through revelation and not reason.
4. Absolute Uniqueness: This is also a Negative Attribute indicating a lack of resemblance between Allah and Creation, for He is neither a body nor an accident, neither a universal nor a particular. He similarly transcends all states and attributions that, for example, can be said of humans and other entities, such as sleep, heedlessness, hunger, thirst, and need. The proof of this Attribute is that if Allah were not opposed to all created things in all qualities, He would resemble them in their createdness, or they would resemble Him in His Eternality. That is impossible.
   We believe that Allah cannot be characterized by those qualities which characterize creation. These latter are the essence of createdness, such as being restricted to a place or time, having bodily or mental needs, or weakness or incapacity. Allah is completely Transcendent. Nothing even remotely resembles him. He has neither ancestors nor descendants. Nor does he have friends and enemies in the manner commonly spoken of, though we may use these words to mean sincere devotees, on the one hand, and those who transgress his commands, on the other.
   However, it is true that we may describe humanity by some qualities we attribute to Allah, such as Knowledge, Power, Will, and Perception. However, we distinguish by stating that these attributes are Essential Attributes of Allah, but not essential attributes of humans. In the case of the latter, they are bestowed unto us as Blessings.
5. Subsistence in Himself: This means that He has no need for any other. We believe that Allah subsists in Himself. He has no need for an entity to generate Him, nor for a space to encompass him. He has been Allah since before the generation of anything else, and before the generation of time and space itself. Nor does He have directionality, though some anthropomorphists have said that He is characterized by "aboveness." This is invalid. As Qadhi 'Iyadh has said, "There is no disagreement among the Muslim jurists, ahadith scholars, theologians, thinkers, and lay people that the apparent meaning of verses that mention Allah being in the Heavens, such as ‘Do ye feel secure that He Who is in Heaven will not cause you to be swallowed up by the Earth when it trembles?’ are not to be taken literally, but rather are to be interpreted."
6. Oneness: This is also a Negative Attribute in that it denies something that is not appropriate to Attribute to Allah, that is, multiplicity or quantity. Allah is neither composed of parts, nor made up of particulars subsumed under a Universal. He does not have two sets of Knowledge or two Wills that complement one another, nor does He have a Knowledge or Will that partakes in the knowledge or will of others.
7. Power: This is an Eternal Attribute of the Divine Essence through which all things come to be and come to an end in accordance with His Will. What is necessary for every Muslim to know and believe is that Allah is capable of all things. The proof that Allah is characterized by power is that if He were not Omnipotent, He would be characterized by incapacity. This is impossible.
8. Will: This is also an Eternal Attribute of the Divine Essence which has to do with realizing some of the potentialities of contingent beings. Allah’s Will is One. It originates and annihilates some things.

There are also other attributes. These include Knowledge, Life, Speech, Hearing, and Sight.

Regarding the Beautiful Names of Allah, He Himself says:

The most beautiful names belong to Allah: so call on Him by them...
[Quran 8:180]

The Names of Allah are Eternal like His Essential Attributes. This Eternality is taken to mean that either that they were suitable of Allah from pre-eternality, or that they always indicated the meaning of those names. Some like Sheikh ibn ‘Arabi took them to be equal in that they all pertain to One Essence, Allah, even though they may differ in the world. Others took them to be of varying degrees of importance.

"Allah" is itself the Greatest Name, above all others. Ninety-nine of these Names have been enumerated in a hadith in Imam at-Tirmidhi’s book on the authority of Hazrat Abu Hurairah, but Imam an-Nawawi has said that the scholars have agreed the Names and Attributes that are listed there do not exhaust the Names and Attributes of Allah. The position of the Ahlus Sunnah w'al Jama'ah is that His Names and Attributes are taught to us, for this is what indicates Allah’s Permission. This may take the form of either being in the Qur’an and sunnah, or it may be established by consensus of prevalent use, such as the Existent, the Necessary and the Eternal.

Now let us turn towards the subject of Prophecy. In Arabic, the word "prophet," "nabi," is taken from the word for "news" or "report," for the Prophet reports about Allah. The Prophet is also the one who is reported to, in the first instance, since Gabriel brings him news.

Terminologically, the word "prophet" refers to a pure human who is inspired by a Revelatory Code of Conduct on which he himself acts, even though he may not be called on to propagate it. If he is in fact called upon to propagate, he is a "messenger" or "rasul."  All Messengers are Prophets, but not all Prophets are Messengers.

The Sending of Messengers is a Great Bounty from our Lord because the phenomenon is a rational possibility, but He is under no obligation to send Messengers.

Allah has named twenty-five Prophets in the Qur’an. Their Prophethood must be believed in. It is not permissible for a Muslim to be ignorant of them. There are yet others not mentioned by name or in detail in the Qur’an. We know of them only generally, and so must believe in them in that general manner. That is to say, we must believe that Allah sent many Prophets and Messengers to every nation and group in a variety of places and times. It is ignorant to think that Allah specified only the Arabian peninsula and its surrounding areas for Prophecy.

There are five necessary requirements for Prophethood:

1. Prophets only arise among humans, not among jinn or angels.
2. Prophets must be characterized by trustworthiness and honesty, and innocence from sin.
   This is so that their testimony may be believed, and held to a high standard.
3. Prophets must be characterized by a perfect rationality, precision, and uprightness.
4. Prophets must have propagated to the people everything they had been ordered to propagate.
5. Prophets must have not concealed anything.

There is disagreement on whether a prophet must be male. Those who said he must be a male rely on the verse:

Before thee, also the messengers We sent were but men, to whom We granted Inspiration: if ye know this not, ask of those who possess the Message. [Quran 21:7]

Those who say it is not a condition that a prophet must be a male point to verses which say that the mother of Moses was inspired as well:

"So We sent this Inspiration to the mother of Moses…" [Quran 28:7]

And that Mary, the mother of Jesus, was listed in a context where many other Prophets were listed:

Those were some of the Prophets on whom Allah did bestow His Grace ― of the posterity of Adam, and of those whom We carried in the Ark with Noah, and of the posterity of Abraham and Israel ― of those whom We Guided and Chose...
[Quran 19:58]

The greatest of Prophets is the Final Prophet, Muhammad. Muslims are duty bound to love him, as we learn from numerous of ahadith.

Regarding miracles, these are the Actions of Allah in which the conventional laws of nature are broken at the hands of His Messengers so that the Messenger’s truthfulness and the veracity of his Message may be affirmed. It may be speech, like the Qur’an, or an action, such as the gushing forth of water between Muhammad's fingers, or an absence, such as the inability of the fire to burn Abraham.

The conditions for a miracle are that it be from Allah Himself, it be a breaking of the conventional laws of nature, it be inexplicable, it be at the hands of someone who claims prophecy so that his Prophethood may be established, it be in accordance with what is being claimed and what is claimed not be disproven by the miracle itself, and it not precede the claim but be made in conjunction with it.

Therefore, Prophet Jesus’ speech in his infancy, wet dates falling on Lady Mary from a dry palm tree, cutting the chest of Prophet Muhammad and washing his heart, clouds forming a shadow over him to protect him from the sun along with the peace greetings that he used to hear from stones before his prophecy are considered miracles.

The Prophet's greatest miracle was the Qur’an itself. He also had material sensible miracles, such as the splitting of the moon, the greetings offered to him by stones, trees speaking to him, the gushing forth of water between his fingers, and others.

It is obligatory for a Muslim to believe firmly that there is no Cause in the world other than Allah, and that all the apparent causes we see in the world of phenomena are deputized by Allah Himself. There is however no harm in using language that indicates causality of things other than Allah if one's beliefs are sound on this matter. For example, one might say, "This medicine was of benefit to me," or "This doctor cured me," or "The rain this year caused there to be a good crop" without any harm of falling into disbelief.

This is why there is no harm in a Muslim seeking intercession with Allah via the Relics of Prophets, as long as he believes that the only Cause is Allah. This fits with the language used with respect to the apparent causality of the world. The most obvious instance of such is the Qur’anic verse:

We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures. [Quran 21:107]

If Allah has said of the Prophet that he is the cause of mercy to His servants, there is no harm in invoking this honor He has granted the Prophet.

There is also no difference between invoking him during his life and after his death. This is because his bodily life was never the reason for invoking him in this manner, such that we may say this is no longer possible.

Regarding belief in Revelation, the word used for this, sam’iyyat, refers to all that which can be known only through reports that partake in certainty. One may not be a believer in Allah in his heart, mind and soul without believing in both the seen and the unseen. The unseen we believe in is that which is not visible, which may not be perceived purely through rationality.

Believing in the unseen is the first pillar of piety. This means believing in

1. Allah,
2. the Reality of the Angels of Allah,
3. the Authority of the Divine Scriptures inspired by Allah
4. the Messengers of Allah,
5. the Reality of the Last Day and that it will undoubtedly come,
6. Fate, good or bad, and that there is nothing in the world except it was willed by Allah.

Believing in the unseen includes also believing in the existence of the Jinn whose existence is proven by definitive texts. Allah says in the Qur’an,

And He created the jinn from smokeless fire. [Quran 55:15]

So the jinn are created from fire and are asked to worship Allah Almighty and follow the Prophets and Messengers as Allah says:

I have only created the Jinn and Man so that they may serve Me. [Quran 51:56]

Also the jinn are divided into believers and disbelievers recorded in the Quran,

"Amongst us are some that submit their wills to Allah and some that swerve from justice."
Now those who submit their wills― they have sought out the Path of Righteousness.
[Quran 72:14]

Satan is one of the jinn but was expelled away from Allah’s Mercy and earned Allah’s Wrath on himself because of his disobedience towards Allah’s Direct Command to prostrate to Adam as was narrated in the Qur’an:

Behold! We said to the angels "Bow down to Adam": they bowed down except Iblis. He was one of the jinn, and he broke the Command of his Lord… [Quran 18:50]

Allah’s Eternal Wrath on Satan deems him to enter Hellfire but his Punishment is postponed until Judgment Day where he will be sentenced to excruciating pain along with those who were seduced by Satan and followed his path of evil. The jinn are inhabitants of Earth and are able to see humans unlike humans who are unable to see jinn as Allah explained in the Qur’an saying:

… for he and his tribe watch you from a position where ye cannot see them... [Quran 7:27]

Regarding the Throne, we believe it is the greatest of creation, and it is where Allah will present Himself on the Judgment Day. This Throne will be carried by eight angels on that Day but we are unable to attribute any sort of a defined or detailed description of this Throne due to a lack of knowledge about it.

We also believe in the Divine Footstool but similarly we have no available data describing it. What we know for sure though is that neither the Throne nor the Footstool are dwellings of Allah. In other words, Allah did not create the Throne out of need for elevation or superiority and did not create the Footstool out of a need for sitting down.

We also believe in the Divine Tablets, al-Lawh al-Mahfuz, and this is the first of creation. It is preserved well within the Bayt al-Ma'mur directly underneath the Divine Throne. Its length is of one-hundred years. Before creating anything else Allah ordered the Pen, the second creation of all, to write. It asked what it was to write. It was told,
“All that is going to be.”

Akin to the Throne and the Divine Footstool, the same goes for creating the Pen; it was not created for writing previously unknown knowledge nor angels asked to record the deeds of humans out of fear of forgetfulness.

Regarding belief in Paradise and Hell, these are two created entities, the first an Eternal Abode of Reward, and the latter an Eternal abode of Punishment and Fire, of levels and each person will occupy the level in accordance with his deeds. Some people might assume that the Eternality of Heaven and Hell comes in opposition to Allah’s saying in the Qur’an:

…everything will perish except His Own Face. To Him Belongs the Command, and to Him will ye all be brought back. [Quran 28:88]

But the correct interpretation of this verse is that everything in its own right amounts to nothingness because of its inability of independent self existence.

We also believe in the Reservoir from which the Prophet will serve the believers of his nation in the hereafter and we believe that whoever drinks from it shall never be subjected to thirst.

Regarding the Hour and its signs we believe there are some obvious signs like the appearance of Gog and Magog, the Emergence of the Beast, the rising of the sun from the west and the appearance of smoke. These Signs, specially the ones that are backed by definitive proofs from the Qur’an, are absolute tenets of belief and whoever denies their veracity is deemed to be a liar and a disbeliever. These Signs are part of Revelation which the mind does not have much say in as they are believed in through revelatory reports. For example, Allah says in the Qur’an:

Until the People of Gog and Magog are let through, and they swiftly swarm from every hill.
[Quran 21:96]

The questioning in the grave is authenticated by numerous prophetic reports. It is believed that the soul returns back to the body with all its five senses intact and its intellectual ability persevered to be questioned in the grave and receives its due punishment or enjoy its grace. After the burial of the dead and the dismissal of people attending his or her funeral, two angels called Munkar and Nakir are responsible for asking the deceased three questions in the language that is understood by the deceased.

The angels ask the dead about the two parts of the testimony of faith namely the Oneness of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad. Prophets and Saints are exempted from these questions as well as Martyrs who died for the Sake of Allah along with children because they were not eligible to understand Commands and Prohibitions ordained by Allah.

Allah Almighty has the Power to gather back the scattered particles and atoms of the body resided in a grave or spread in a desert or kept in the belly of an animal and form the human body again to be asked about his or her life on Earth. The scholars of the Ash’ariyyah theology reached a consensus that both the body and the soul combined either suffer from the ailments or enjoy the grace in the grave.

The return of the body to the spirit on the Day of Judgment is believed in as all the particles of the body is gathered again to return it to its original state to form the full human body. Allah Almighty possesses the Ability to reorganize these particles because of His Unlimited Power and Divine Knowledge.

We also believe in the Resurrection of the dead and taking them out of their graves for the Reckoning. In this day all human beings, jinn,and angels shall be resurrected along with beasts and animals.

Regarding the belief in Intercession of the Prophet on this day, it is obligatory and this noble status of wasilah is the supplication or prayer which the Prophet saved for his people until Doomsday. The meaning of intercession entails forgiveness for whoever attested to the Oneness of Allah and the Prophecy of Muhammad even if this person committed the gravest of sins.

All the other prophets also have the Right of Intercession in the Day of Judgement along with the angels, the gnostics and the martyrs. The first intercessor among all these is Prophet Muhammad. As for the intercession of others, it occurs only after reckoning and punishment over small and grave sins which were not forgiven by Allah. The importance of intercession lies in honoring the intercessor in this day and showing his great position in the sight of Allah. Therefore, the Forgiveness of sins other than polytheism is possible both through logic and revelation as intercession deems forgiveness possible. As for polytheism, it is deemed impossible through Revelation for a polytheist to be forgiven.

The Ash’ariyyah creed refuses to make a judgement of disbelief on any sinful believer in this world and it is similarly impermissible to pass a verdict of his or her eternal stay in Hellfire for sins whether minor or major. The correct approach is to delegate the whole issue to Allah.

Regarding the belief in the crossing of the Path that stretches over Hell, all will have to pass over it as a test and among the passers are the prophets, the gnostics and those who enter paradise without previous subjection to reckoning and judgement over their deeds. The description of the path is that it is thinner than a hair and sharper than a blade. Whoever is deemed to enter Paradise will succeed in crossing his way over to Heaven and whoever is deemed to enter Hell will fall over the bridge straight down to Hell.



— Mufti 'Ali Goma'ah, transmitted via Sidi Terence Helikaon Nunis of A Muslim Convert Once More

An Introduction to Kalam

In the following article we are going to divulge the field of Islamic theology, known as kalam. The article will address,

• What is the root of the word 'kalam'? Why is the discipline of Islamic theology referred by it?
• What are the numerous other names of the field of Islamic theology?
• What is the relation between kalam and philosophy?
• What is the origin of kalam?
• What is the place of kalam in Islamic thought?
• What are some key creedal issues reconciled with through the use of kalam in relation to specific schools of Islamic thought?

The field of Islamic theology is known in Arabic as kalam. In the linguistic sense, 'kalam' meaning 'speech,' denotes a word indicating a certain meaning. In its technical sense, 'kalam' denotes the theoretical consideration of matters of religious creed or theology.

Regarding kalam, Imam ibn Khaldun said,

It is the discipline comprised of disputation over creedal beliefs with rational proofs.

Imam al-‘Ayhi said,

Kalam enables one to affirm creedal beliefs by amassing arguments and repel doubt.

Regarding the root of the word 'kalam,' Imam al-‘Ayhi recorded four types of etymologies for the name of the discipline, respectively claiming it is so called because of its linguistic sense of speech, kalam, yielding dialectical debate, al-jadal, which is the primary tool of the discipline, much like logic is the primary instrument or bulk of philosophy; its chapter-headings, which were first titled, "Discourse (al-kalam) on such-and-such;" its paradigmatic topic of the Speech of Allah, Kalamullah, meaning the Qur’an, which raised ancillary questions to such profusion that the discipline itself came to be named after the topic; and the fact that it enabled adversarial discourse, kalam, pertaining to religious matters.

Kalam gained different names corresponding to the theoretical perspective taken by it. As Imam at-Tahanawi and Imam at-Tahawi variously noted, it is also known as the science of the foundations of religion, usul ad-din, and the science of theoretical consideration and deduction, ‘ilm an-nadhr w'al-istidlal; Imam Abu Hanifa famously called it the greatest jurisprudence, al-fiqh al-akbar.

The preferred name is the discipline of unity, ‘ilm at-tawhid, in that it explained, on a Qur’anic basis, the relation between the axis of existence, Allah Most High, humanity and the cosmos with reference to the two concepts of Divinely-Appointed Successorship, istikhlaf, and subservience, taskhir. Imam at-Taftazani said,

The discipline related to derivative or inferential matters is called the science of rulings, ‘ilm al-ahkam; whereas that related to first principles and creed is called the science of Divine Unity and Attribution, ‘ilm at-tawhid w'as-sifat.

Certain scholars have held there to be a methodological difference between kalam and philosophy, in that the mutakallim, practitioner of kalam, admits or denies various metaphysical principles and then offers proofs in their support, while the philosopher admits no such first principles whatsoever and in their absence seeks to reason to a certain aim. For example, the mutakallim may admit the Existence of Allah from the beginning and seek thereafter to offer proofs for His Existence; but the philosopher begins with no such presumptions and only then tries to demonstratively establish the existence of Allah.

Sheikh Ahmad Amin approximated the preceding schema in contrasting the judge, one who begins by adopting a neutral position and then follows the evidence until he reaches a verdict as to the innocence or guilt of the accused, and the defense lawyer, who from the very beginning is bound to uphold the innocence of the accused.

We should not however inaccurately suggest, regarding the philosophers, that they necessarily begin in the absence of metaphysical presuppositions, for certain philosophical schools certainly do begin from first principles — otherwise they would be seeking through trials and experimentation to affirm or deny any metaphysical postulate.

The discipline of kalam, in fact, is Islamic philosophy in that it takes the religious creeds brought by Islam as performing the function of first principles. Thus it is a subsection of Islamic philosophy distinct from that postulated by such Arab and Muslim philosophers as Sheikh al-Kindi, Sheikh al-Farabi, and Sheikh ibn Sina, who preferred a different method: taking as the point of departure the opinions of Greek philosophers and then seeking to develop Islamic critiques. Those philosophers aided the defense of Islam, in terms of creeds and schools and religions, by taking from philosophy and Greek logic the tools to defend them. That is, they departed from what was given in those creeds and schools, such as Greek philosophy and logic, in order to arrive at what was given for them, Islam.
Dr. Zaynab al-Khudayri said,

Our teacher, Dr. Yahya Huwaydi, called this philosophy, which blossomed into the various disciplines of law and kalam and principles of religion, Islamic philosophy, because it was established on the Qur’an and its philosophy.

Regarding the origins of kalam, when Islam arose, the societies of what is known as the Arab lands were comprised of mere tribes or clans. The Prophet’s Hijrah to Medina acted to elevate the tribal condition, cutting tribal bonds such that the believers from disparate tribes deferred to a single order of conduct. The nascent Arab Muslim nation began in the heart of that society.

The epoch of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs extended the teaching of the Prophet, establishing equality among the people and ending the preferential treatment previously accorded one's kin and the powerful. This, however, was not the case after the era of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, when began the decadent discrepancy between the theoretical affirmation of such equality and its practical application.

The ensuing social struggle took the form of internal conflict between the powerful, each of whom sought the Caliphate; the state became an instrument of despotism over common social goals. Each party of them held themselves superior in truth to the rest, and sought religious justifications to that effect. Each party, moreover, championed a clan’s heritage and lineage in claiming what they upheld: the Umayyads, Hashimites, Abbasids, Safavids, and so on, as the partisans to the conflict strove to establish dynastic states like that of Persia.

All of this worked to augment the conditions from which the theological schools, al-madhahib al-kalamiyyah, would later develop into the discipline of kalam. The Kharijite splinter group among them, most of whose supporters hailed from non-Quraysh Arab tribes, did not admit the principle that the Caliph could not be elected from non-Qurayshites or non-Arabs (they first elected the non-Qurayshite, ‘Abdullah bin Wahb ar-Rasibi to be their leader).

The majority of scholars recognize that the Shi‘ite sect found its intellectual roots in Persian notions of kingship and lineage, given the clear resemblance between their school’s positions and the Persian monarchical system. Likewise, most of the supporters of the Mu‘tazili school were of the clients, al-mawali, the children of non-Arabs who became patron wards of the state.

The Umayyads proved the majority of the supporters of the two sects of Determinism, Jabriyyah, and Deferral, Irja’, to the extent that it soon became a saying that “Determinism and the Deferral is the Religion of the Umayyad Kings,” — jabr w'al-irja’ din al-muluk.

And on this single Earth, the general Muslim populace splintered, through these conflicts and acts, until they fashioned diverse ways of thought, schools of law, politics, art, knowledge, tradition, and other aspects of civilization. One of these was the discipline of kalam.

Kalam was consolidated as a discipline also through contesting outside influences. The Islamic conquests came to include diverse bodies at the social level, meaning also those of non-Islamic cultures adhering to manifold ways of thought, schools, creeds, and philosophies. Hence it came necessary to employ rational and logical methods to note the deficiencies in these creeds and philosophies and invite their adherents to Islam.

A ruling of general prohibition was adopted by some such as certain Hanbalis and Sufis, including Imam as-Suyuti in his work known as Sawn al-Mantiq w'al-Kalam ‘an Fann al-Mantiq w'al-Kalam and Imam al-Hawari in his work, Dhamm al-Mantiq wa Ahlih, as some of them relied on a mistaken interpretation of reported enunciation of the early Muslims that prohibited plunging into speculative discourse on theological matters under a principle called tafwid.

Yet tafwid does not mean silence in the face of corrupt beliefs but rather refraining from plunging into creedal matters so long as the prevailing understanding remains sound. Indicating sound creed is a righteous act, and is what prevailed during the epoch of the Prophet and the Rightly-Guided Caliphs. When there arise widespread deviations from correct understanding, however, then Muslims are obligated to work to rectify them. This is what occurred throughout Muslim history whenever they undertook to oppose false creeds. Sheikh Hasan al-Basri said,

None of the Salaf would mention a thing, nor would they debate it, for they were all of a single uniform mission. They only began to talk about a matter and engage in debate when people began to deny it or raise doubts about it. When people began to innovate in the religion, Allah raised eminent scholars to refute and debunk these innovations and deviations from the truth.

This is likewise supported in what is narrated from Imam ibn ‘Abd al-Barr,

The jama‘ah follows the opinion of Malik that unless it would compel someone to [vain] speech, or fearing its general influence, or something to that effect — he would not seek to avoid discussing such matters when desiring to refute falsehood and turn its advocate from its school.

The view that the early Muslims, the salaf, refrained from engaging theological questions and opposed it is an innovation, bid‘a, of unsound basis. We can provide further examples to support this, including the narration of the Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah from Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who, in his work ar-Radd ‘ala az-Zanaadiqah w'al-Jahmiyyah, engaged in certain interpretations against what the Zanaadiqah and Jahmiyyah doubted regarding the ambiguous elements of the Qur’an; and he then addressed their meaning, as is further narrated by Imam al-Bayhaqi. This is similar to what we regard as the right position, that is, kalam as the attempt to posit solutions or repudiations to theological problems posed. Of course, these attempts are delimited by authentically-narrated articles of creed indicating what Allah has offered human knowledge in its limits of understanding. This true position is confirmed by Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah,

Engaging the discipline of kalam is permissible when verifying truth and invalidating falsehood, and otherwise when not engaged in the aim of arguing with empty proofs or expounding false positions. 

Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah also said,

The salaf and the a’immah did not find kalam objectionable in itself for the terminology it employs such as the terms essence (jawhar), accident (‘arad), body (jism), or otherwise, but because the meanings that they express in their formulation open themselves to false, reprehensible aspects in the proofs and determinations [offered]. They are not forbidden, because these words combine together meanings both of denial and affirmation… 

So if you have familiarized yourself with the meanings they intend, for instance in these expressions, and assess them with the Qur’an and sunnah such that their truth is affirmed, and that falsehood is denied which the Qur’an and sunnah deny, then engage in them freely.

Imam al-Ghazali relied on a similar method in considering the unveiling of the Sufis, and thereby established all of that which is true. Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah proceeded from this assessment in many topics of kalam. For instance, the relation between existence and the existent, or the conjunction of Divine Power and Determination with human free will in the third part of his Majmu‘ Fatawa.

Imam al-Ghazali resembles this position but differed on the point that the discipline of kalam does not yield gnosis, al-ma‘rifat al-yaqiniyyah, as does spiritual unveiling, kashf, or inspiration, ilham, for it depends on and hence is limited to the intellect. He wrote in his spiritual autobiography,

Then I commenced with the discipline of kalam, and obtained a thorough understanding of it. I studied the works of its sound theologians, and myself composed some works in the subject. But I found it a discipline that, while attaining its own aim, did not attain mine. Its aim is preserving the creed of orthodoxy and defending it against the inclinations of innovative folk. 

However, in doing so they (the practitioners of kalam) came to argue on premises they admitted to their opponents and to which they were compelled, whether following precedent (at-taqlid), or the consensus of the community, or by solely accepting the Qur’an and traditions. 

The majority of their argument was dedicated to laying forth the contradictions of their opponents and criticizing the logical consequences of what they admitted. But this is of little benefit with respect to someone who admitted nothing at all save logically necessary truths so kalam was not sufficient in my case and was unable to treat the malady of which I complained. 

Determining whether kalam is permissible, recommended, or necessary proceeds from assessing its benefit, and determining whether it is impermissible with reference to its harm. Imam al-Ghazali writes elsewhere that kalam contains both benefit and harm, its specific ruling being determined by the conditions at the time.

Regarding the key differences in kalam of the sects of Islam there are the following principal schools of thought: Shi'ites, Kharijites, Murji'ia, Qadariyyah, Jabriyyah, Asha'ris, Maturidis, Mu'tazilis, and Mujassimis.

We will start with Shi‘ites. Lexiconically, the word, ‘Shi‘a’ means, ‘adherent,’ and the related word, ‘partisanship,’ tashayyu‘, denotes the victory of one over another. Historically, the word ‘Shi‘a’ refers to the supporters of the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib.

In the sectarian sense, the term refers to the explicit conviction that the right to the Caliphate fell only to ‘Ali and his children. They differed thereafter as to which among his descendants had priority: the Fivers, Zaydis asserted the Imamate through the third-generation descendant Zayd ibn ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn; the Seveners, Ismailis, asserted the Imamate through the seventh-generation descendant Isma‘il ibn Ja‘far as-Sadiq, and the Twelvers, Ithna Ash‘aris, asserted the Imamate through Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, known as al-‘Askari.

The Twelver Shi‘ites hold that the authority of the Imamate is one of the fundamental principles of religion that do not admit rational interpretation and therefore is not subject to independent judgment, ijtihad. Nor are ancillary matters related to it subject to such independent judgment, although they may admit rational interpretation. That is, choosing the leader, al-imam, is not achieved by election through the pledged allegiance, bay‘ah, of the community as the Sunnis hold, but rather through Divine Appointment and textual designation, that is, via proof-texts drawn from the Qur’an and sunnah.

The pledged allegiance is subsequent to and dependent on this Divine Appointment. Shi‘ites narrate various textual proofs for this position, among them the hadith of the Oasis of Khumm, Ghadeer-e-Khumm, where the Prophet is said to have stated,

Whosoever I am his master, so too is ‘Ali his master.

Likewise they advance rational proofs, including that the orthodox community, being comprised merely of a multitude of fallible individuals, is not immune from mistakes, and that mistakes in this matter of choosing the leader yield nothing less than chaos and social disintegration. For these reasons, among others, this matter must be effected through Divine Appointment and thereby secured against the fallibility of the populace.

Given that they were Divinely Appointed, the a’immah are understood to be safeguarded from error. Shi‘ites adduce both textual and rational proofs for this doctrine, including respectively Allah’s Address to Abraham:

And remember that Abraham was tried by his Lord with certain Commands, which he fulfilled; He said, "I will make thee an Imam to the nations." He pleaded, "And also from my offspring!" He answered, "My Promise is not within the reach of evil-doers."
[Quran 2:124]

Allah is very clear that His Covenant does not include wrongdoers and the argument that the infallibility of the a’immah interrupts the infinite regress of moral culpability that otherwise obtains.

Imam Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-‘Askari was hidden in what is known as the minor occultation, ghaiba sughra, which lasted for seventy years beginning in 260 AH / 874 CE. Then began the major occultation, ghaiba kubra, which continues until the End of Days. Twelver Shi‘ites further believe in the messianic return of the Twelfth Imam during the Last Days in the form of the long-awaited Mahdi.

Shi'ites also champion the concept of taqiyyah which is a matter of huge controversy. Taqiyyah refers to concealing the doctrines of a school from those who do not believe in it, or an individual’s concealing his affiliation to a school. Shi‘ites adduce in support of this doctrine the Qur’anic verse:

…except under compulsion, his heart remaining firm in Faith...
[Quran 16:106]

They narrate from Imam Ja‘far as-Sadiq the report,

Taqiyyah is of my religion and that of my fathers'.

The Zaydis follow Zayd ibn ‘Ali ibn al-Husayn and, ideologically, are the Shi‘ite denomination most similar to the Sunnis. They agree with the Ahlus-Sunnah wa'l-Jama’ah against the Twelver Shi‘ites that the question of the Imamate is a branch of religion which does admit rational interpretation and is subject to independent judgment.

The Twelver Shi‘ites hold their opinion to be established through express textual support, that is, authentically narrated reports indisputably indicating the person of the Imam. Zaydis recognize texts indicating the person of the Imam but hold them to be less definitive both in their transmission and their signification, and to describe the attributes of the Imam but not specify him by name.

Further distinctions between the Twelver Shi‘ites and Zaydis are logically entailed by these differences in that the former hold that one who denies the Imamate of ‘Ali and his descendants in effect denies decisive proof-texts and so disbelieves; while the latter hold that denying these matters means rather that one has sinfully erred in judgment but remains within the fold of faith.

The Zaydis hold that ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib had precedence over Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, and ‘Uthman in that he had more right than them to the title of Caliph, but due to his younger age and the perilous conditions in the troubled state of the time, it is permissible to admit the Caliphate of those before him. This again is opposed to the Twelver Shi‘ites, who hold that the prior three Caliphs were flagrant usurpers.

The Twelver Shi‘ites, Ismailis, and certain Zaydis affirm a core doctrine of the awaited Mahdi, as opposed to the Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama’ah, of whom the majority believe in the Mahdi and another party do not, but in neither case make this doctrine foundational to their creed.

The roots of the Shi‘ite conception of the authority of the Imam, and specifically that of the Twelver Shi‘ites, hearkens back to the doctrines and philosophies prevailing in pre-Islamic Persia. When Islam entered Persia she was in a state of disarray, and due to it her civilization was enriched but endured. One of the elements of Persian civilization that Islam did not abolish was the system that understood kings to have a quasi-divine nature, which influenced the Shi‘ite view of the Imamate as argued by Sheikh Muhammad Abu Zahra.

Next, let us move on to the Kharijites. Lexiconically, ‘khuruj’ denotes 'insurrection,' 'rebellion' or 'insubordination.' The active participle, ‘khawarij,’ refers to those who rebelled against ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib. The movement originated at the murder of ‘Uthman, and the allegiance pledged to ‘Ali as Caliph. Mu‘aviye, then Governor of Syro-Palestine, refused to acknowledge this allegiance, accusing ‘Ali instead of covering over the murder of ‘Uthman.

Thereafter ‘Ali and Mu‘aviye faced each other at the Battle of Siffin and the latter would have been routed, but then ‘Amru ibn al-‘As enjoined his forces to hoist up copies of the Qur’an on their lances, invoking the authority of scriptural writ to decide between them.

Certain of ‘Ali’s supporters inclined toward seeking an arbitrated settlement between him and Mu‘aviye, but a faction rejected the possibility of subjecting legitimate authority to such adjudication. They proclaimed the dogmatic slogan, “No decision save that of Allah,” and struck camp at Harura, by which they are also known as al-Haruriyyah. Refusing the outcome of the arbitration, they rebelled against his authority and thus became known as the Khawarij, literally, “those who rebelled.” They subsequently split into twenty schisms.

The most important articles of Kharijite doctrine are as follows. They considered whoever is content with such arbitration to be disbelievers, thus introducing the doctrine of takfir. They anathematized ‘Ali, Mu‘aviye and ‘Uthman, all of whom accepted arbitration in matters of authority.

They believed in appointing the caliph through free, valid election alone, as established by the Muslim majority, and not a group of delegates or the like. They would support the caliph so long as he ruled in justice as upheld by the shari‘ah; otherwise, they held it necessary to remove him from power, given also the necessity of rising against permissive authorities.

They upheld the permissibility of non-Qurayshite caliphs, and indeed that all contenders were equal regardless of tribal or ethnic origin — even that non-Arab claimants were preferable for they would be easier to remove from power if they acted against the shari‘ah. They chose the non-Qurayshite ‘Abdullah ibn Wahb ar-Rasibi as leader.

They held a radical conflation of belief and action, holding that faith, imaan, necessarily yields righteous works which in turn meant they considered the perpetrator of sins a disbeliever without distinguishing between enormities and minor sins. Likewise they considered those adhering to opposing judgments and schools to be disbelieving infidels.
In support of such doctrines they offered the Qur’anic verses:

…pilgrimage thereto is a duty men owe to Allah ― those who can afford the journey; but if any deny faith, Allah stands not in need of any of His creatures.
[Quran 3:97]

They interpreted it to equate abandoning the rite of pilgrimage, surely a sin, with full disbelief, such that any sinner becomes a disbeliever. They also cited the verse:

…If any do fail to judge by what Allah hath revealed, they are disbelievers.
[Quran 5:44]

They interpreted it to mean that every perpetrator of sins had decided his course of action by something other than revelation and so had disbelieved.

The followers of ‘Abdullah ibn Ibaad, some of whom continue to reside in Oman and northeast Africa, are known as the Ibadis; they comprise the Kharijite sect closest to the Sunnis. They distinguish between disbelief in doctrine, that is, with respect to Allah, and disbelief with respect to His Bounties, that is, restricting or denying related aspects. They hold that their opponents’ judgments and schools disbelieved in the latter sense, not the former; thus their opponents’ persons, homes, and livestock remained inviolable to them, except for their steeds and weapons.
Likewise they held their opponents’ testimony, marriage with them, and inheriting from them all to be legitimate.

The Kharijite school rested on the equation of sovereignty, hakimiyyah, with power, sulta, as what yields dominion, siyadah, quite resembling that of modern political thought — that is, a concept of absolute authority. However, authority yields dominion only in particular times and places. Certain contemporary Islamist groups have approximated this view, relying for instance on what they understood of the teachings of Abul A‘ala Mawdudi or the later works of Sayyid Qutb.

‘Ali ibn Abi Talib was among the first to stridently resist this approach, responding to the incessant Kharijite slogan, “No decision save that of Allah,” he said,

A true word, yet they intend falsehood by it. True, no Authority save that of Allah, yet they claim there is no command save that of Allah while people require leaders, whether righteous or profligate.

In sharp contrast to the Khawarij, we have the Murji‘ia who were another early sect. Their eponymous key tenet of irja’, lexiconically denotes ‘postponement, ’takhir, for they ‘postponed’ the requital of transgressions to the Final Day. It is imperative to differentiate the position of this sect from that of certain early companions and followers who, responding to the conditions of their time, forbade engaging the bitter contemporaneous political struggles. In that vein, they recommended ‘deferring’ the case of grave sinners to Allah, Who will punish or forgive them as He wills on the Day of Judgment. In the subsequent period, however, there emerged the Murji‘ia, who took this notion of deferral to its limit and made it a point of doctrine. They thus held that sin does not spoil faith much like obedience does not benefit disbelief, that is, that the believer remains a believer no matter the enormities of sins he commits, just as the disbeliever remains a disbeliever no matter the righteous deeds he works.

The Murji'ia held that faith, imaan, pertains to private beliefs, and that one who pronounces disbelief, kufr, with his tongue and worships idols or practically adheres to Judaism or Christianity, for instance, worshiping the cross or pronouncing Trinitarian doctrine, in the lands of Islam, and thereafter dies without recanting these practices, can yet be a believer of unaffected or complete faith in the Sight of Allah and be among the Folk of Paradise.

While the Kharijites grossly conflated faith, imaan, and works, ‘amal, the Murji‘ia radically separated them, somewhat akin to the Lutherans. The correct position is that the relation between faith and action is one of union but not absolute identity, as believed the Kharijites and distinction but not absolute disjunction, as believed the Murji‘ia.

Next, we have the Libertarian sect, al-Qadariyyah, whose name refers to the human power, qudra, to act and choose. Some hold that it refers to the determination, al-qadr, which they deny for Allah and affirm for humans. Some writers hold them to be aptly described by their opponents as per the hadith saying, “those who deny Allah’s Calibration are the fire worshipers of this community.”

The word "fire-worshiper" is used in the narration because the Arabic word for it, "majoosi," refers to the Zoroastrians who hold a dualistic view of the world. Therefore, by referring to the Qadariyyah as the majoosis of the [Islamic] community, the narration addresses their dualist viewpoints on freedom and determinism.

The most important Qadari leader, Ma‘bad al-Juhani, preached his school in Iraq and was killed by Hajjaj in the uprising of ‘Abdur Rahman ibn al-Ash‘ath and Ghilan ad-Dimashqi, who had been debated by ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz and was spectacularly killed by Hisham ibn ‘Abdul Malik.

This group radically ascribed action and volition to humans, holding that every human action occurs through a will independent from the Will of Allah. They rejected Allah’s Pre-Eternal Knowledge and Determination, taqdir, from the occurrence of human action. Dr. Muhammad Yusuf observes,

The Libertarians took the position that humans are the ones who determine their own actions through their knowledge, facing them through their will, and enacting them through their power — and that Allah has no power over these works, cannot engage them in His Volition or Power, and cannot have knowledge of them before they occur.

In this way, the Libertarians came to ascribe the Divine Attribute of Lordship, Rububiyyah, to others beside Allah, delimiting His Properly Unrestricted Knowledge and Power.

On the other end of the scale we have the Determinist sect, the Jabriyyah, who came to be named for their fundamental tenet denying human power to act and choose, claiming Allah compels, jabr, His servants' actions.

The Jabriyyah were also known as the Jahmites gaining their name through their eponymous ascription to the teachings of Jahm ibn Safwan. They argued that, given that Allah is the Creator of creatures’ acts, and given that He possesses unrestricted power, human power over actions is transformed into a mere instrument without volition.
Jahm bin Safwan said,

Indeed humans determine nothing, nor are they characterized by such ability; rather they are compelled in their actions, having no [independent] volition and no choice. It is Allah Most High Who Creates actions for them in the same way that He does for other bodies. Actions are ascribed to them only in a figurative sense, as they are other bodies.

In the following period this opinion suffused various groups associated with the Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama’ah.

The Determinist opinion arose in Islam because the transcendental conception of Allah holds there to be no contradiction between the abstract or general Acts of Allah and the delimited acts of human beings. The former defines and delimits the latter, both in their generation, manifesting them in the visible world through the Divine Habit that ensured the conditions of human action, and their commission, like legal boundaries manifest themselves through the various Divine Commands of obligation and prohibition, to which humans ought to cleave in their actions.

This school of thought conflates the Acts of Allah with everything consequent, and so understands attributing actions to any other than Him to be ascribing Him partners in His Lordship even though this is more properly the case only with reference to the Unrestricted Acts of Allah, not the delimited acts of human beings. Their conflation in fact resembles the approach of Idealists of Western philosophy such as Georg Hegel or the Calvinists of Christian thought. The improbability of such hard determinism in Islamic orthodoxy means, in contrast to the claims of some Orientalists, it is not receptive to such Idealism nor the Fatalism of the Christian Calvinists.

Next, we have the Mu‘tazilis who gained their name when Waswil ibn ‘Atha’, the founder of the school, differed from his teacher, Sheikh Hasan al-Basri, on the question of the status of a Muslim who committed grave sins. The latter held him to be a sinner but nonetheless a Muslim while Waswil dissented to argue that he was in a station between belief and disbelief, that is, neither a believer nor a disbeliever. Sheikh Hasan al-Baswri commented that Waswil “withdrew,” i‘itazala, from his company, and so this disagreement led to the formation of the Mu‘tazilis.

Mu‘tazilism is based on five creedal articles. The first two pertain to the highly transcendental conception of Allah that they advance. With regards to Divine Unity, Tawhid, Mu‘tazilis rationally interpreted all verses that could yield anthropomorphism and, in an effort to rigorously maintain the single Eternity of Allah, denude Allah of all Attributes other than His Essence, repudiating a distinct existence to these Attributes. Thus they rationally interpret all the Divine Attributes as recorded in the Qur’an to be various Names of the Divine Essence, not Attributes proper themselves. In this sense, they are also known as those who deny the Attributes, al-Mu‘attila, with the nuance that they only deny these Attributes as they exist distinct from the Divine Essence, at-ta‘til al-juz’iyy l'at-ta‘til al-kulli.

With regards to Justice, al-‘Adl, the Mu‘tazilis held that the principle of Divine Justice dictates that He rewards the righteous with good and requites the sinner with ill, and also that He endows humans with power over their actions and the ability to choose between good and evil. For, were humans compelled in their deeds, then the Divine Reward and Punishment based on them would be essentially unjust and He is above it. In order to secure Divine Justice, however, they radically emphasized human freedom and so came to imply that humans create their actions.

They held further that the moral quality of actions, their good or evil, inhere essentially in them, being independent of Divine Commands or Prohibitions. Therefore the Legislator enjoins certain actions because of the good inherent in them and prohibits others due to the evil inherent in them, and even those people who have not been reached by Revelation are nonetheless accountable to Allah for their actions because the ethical status of actions is independently rationally comprehensible.

With regards the intermediate position, al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn, the Mu‘tazilis held that those who commit enormities are relegated to a position between that of disbelief, kufr, and belief, imaan, that is, they cannot properly be said to be disbelievers or believers, although nothing prevents anyone calling them ‘Muslims’ if it is specified that their repentance is yet called for. Imam ibn Abi Hadid said,

If we take the position that those who commit enormities can be called neither believers nor Muslims, we would prefer that he be called Muslim so that we may distinguish him from ahl adh-dhimmah or idolators.

On the issue of the Promise and Threat, al-Wa‘d w'al-Wa‘id, the Mu‘tazilis held that Allah’s Promise to reward the righteous with good and requite sinners with ill to be irreversible. Thereby they also denied notions of Intercession in the Hereafter.

On the issue of commanding the good and forbidding evil, al-amr bi'l-ma‘ruf w'an-nahi ‘an al-munkar, the Mu‘tazilis made rebellion against a tyrannical despot obligatory, albeit conditional on the particular circumstances of the case. This is contrary to the Kharijites who affirmed this obligation unreservedly.

The radically transcendent emphasis of the Mu‘tazilis led them to deny the Divine Attribute of Speech, al-Kalam, as distinct from the Divine Essence, for, as a contingent characteristic of other creatures, they believed it could imply a multiplicity of deities. In this they repudiated the Christian claims that the Qur’an supported the Divinity of Christ when it described Jesus as the ‘Word of God,’ Kalimat Allah. They further interpreted any of the Qur’anic references to the Speech of Allah, Kalamullah, to mean that He Created that speech as He did any other thing and thereby that the Qur’an itself is created and thus contingent, not Pre-Eternal.

In keeping with these methodological and hermeneutical principles, Mu‘tazilis rejected the possibility of ‘seeing’ Allah. Certain scholars understood this to apply specifically to the notion of seeing Allah physically with one’s eyes.
Imam ash-Shahrastani said,

They were united in denying an ocular beatific vision in the Abode of Permanence.

From the position that Allah in His Wisdom acted according to certain principles, not haphazardly, the Mu‘tazilis took up the notion that it was necessary for Allah to act in the best manner possible. That is, given that Allah only acts from His Infinite Wisdom, it is impossible for Him to command anything but virtue or prohibit anything but depravity. Thus both good and its superlative are necessary for Allah.

The Mu‘tazilis reached their positions primarily through engaging members of other religions and refuting opposing creeds, by using methodological abstractions and rational strategies derived from Greek logic. However, these techniques, in their rigor, in fact shield one from the vigor and vitality of gnosis as ordered by Revelation, and cut at the very heart of knowledge of the unseen. For example, the Mu‘tazili concept of the Divine Essence can be understood as a response to the radical anthropomorphists or corporealists, mujassima, who imputed to Allah aspects of a body like that of humans, but their more transcendent concept in effect severs the bond between humans and their Lord. It empties their concept of the Existence of Allah, as in the question of Divine Attributes, even while it unrestrictedly subordinates these matters to the intellect, as in the question of the ethical status of acts and others such surveyed above.

They go too far also in their affirmation of human freedom, as they transform the delimited acts of human beings which are defined by the Acts of Allah in their instantiation and their moral investiture, takwinan wa taklifan, into unreserved acts. They hold that humans are the creators of their own acts, but creation is an Attribute of Lordship signifying that an act is performed by none other than Allah. Therefore they seem to imply partners in His Lordship, and compromise the monotheism they otherwise strictly seek to defend. Finally, it is more proper to hold that Allah made the good of His actions obligatory upon Himself, rather than to say He is obliged or bound in any sort of fashion. In Qur’anic idiom:

He hath inscribed for Himself Mercy...
[Quran 6:12]

Then we have the Asha‘ris. The eponymous founder of this school is Imam Abul Hasan al-Asha‘ri, one of the first to study under, eventually quitting, the Mu‘tazilis. The Asha‘ris came to comprise the largest Sunni group, including among its ranks such great scholarly giants as Imam al-Juwayni, Imam ash-Shahrastani, and Imam al-Ghazali.

Like the Mu‘tazilis, the Asha‘ris held that the Divine Essence was Transcendent and repudiated anthropomorphism. However, they understood the Qur’anic verses whose apparent sense could yield similarities between Allah and human beings to employ conventional Arabic figures or metaphors without subjecting them to further speculative or abstracting interpretation.

Hafiz al-Baghdadi attributed anthropomorphist interpretations to “renegades and radicals,” while Shahrastani considered the anthropomorphist Karramite scholars to be “ignorant fools”. Imam al-Ghazali insisted one must properly understand ostensibly anthropomorphic Qur’anic expressions such as those referring to “the Hand of Allah”, which, as an equivocal expression, includes the primary corporeal sense of a limb composed of flesh and bone but also includes a metaphorical sense that is not essentially corporeal.

The Asha‘ris affirmed Divine Attributes as distinct from the Divine Essence, including Divine Power, Will, Hearing, Sight, and Speech. Imam al-Asha‘ri held that human acts are the result of Allah’s creation and human acquisition, kasb, which is the conjunction of human power and Divine Act. An example to elucidate this relation is the movement of a hand wearing a ring, whereby the movement of the ring is conjoined to that of the hand.

Contrary to the Mu‘tazilis, Asha‘ris did not believe that acts are essentially good or bad, but that they receive their moral character through Divine Command or Prohibition. Imam al-Asha‘ri said that one who commits enormities is a sinning believer and relinquished to the Will of Allah as to whether He forgive him and enter him into Paradise or whether He first requite him with Punishment for his sins.

Imam al-Asha‘ri further affirmed the possibility of the beatific vision, in that every existent, including Allah admits being seen. The Asha‘ris posited that the Divine Attribute of Speech is Pre-Eternal in His Essence, but he divided the Divine Speech into two types: Unlettered Speech, Kalam Nafsi, which singularly abides with the Divine Essence; and Lettered Speech, Kalam Lafzi, which is comprised of contingent letters and sounds conforming to the meaning of the unlettered speech that comprehends every injunction and prohibition. The Noble and Holy Qur’an is therefore the Uncreated Speech of Allah but its disparate letters, colored inks, inscriptions, and vocalizations are all created.

Finally, Asha‘ris held that the Acts of Allah are not bound to an underlying rationality, for that would greatly restrict His Sovereign Will even in such questions as the requital of the obedient and transgressors. Rather, they cite the Qur’anic verse:

He cannot be questioned for His Acts, but they will be questioned for theirs.
[Quran 21:23]

Various criticisms were advanced against these positions and formulations. Imam ibn Hazm criticized the Asha‘ri conception of Godhead, arguing that their division of the Eternal Essence of Allah from His Abiding Attributes compromises His Absolute Oneness. The Asha‘ris began soundly establishing human actions as the result of Allah’s creation and human acquisition, but their definition of acquisition as merely a conjunction effectively tended toward Determinism. Imam al-Juwayni commented that denying human power and ability is refused both by rationality and lived experience, for affirming a power without effect, as in the definitions of certain Asha‘ris, is essentially denying that power as such.

The Asha‘ri position on the ethical status of acts in effect was said to undermine rationality, for by unreservedly refusing the possibility of independently discerning good, husn, or ill, qubh, they in turn deny the independent existence of good, khayr, and evil, sharr. Likewise, their position that Allah’s Acts are not bound by Revelation in an absence of wisdom is a contradictory and inadequate conception inadmissible for Allah, for His Works are Unreservedly Independent and in turn Complete.

Finally we have the Maturidis founded by Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, holding many positions in common with the Asha‘ris but differing from them on others. Much like the Asha‘ri approach to Qur’anic verses that could yield an anthropomorphic concept of Allah, they affirmed His Transcendence while understanding these expressions by the conventional figurative meanings they had garnered in Arabic, and not through speculative rational interpretation.

The Maturidis recognized that the moral quality of certain works can be rationally apprehended, just as there are others whose moral quality cannot be understood except through Revelation. But in every case, they hold that humans are not obliged to do good and refrain from evil until they encounter Revelation.

They agree with the Asha‘ris that human acts are the result of Divine Creation and human acquisition, but, against the Asha‘ris, hold that acquisition is not merely conjoined with action but in fact is its very reality, haqiqiyyah.

Maturidis hold that believers, those who commit enormities, will not abide in Hellfire, even if they died without repenting. Imam al-Maturidi said,

The truth about believing, habitual sinners is that their case is relegated to Allah, for Him to Forgive them if He so Chooses from His Bounty and Goodness and Mercy, or to Punish them to the extent of their sins, if He so Chooses. They will not abide in the fire. People of faith are between hope and fear.

Against the Mu‘tazili rationalizing interpretation of Divine Acts, Imam al-Maturidi said,

His Acts obey an underlying wisdom because He is the Wise; He wills Wisdom by them because He intends them, not because He is compelled to act in a certain manner. He is not bound but rather has Free Volition and Will.

We note here that the Maturidis have the soundest solution to the issue of the scope of reason in discerning the ethical status of actions, in that they develop a variegated approach. Yet they do not clarify the nature of these acts in their two types such that one might say that the acts whose moral status does not admit rational investigation are abstracted from their particular conditions, while those whose moral quality is discernible are circumscribed in relation to their time and place.

Regarding the matters of doubt and dissent between the sects, firstly we have tashbih which is the position that there are similarities beyond analogies between Allah and His creation. Tajsim is the related position that imputes a bodily form to Allah. Tashbih emerged before Islam among certain Jewish and Christian sects, and then spread to certain radical sects in Muslim lands; its more prominent proponents include certain Shi‘ite groups, the Karramites, and the Hashwites. It is based on a particular understanding of those scriptural verses whose apparent meaning expresses similarities between Allah and creation.

The Shi‘ite extremists who took such a position include Mughira bin Sa‘id, who claimed that the one he worshiped was a man of light with a crown upon his head and limbs unlike a man, and Bayan bin Sam‘an, who maintained that the one he worshiped was a human being enveloped in light but for his face.

The Karramites were named after Muhammad ibn Karam al-Sajistani, who affirmed the Divine Attributes but in a corporeal and anthropomorphic fashion. He called his followers to worship an embodied, delimited god. In his book, “The Punishment of the Grave,” he described Allah as seated proudly upon the Throne in terms that admit movement, change, and cessation, much like he affirmed the beatific vision without securing the doctrine against its potential spatial implications.

The Hashwites, finally, are those who cling to an extremely literal hermeneutic, and so insist on the apparent sense of those verses that could imply similarities between Allah and creation. Imam at-Tahanawi recorded, in one of his books, Kashf Isthilahat al-Funun, that the Hashwites clung to apparent meanings until they corporealized God.

Some assimilated them into various Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama’ah groups, especially the later Hanbalis, of whom we may give examples of scholars who appear to adopt the Hashwite hermeneutic; but great numbers of other Hanbalis, including Imam ibn Jawzi vociferously rejected it in the fourth and fifth centuries. Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal himself never anthropomorphized but rather urged a specific kind of relegation, tafwid, which, as practiced by certain early Muslims, is simply refusing to comment on such matters.

Imam ibn al-Jawzi said,

I wonder at those who call to knowledge and tend toward anthropomorphism by taking ahadith literally.

The interpretation, haml, here referred to includes both a specific understanding and discussion of that understanding; but maintaining the traditional approach is achieved by refraining both from plunging into that discussion or speculating on how to understand it.

One of the Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama’ah approaches to such questions is attributed to Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali legal school of Islamic law and jurisprudence, and includes numerous great scholars such as Imam ibn al-Jawzi, Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah, and Imam ibn al-Qayyim.

Other appellations of this methodological group include, “the Traditionalists,” who literally call themselves, “Companions of the Narration”, Aswhab al-Hadith, and “the People Adhering to the Way of the Pious Predecessors,” Ahl as-Salaf. The later Wahhabi school named after Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab hearkens back to this group in aspects of its method and practice.

The approach of Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal on ambiguous matters was to refrain from commenting on them, relegating their specific interpretation to Allah, tafwid, in His Transcendence with reference:

…but no one knows its true meanings except Allah... [Quran 3:7]

Later, Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah adopted such a position of tafwid, but furthermore considered the early Muslims to have understood these ambiguous verses and ahadith in their apparent sense. He ascribed this understanding to them despite their refraining from comment. He wrote,

It is evident that when the Lord described Himself as ‘Knowing, Powerful,’ He did not qualify His own formulation by saying its evident sense is unintended. This is because its meaning with respect to Him is similar to its meaning with respect to us. A similar hermeneutical principle obtains in such cases as Allah Ascribing to Himself the Creation of Adam by His Hand.”

Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah rejected determinism because of the way it divested all the sinner’s responsibility before Allah. He affirmed human power to act and choose, but without ascribing them the creation of their acts as did the Mu‘tazilis. He writes,

One of the most enduring elements of human thought is [the causal principle by which] one who acts justly is understood to be just, one who works iniquity is understood to be iniquitous, and one who lies is known as a liar; if it is not the creature who is agent of his lies and iniquity but rather Allah Who is the Agent of those actions, that entails Allah be attributed with deceit and wickedness!

Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah also disputed the Asha‘ri position that Allah’s Acts are not justifiable, arguing that this emptied His Acts of their underlying wisdom. Rather, he said, He created creation, enjoined His Commandments, and forbade His Prohibitions all according to a distinct wisdom.

Imam ibn al-Qayyim agreed with Imam al-Maturidi that the moral quality of certain acts is rationally discernible, yet that the reward of good and requital of ill requires Revelation. He wrote,

In truth, one will find no contradiction in the approach holding that acts are in themselves good and evil like they have benefit and harm without making this a cause of their reward and requital, which is determinable only through the Commands and Prohibitions of Revelation.

Like Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah, Imam ibn al-Qayyim refused the position that human acts are determined in any way. Thus he affirmed human action and volition without making reference to their existence as Allah’s creation.

Imam ibn al-Jawzi differed from Imam ibn al-Qayyim and Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah in understanding potentially anthropomorphic Qur’anic verses and ahadith in terms of a metaphor that could that would be readily understood by an Arabic speaker, without finding it necessary to resort to rational speculation, for example, as one who says that the Qur’anic references to Allah’s ‘Finger’ is ‘the trace of His Virtue’ or that ‘His Hand’ is ‘His Blessing.’ This is the position too of Imam ibn Hazm, Imam al-Ghazali, and Imam al-Maturidi. For a thing is taken on its face value if possible; if it is interpreted, it is done so based on metaphor.

There are two aspects to the approach of the early Muslims to this question: their theoretical understanding and its practical implementation. It is unsound to hold simply that they refused to comment on the matter, for certainly some of them did speak on it, specifically ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib and 'Abdullah ibn Mas‘ud, in refuting the creeds of innovators. Sheikh ibn Taymiyyah and Imam ibn al-Qayyim were of the opinion that the early Muslims understood such verses as apparent, while others, including Imam ibn al-Jawzi, ibn Hazm, and al-Ghazali, as surveyed above felt otherwise.



— Mufti 'Ali Goma'ah, transmitted via Sidi Terence Helikaon Nunis of A Muslim Convert Once More