Towards Understanding Hadith

Legality of the Four Schools of Sunni Islamic Thought

Are lay-Muslims obliged to follow only one of the four schools of jurisprudence of the Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama’ah? Are there any other options that one can follow? Regarding this oft-debated issue, there is a difference between learning and applying.

When it comes to applying, abiding by a certain legal school of jurisprudence for laymen is not obligatory in every matter as they are eligible to adopt the legal opinion of other juristic scholars and mujtahidun. Therefore, ordinary laymen have no certain legal school of jurisprudence because they follow the juristic opinion of the scholar they ask.

This is the established opinion for the Hanafis. The renowned Hanafi scholar Imam ibn ‘Abidin stated in his commentary in reference to Imam ash-Sharnibali that he said,

“One does not have to abide by a certain legal school and he is permitted to follow an opinion which opposes the opinion of the juristic legal school which he follows. He is allowed to adopt two opposite opinions in two separate incidents that are not related to each other. He is not permitted to nullify an action he did by the virtue of following the juristic opinion of another scholar because engaging in an action is similar to passing a verdict by a judge with no appeal.”

This opinion is supported by Allah as He asserted the obligation of following scholars in general with no specification or dedication to one scholar over the other. Allah says:

…if ye realize this not, ask of those who possess the Message.
[Quran 16:43]

Also when people posed their questions at the time of the Prophet’s Companions and the scholars of the next generation, they did not abide by a certain school but they rather asked eligible scholars without limiting themselves with the opinion of someone while denying the opinion of the other.

Following one of the opinions of the mujtahidun, eligible scholars who practice independent legal reasoning, ijithad, is in fact, following the truth. All the mujtahidun are correct and this means that each of them follows his own independent legal reasoning which led them to believe in the validity of the concluded ruling. As one chooses to follow any of the scholarly opinions of these renowned mujtahidun, he should not believe that this is the only correct juristic opinions and other opinions are invalid.

As for the issue of learning and studying different legal schools of jurisprudence, following a certain school of jurisprudence is inevitable. The four schools of jurisprudence of the Ahlus-Sunnah w'al-Jama’ah were well served and deeply studied by generations of renowned scholars in a way that other schools of jurisprudence were not subjected to. The four schools were well edited and the popular and favored opinions were highlighted and backed with authentic supporting evidence. The biographies of the renowned scholars of each school were documented and their methodologies of deriving juristic legal rulings were scrutinized so each of them became an independent school of jurisprudence that benefits those who seek religious knowledge.

Therefore, if following a certain legal school of jurisprudence is not mandatory then what is the Divine Wisdom behind having four different legal schools of jurisprudence with so many various juristic opinions? Why the scholars do not agree on one juristic opinion and base their opinions only on definite authentic legal evidence?

The issues of the shari’ah are divided into two categories.

The first category has to do with issues that reached the Muslims’ consensus such as the number of the obligatory prayers, specifying the month of fasting, destination of prayer, location of pilgrimage, prohibition of intoxicants, adultery and usury and other matters which formulate the Islamic identity. These matters are not subject to dispute as the legal evidences of these matters are definite.

The second category has to do with issues which the scholars differed about. The reason for their different opinion is related to the fact that Allah made the supporting legal evidences for these issues speculative and not definite which means that the evidence bears the possibility of multiple ways of understanding it.

The shari’ah could have been formed of only the first category which refers to matters of consensus with no disputes among scholars. But the fact is that Allah decided for this religion to be the final Divine Word from Heaven to Earth and it is Last Testament from Allah to the whole of Creation. Therefore, the second category was solid evidence and an eye witness to testify to the flexibility of the shari’ah and its applicability in different times, various geographical locations, all circumstances and diverse people.

Prophet Muhammad conferred the validity of differences in understanding the possible legal evidence when he said to his companions,

“No one among you prays the afternoon prayer until you reach the tribe of Banu Qurayza.”

Some of the Prophet’s companions abided by the literal understanding of the Prophet’s words and refused to pray the afternoon prayer until they reached the tribe of Banu Qurayza which was after the sunset prayer. Other companions understood the embedded meanings behind the Prophet’s words, which was some sort of encouragement and stimulation not to be late in arriving to Banu Qurayza, so they prayed the afternoon prayer while along their way to Banu Qurayza before the sunset prayer was due in accordance with following the spirit of the text and not its literal meaning. These two different opinions resemble the two different intrinsic natures of human beings; abiding by the literal meaning of the text and embracing the spirit of the text.

The Prophet did not deny the opinion of any of the two parties which indicates the legality and permissibility of differences in understanding and opinions as this kind of differences falls under variation and not contradiction. Therefore it was said,

“Differences among my Ummah is a Mercy.”

If the legal evidences on these matters were definite, there would be no room for scholarly debate. It was according to Allah’s Divine Wisdom that the legal evidences on these matters were speculative and probable to make it easier on people so this is one of the beauties of religion.

Confrontations and disputes only occurred among some Muslims who did not understand these prominent meanings of the concept of ‘difference’ in the philosophy of the shari’ah. They, unfortunately, dealt with speculative issues with the mindset of one exclusive opinion that does not bear the possibility of change or alteration and at the same time they deem their opponents as wrong or innovator in religion and this attitude is prohibited and not allowed.

— Mufti Ali Goma'a, transmitted via Sidi Terence Helikaon Nunis of A Muslim Convert Once More

History and Source of Islamic Law

As a religion which includes doctrine, law and ethics, Islam forms a complete and comprehensive worldview for human life. Islamic Law, fiqh, for its part, is the means by which we are capable of producing appropriate rulings through derivation from the revelatory foundational texts of prophecy. Such foundational texts come in two forms, which are, the ‘recited,’ that is, the Holy Qur’an, and the ‘unrecited,’ that is, the pure Prophetic Traditions, Sunnah.

After its initial period of direct legislation in the time of the Prophet, Islamic Law has undergone many stages, each of which has its own distinctive features and impact on its current form. It is appropriate, then, that there be a study of these stages, which is not simply a description and explanation of the past, but which also serves the present by contributing to greater expertise and depth in understanding the Shari’ah.

The purpose of studying the history of any science is to come to know its foundational principles, central concerns, and ultimate goals and benefits so that we may better learn from it. Islamic Law is no exception to this, for it is not simply a collection of legal rulings in matters of ritual worship or transactions; rather, it is a complete methodology for all the various facets of human life: doctrine, ritual worship, society, economics, law-making, and politics. Indeed, in its later stages, Islamic Law evolved to be an impressive edifice, organizing civilization in all of its social interactions and human relationships with sophistication and nuance.

This, of course, gives the study of the history of Islamic Law a great importance, because fiqh treats human life in all its details and forms, such that it might be said that the Shari’ah is the basis upon which the entire ummah is built, and the logic that serves as the focal point for Islamic Civilization.

Linguistically speaking, the word shari’ah has two meanings. The first is ‘a source of flowing water meant for drinking.’ Secondly, it means a ‘straight and unwavering path,’ as Allah Almighty Says:

Then We put thee on the Path: so follow thou that…
[Quran 45:18]

Thereafter, Shari’ah came to express, in the language of the jurists, the rulings prescribed by Allah for His servants, so that they may become proper believers. These rulings are known as the Shari’ah because they are decisive – there is no deviance from their program, nor divergence from their objectives.

Tashri’, legislation, is the enacting of the Shari’ah, that is to say, the setting down of its principles and explication of the order and system that both individuals and groups are to comply with. Of course, in this manner of speaking, Islamic Legislation properly existed only in the lifetime of the Prophet, because Allah has not given the power of legislation to anyone other than His Prophets. And in this, the Prophet Muhammad relied on two types of revelation: ‘the recited,’ the Qur’an itself; and the ‘unrecited,’ the Sunnah.

Based on this, it might be said that the history of Islamic Legislation refers only to that which took place during the Prophet Muhammad’s life, and does not include the many discrete rulings which thereafter revealed themselves to the minds of the mujtahidun. However, the scholars have tended to expand the referent of this branch of knowledge. As Sheikh Muhammad ‘Ali as-Sa’ayis said,

“The history of Islamic Legislation is a discipline in which is treated the nature of Islamic Law during the lifetime of the Prophet, as well as in subsequent eras. It specifies the different time periods in which rulings came to be, and elucidates what occurred during them with respect to abrogation, specification, expansion, etc. It also discusses the jurists and mujtahidun and their relationship to these rulings.”

The Islamic Shari’ah is a Divine Law, meaning that it is prescribed by Allah Himself. The differences between it and the positive law are as follows:

1. The Shari’ah is a sacred religious law, through which one is taught how to worship Allah, compliance with which is considered obedience to Allah deserving of reward, and violation of which is sinful disobedience meriting punishment.
   Although it may also specify worldly punishments, it is connected to the afterlife in terms of reward and punishment, as opposed to positive legislation which does not deal with what is in people’s hearts.
2. Islamic Law seeks to elevate Man, purify his heart, and refine his soul. Positive legislation simply strives to regulate society without regard to individual’s character and ethics.
3. Islamic Law commands the good and forbids the evil, whereas positive legislation is concerned only with prohibitions. It does not compel good works except incidentally.
4. Islamic Legislation pronounces on both the internal and external actions of man, whereas positive law restricts itself to the external and observable.
5. The Principles of Shari’ah do not apply to one people at the exclusion of another, or to one time period at the exclusion of another. They are universal principles to fulfill the needs of all people regardless of nation or era, and raise their standing in all eras.
   As for positive legislation, it is specific to a given group in a given time, and so is in need of change whenever that constituency evolves and their particular demands change.

Regarding the sources of Islamic Legislation, the first source is the Qur’an. The Qur’an is the Revealed Speech of God which is inimitable, whose recitation is considered worship, and which has been mass-transmitted to us. It is definitively authentic, qat’iy ath-thubut, though some of its verses may not be completely definitive in their meaning, qat’iy adh-dhalalah, but only probable.

The Word of Allah, the Qur’an, is absolute; that is to say, it is independent of time and place; it addresses all, not just those at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, nor simply those in the Arabian Peninsula but the Qur’anic discourse is catered to all of humanity belonging to all regions and generations.

The Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet in portions over twenty-three years, the majority of which he spent in Mecca. Allah says in the Qur’an:

It is a Recitation which We have divided, in order that thou might recite it to men at intervals...
[Quran 17:106]

For this reason, scholars have partitioned the Qur’an into two phases, the Meccan and the Medinan, though they have differed on the precise criteria for this categorization.

The most accepted opinion is that the Meccan is that portion of the Qur’an revealed before the Prophet’s migration, hijrah, and the Medinan is that which was revealed after it even if some of it was technically revealed in Mecca.

An alternative opinion is that the Meccan is whatever was revealed in Mecca even if it was after the migration, and the Medinan is that which was revealed only in Medina.

A third opinion is that the Meccan is that which is addressed to the people of Mecca, and the Medinan is that which was revealed addressing the people of Medina.

The benefits of understanding this categorization are the following:

1. We come to know which verses came later, thus reliably consider what to abrogate, qualify or specify.
2. We come to know the history of legislation, and the wisdom of its gradual application.
3. We come to develop a confidence in the Qur’an, and its sound transmission to us without any alterations.

Anyone who has read the Qur’an will have noticed that the Meccan verses have their own exclusive characteristics not found in the Medinan, even though the latter are an extension of the former in terms of rulings and legislation.

Since the pre-Islamic Arabs were idolaters, associating partners with Allah, while denying the Day of Judgement, and because their eloquence was well-known, the Meccan Revelations were concerned with addressing them with that which was appropriate for their situation: providing proofs and clear-cut arguments in an effort to invite them to monotheism, to make clear their evil ways, to prove Muhammad's Prophethood, to offer them parables, to admonish them with lessons from previous nations, to establish proofs for Creation, and to engage in rational debate.

It is only upon the formation of a group of believers in Allah, His Angels, His Scriptures, His Appointed Messengers and the Day of Judgement, and their subsequent enduring of extreme difficulties, and migration to Medina, that the Medinan verses were revealed, comprising the rulings of Islam, and its limits and penal codes; explaining the principles of legislation; setting out rules for society, relationships between family members, and the connection between individuals and groups.

Below are the most prominent features of the Meccan and Medinan verses respectively:

Regarding the Meccan Revelations, they can be recognized by their distinguishing features that,

1. Through the Signs of Allah in Creation, they call to monotheism, the exclusive worship of Allah, the affirmation of Prophethood, the prophetic mission, and rewards and punishments; through rational proofs, they respond and debate with the polytheists; they also mention the Day of Judgement and the Hellfire.
2. They establish the general principles of legislation and ethics upon which society is based; they expose the scandals of the polytheists in terms of bloodshed, unjustly usurping the wealth of orphans, burying their daughters alive, and other practices.
3. They recount stories of the prophets and past nations, so that unbelievers may come to know the fate of those who came before them; they also console the Prophet Muhammad and his companions so that they may endure their abuses, and be assured of victory over them.
4. They appeal to the reader aesthetically by using powerful language, short verses, and choice words.
5. The mode of address in the Meccan verses are very broad and general, often taking the form of “O mankind,” or “O Sons of Adam.” In contrast, the Medinan verses primarily address the believers, very often with the phrasing, “O you who believe,” or the Jews and Christians referred to as, “O People of the Book”
6. Covenants recur often in Meccan verses. There are approximately thirty examples of establishing covenants in this period, whereas there is only one example in the Medinan verses, which is:

The unbelievers think that they will not be raised up for Judgment.
Say, "Yea, by my Lord, ye shall surely be raised up: then shall ye be told the truth of all that ye did..."
[Quran 64:7]

Regarding the Medinan Revelations, they can be recognized by their distinguishing features that,

1. They are an explanation of laws governing rituals, transactions and relationships, penal codes, inheritance, virtues of struggling in the Path of Allah, family structure, and the relationship between state and society, along with the principles and main concerns of lawmaking.
2. They address the People of the Book, the Jews and Christians, inviting them to Islam, making clear the manner in which they have handled previous scriptures, and indicting them for deviating from the truth, dissenting among themselves out of envy after knowledge had come to them.
3. They reveal the real behavior of the hypocrites, munafiqun, exposing that which they tried to conceal, analyzing their mentalities, and making clear their danger to true religious traditions.
4. They are lengthy passages setting down the Shari’ah, and clarifying its objectives and goals.

Regarding the objectives of the Qur’an, there are three principal objectives:

• That it serve as Guidance for Mankind, which can be further categorized into two types:

• A general Guidance for all people, as Allah Himself says:

Ramadan is the month in which was sent down the Qur'an as a Guide to Mankind with manifest Signs for Criterion and Judgment...
[Quran 2:185]

And again:

Verily this is no less than a Message to the worlds:
[Quran 81:27]

•  A specific Guidance catered for believers, as Allah also says:

It is a Guide and Glad-Tidings for the believers
[Quran 27:2]

And Allah doth advance in Guidance those who seek guidance...
[Quran 19:76]

… Say: "It is a Guide and a Healing to those who believe…"
[Quran 41:44]

• That it be a manifest sign in support of the Prophet. In other words, the Qur’an stands in the world as a Sign attesting to the Message of the Prophet Muhammad, and endures throughout all of time forever as an Everlasting Miracle articulating Guidance and the True Faith, superior to all others, as Allah says:

It is He Who has sent His Messenger with Guidance and the Religion of Truth, to proclaim it over all religion: and enough is Allah for a Witness.
[Quran 48:28]

• That creation is capable of worshiping Allah through its recitation, and that they may be rewarded for simply repeating His Words.

Those who rehearse the Book of Allah, establish regular prayer, and spend in charity out of what We have provided for them, secretly and openly, hope for a commerce that will never fail: for He will pay them their meed, nay, He will bestow unto them even more so from His Infinite Bounty; for He is the Oft-Forgiving, Most Ready to appreciate service.
[Quran 35:29-30]

The second source of Islamic Legislation is the Prophetic Tradition, that is, the Sunnah of Hazrat Muhammad.

The Sunnah is defined as statements, actions, tacit approvals, or qualities related about the Prophet. In terms of statements, we may take the example of that which is related from ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, who said,

I heard the Prophet say: “Actions are by intentions. So, every person will have that which he intended.”

In the category of actions are included all actions of the Prophet that have reached us, such as his manner of doing ablution, wudu’, and of performing the pilgrimage, hajj and so on and so forth. As an example, we have a hadith from the Prophet saying,

“Pray as you have seen me pray.”

Similarly in his final pilgrimage, he said,

“Take the hajj rituals from me.”

Tacit approvals consist of the Prophet’s affirmations of the statements or actions of some of the companions, either through his silence and, therefore, lack of repudiation, or through his expressed agreement and commendation. Examples of this include the narration of Abu Sa’id al-Khudri who said,

Two men set out on travel. When the time for prayer came, neither of them had any water in their possession. So they performed tayammum and prayed. Thereafter, they came across water while the time of prayer had not expired. One of them performed his regular ablutions and repeated his prayer, while the other did not do so. Then, they came to the Prophet and mentioned to him what had transpired. He said to the one who did not repeat the prayer,

You have achieved the Sunnah, and your prayer was valid.

And to the one who performed the ablutions and prayed again, he said,

You have two rewards.

As for qualities, many of the Prophet’s qualities and characteristics have been related. Some scholars have even taken to compiling these, such as Imam at-Tirmidhi in his work, ash-Shama’il.

Regarding the types of rulings found in the Sunnah, we have many:

• Rulings that echo and emphasize the rulings of the Qur’an. An example of this is a hadith related by the Companion Anas ibn Malik who said that the Prophet said,

“The wealth of a Muslim is not permissible to another except with his agreement and permission.” 

This is in agreement with the verse:

O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities; but let there be among you traffic and trade by mutual good-will...
[Quran 4:29]

• Rulings that clarify and explain general Commandments in the Qur’an. An example of this is that which clarifies the amounts for zakat.

• Rulings that restrict or specify general commands of the Qur’an. An example is the general Qur’anic Command to amputate the hand of the thief, which the Sunnah specified is to be done at the wrist. Another example is the general Qur’anic prohibition against eating carrion
  However, the following hadith from Abdullah ibn ‘Umar exempts seafood from this prohibition.
  According to ibn ‘Umar, the Prophet said,

“Two types of blood and two types of carcasses have been made permissible for us to eat:
of the carcass, fish and locusts; and of the blood, liver and spleen.”

Forbidden to you are carcasses, blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been invoked the name of other than Allah...
[Quran 5:3]

• New rulings not mentioned in the Qur’an, because the Sunnah is an independent source of legislation. In this regard, it is not unlike the Qur’an. It is reliably transmitted that the Prophet said,

“I have been given the Qur’an and something like it with it... So mandatory upon you is the Qur’an. What you find deemed permissible in it has been made permissible for you, and what you find deemed impermissible in it has been made impermissible for you. So, neither the domesticated donkey nor any predator with fangs is permissible for you.” 

This means the Prophet was given the Qur’an and something like it, the Sunnah. The rulings of both must be followed, and from this we come to know of the prohibition against eating both domesticated donkeys and fanged predators, as well as the prohibition against eating birds with claws, and the rulings on the inheritance of the grandmother, and so forth.

We may categorize the rulings mentioned in the Qur’an and Sunnah as follows,

• Doctrine: Belief in Allah, and His Angels, Scriptures, Prophets, as well as the Day of Judgement, and Fate, the good and the bad, and all that follows from the above, such as belief in the Unseen, matters of eschatology, Allah’s Reckoning, Paradise and Hell.
• Ritual worship: Rulings about the relationship between Allah and His servant, in terms of their exclusive worship of Him. These include prayer, alms-giving, fasting, pilgrimage, and all the conditions, constituent parts, obligations, and encouragements associated with the above.
• Personal status: Rulings related to the regulation of family matters. These include marriage, dowries, divorce, the rights and obligations of married life, maintenance obligations, inheritance laws, and things related to these matters.
• Transactions: Rulings concerning people’s relationship with one another, and their financial transactions like sale, interest, loans, pawning, sureties, representationship and proxy, partnership, and agricultural contracts; as well as the economic principles of Islam in general.
• Public policies and governance: Rulings related to the system of governance, and the principles of political leadership towards their constituents; as well as the rights and obligations of each. These include discussions on the status of the ruler, governors, and viziers and the judiciary.
• Punitive law: Rulings on punishing criminals, including lex talionis, blood-money, and mandatory and discretionary punishments.
• International law: Rulings related to the relationship between Islamic polities and others in terms of war, peace, security, and treaties.
• Rulings related to eating, drinking, and clothing: what is permissible and what is not. The general rule is that of permissibility unless textually proven to be forbidden.
• Ethics, virtue, and social protocol: These include the etiquette of social gatherings, visiting one another, greetings, seeking permission in some matters, and eating and drinking in gatherings, as well as encouragement to virtues such as humility, forbearance and patience.

The third source of Islamic Legislation is Consensus,  Ijma’. Linguistically, it means to be determined and tenacious. In fiqh terminology, it is the agreement of the Ummah of Muhammad on a matter of religious significance.

Imam al-Ghazali maintains in his al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul that this agreement removes any doubts or alternative possibilities that might arise through an exclusive reliance on the proof itself. For this reason, an object of such a consensus must be acted upon; it is impermissible to oppose it.

A consensus must be based on evidence, for it is wrong to adopt an opinion without evidence in matters of Shari’ah. The Islamic Nation cannot unanimously agree on an error, as is narrated in numerous ahadith. An example is that which is narrated by ‘Abdullah ibn Dinar on the authority of ibn ‘Umar, who said that the Prophet said,

“Allah will not unite my ummah on misguidance. The Hand of Allah is with the greater group, and whoever deviates from it, takes himself to Hell.”

Sheikh Abu ‘Isa explained that, according to scholars, the ‘group’ refers to the people of fiqh and ahadith.

Another example is narrated by Anas ibn Malik who said,

“I heard the Prophet saying,

My ummah will not unite on misguidance; if you see them differing, follow the majority.” 

The basis of ijma’ may be a text from the Qur’an or Sunnah, or it may equally be an analogical argument, custom, or other types of ijtihad. There are two types of ijma’:

1. Express consensus, which is when all mujtahidun agree on a matter in an explicit and clear manner; each of them articulates his opinion, and they all coincide.
2. Tacit consensus, which is when some mujtahidun offer their opinion on a matter, all the others come to know of it and they remain silent, offering neither objection nor corroboration.

There is still great importance for ijma’ in our times. Consensus is a valid legal source, from which we can come to know the legal rulings about new occurrences happening in our day and age. We believe this is only possible in the present circumstances through the formation of fiqh councils encompassing all mujtahidun from the different parts of the Muslim World. There should be a specific place set aside for these councils, and they must be given what they need to carry out their research. They must carefully study these new matters, arrive at the proper rulings, and disseminate them in regular periodicals or specialized works so that people can refer to them and other scholars may further offer their opinions in them. If what is arrived at amounts to a consensus, and this consensus corresponds to that of the texts of the jurists, the ruling must be followed and acted upon.

The fourth source of Islamic Legislation is Analogical Reasoning known as Qiyas. Imam al-Ghazali in his al-Mustasfa defined Qiyas as the application of one case to another because of a common element between them for the purposes of affirming or denying a judgement on both of them.

The scholars proved the authoritativeness of qiyas through many evidences. These include the verse:

…take warning then, O ye with eyes to see!
[Quran 59:2]

Here, the ‘warning,’ or in other translations, the ‘lesson,’ means to apply the moral of a tale from one account to another like it if they share a common meaning, as ibn ‘Abbas maintained. Other proofs include the verses:

… if they had only referred it to the Messenger or to those charged with authority among them, then the ones who can draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it.
[Quran 4:83]

And,

… nothing have We omitted from the Book...
[Quran 6:38]

The latter means that the narrations in the Qur'an speak of every matter in the world one may encounter even if it is not directly spoken of. There may be accounts within the Qur'an, the moral message of which could be applied elsewhere due to a share commonality of the events.

We may add to these verses other evidences, such as the hadith about the Prophet sending Hazrat Mu’adh ibn Jabal to Yemen. Before he did so, he asked him,

“If a judicial matter comes to you, how will you judge?”

Hazrat Mu’adh replied,

“I will judge by the Book of Allah.”

The Prophet questioned again,

“And if you don’t find it in the Book of Allah?”

Hazrat Mu’adh responded,

“Then, by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah.”

The Prophet questioned once more,

“And if you find it neither in the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah nor His Book?”

Hazrat Mu’adh answered,

“I will exercise my judgement, and will not refrain from doing so.”

The Prophet struck his chest, and said,

“Praise be to Allah Who endowed the messenger of the Messenger of Allah with that which pleases the Messenger of Allah.”

There are evidences other than these four, though they are disagreed upon. Some have reckoned them to number over forty. There are additional sources of Shari’ah, adopted by some and rejected by others. These include juristic discretion, istihsan; the presumption of continuity, istishhab; cutting off means to the forbidden, sadd adh-dhara’i; public welfare, al-masalih al-mursala and many others.

Now let us move on to the great historical periods of Islamic Legislation.
The first of them is the Prophetic Epoch. This was during the lifetime of the Prophet himself, peace be upon him.

The manner of legislation in the time of the Prophet did not depend on legal reasoning based on hypothetical circumstances and occurrences, nor was there a codification of the law and rulings as was the case in subsequent periods. Rather, legislation in this period proceeded in step with the reality of the Prophet’s worldview.

It was clear to the Muslims at the time that if they were confronted with a matter requiring a judgement, they were to refer it to the Prophet, and it would be answered through a verse, or some verses, revealed to him from Allah, or through a hadith. On occasion, the ruling would be clarified to them through the Prophet’s own actions, or through his approval or rejection of the actions of another.

Regardless of what the Prophet’s response was, it would not emanate except from a Revelation from his Lord either through the Qur’an or his Sunnah, as Allah says in the Qur'an:

Nor does he speak of his own desire. It is no less than Inspiration sent down to him.
[Quran 53:3-4]

We may draw three conclusions from this discussion:

1. Legislative authority in this period rested exclusively with the Prophet. And the reference for legislation at this time was revelation in its two forms, the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
2. The verses of the Qur’an were revealed according to specific circumstances, or as a response to a question. Very few were not preceded by an event or query which motivated it. This is what the scholars mention in the science of asbab an-nuzul, the Circumstances of Revelation.
3. Islamic Law was not all revealed at once.
4. Rather, it came gradually in parts in the form of Qur’anic verses and ahadith.

Next comes the Epoch of the Salaf as-Salehin helmed by the Noble Companions, Sahaba; the Followers, Tabi’un; and the Righteous Caliphs, al-Khulafa Rashidun.

With the death of the Prophet came an end to active revelatory legislation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. However, these were the two great resources left behind for subsequent generations from that period. And so, law began to develop and expand in the period of the companions and followers.

This happened because the jurists encountered new circumstances which were not present during the lifetime of the Prophet, but they remained duty-bound to come to know Allah’s Ruling in these new matters. These new matters arose in part as a result of the wars of this period, and so, they had to address the nature of relations among Muslims, and between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially during war. This, in turn, led to a number of legal matters, such as rules relating to the Islamic Conquests, and the expansion of the Islamic Empire and Muslims’ interactions with the people of those lands, for every land has its own customs and traditions, ʿUrf.

As a result, the companions and followers embarked on the task of determining the rulings concerning these matters. So they performed ijtihad, made use of their opinions in light of the principles and objectives of the Shari’ah. This is how the notion of ijtihad bi'r-ra’y or independent reasoning arose as an independent source of Islamic Law; of course, it did not exist during the time of the Prophet when recourse could be made to Revelation.

Evidently, any ijtihad based on ra’y will give rise to differences of opinion, and this is what happened in this period. In some cases, though, the jurists engaged in ijtihad and found themselves in agreement. This agreement is considered a consensus, ijma’; this is how ijma’ came to be a source of law; this also did not exist during the Prophet's lifetime.

In addition, challenges emerged to the Sunnah as a result of the jurists being spread out in different locales and encountering different occurrences. So, the need was felt to investigate the Principles of the Sunnah and ensure that there existed some who preserved it by discussing and relating it, and by extracting rulings from it. In this period, the jurists treated novel matters by searching for a ruling in the Book of Allah. If they did not find it there, they turned to the Sunnah. If they still did not find an appropriate ruling, they turned to ra’y and ruled according to their ijtihad.

There is no doubt that this is a sound methodology, for the jurists did not resort to their own ra’y unless they could not find anything in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Although, they were not all equal in this matter, for some of them made extensive use of ra’y, and some used it sparingly.

Imam ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah said in ‘Ilam al-Muwaqqi’in,

“The task of issuing fatawa then fell to the companions – the elite of Islam and faith, the army of the Qur’an and ar-Rahman.
They were amongst the ummah, the most tender of hearts, the most profoundly knowledgeable, the least pretentious, the most eloquent, the truest in faith, the most general in giving advice, and the closest to Allah.
They varied between those who issued numerous fatawa, those who gave only a few, and those who occupied an intermediate position between these.”

We may enumerate seven companions who used ra’y extensively:

1. ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab
2. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib
3. ‘Abdullah ibn Mas’ud
4. ‘Aisha binte Abu Bakr
5. Zayd ibn Thabit
6. ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas
7. ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar

Those who occupied an intermediary status in this regard included:

1. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq
2. Umm Salamahsour
3. Anas ibn Malik
4. Abu Sa’id al-Khudri
5. Abu Hurayrah
6. ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan
7. ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘As

The rest gave fatawa only occasionally, such as the likes of:

1. Abu ‘Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah
2. Abu Talha
3. Abu Dharr
4. Umm ‘Atiyyah
5. Safiyyah

Following the Epoch of the Salaf comes the Epoch of the Two Parties of Ijtihad bi'r-Ra’y.

Ijtihad bi'r-ra’y in this period was based on an assessment of the underlying causes, ‘illas, of rulings and a consideration for public welfare. The jurists were in one of two camps in this regard:

1. Those who were cautious of ra’y and made only occasional recourse to it
2. Those who were not intimidated by the use of ra’y and resorted to it whenever they felt the need

The majority of the first camp, known as the school of the people of ahadith, was in Medina and the Hejaz.

Their major representative was Imam Sa’id ibn al-Musayyib, one of the famed seven jurists who learned fiqh from the companions and spread it in Medina. Imam Sa’id was one of the most prominent followers in terms of learning, religiosity, piety and virtue, and so is often known as the jurist of jurists. The seven jurists are:

1. Imam Sa’id ibn al-Musayyib
2. Imam ‘Urwa ibn Zubayr
3. Imam Qasim ibn Muhammad
4. Imam Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn al-Harith
5. Imam ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Utba ibn Mas’ud
6. Imam Sulayman ibn Yasar
7. Imam Kharija ibn Zayd ibn Thabit

The majority of the second group, the school of the people of ra’y, could be found in Kufa and Iraq. Their principal proponent was Imam Ibrahim ibn Yazid an-Nakha’i, the sheikh of Imam Hammad ibn Abu Sulayman.

This period came to an end without there being any codification of either of the sciences of fiqh and ahadith. There were, however, some preliminary attempts. Caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, for example, wrote to his representative in Medina, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Hazm, to look for what there was of the ahadith, or Sunnah, of the Prophet and write it down. However, the Caliph died before his agent could complete what he was ordered to do.

Next came the Epoch of the Mujtahidun. This period began at the outset of the second hijri century and extended to the middle of the fourth. In this period, fiqh grew and flourished, and the questions it treated multiplied in an unprecedented manner. This phenomenon is due to a number of reasons, including:

• The regard of the Abbasid Caliphs for law and the jurists. This is evident in their closeness to the jurists, and their resorting to them for their opinions.
• The expansion of the Islamic Empire which stretched from Spain to China. In these vast lands, it became necessary to take account of the various customs and traditions of the people as long as they did not contravene the foundational texts. Therefore, people’s ijtihad differed based on the variation of their customs and traditions.

• The emergence of great mujtahidun with superior qualifications and talents, and their work in developing fiqh in order to respond to the needs of the state for organization and laws. Furthermore, they formed schools which were populated by distinguished jurists.
• The compilation of the Sunnah, which enabled the jurists to distinguish the sound from the weak ahadith, and, so, make better use of them in a more convenient fashion. The Sunnah, of course, is the very subject matter of fiqh, and one of its most important sources.

After the Epoch of the Mujtahidun came the Era of Taqlid

This period began midway through the fourth century and continued until the fall of Baghdad in 656 AH. This is the period of the stagnation of fiqh, for the jurists tended towards taqlid although the standard until then was that there be an independent mujtahid not bound to a specific madhhab, juristic school of thought, but rather restricted only by the texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah and that which acceptable ijtihad leads him to – acceptable ijtihad being an extraction of legal rulings from the two great sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

In this period, the ambitions of the jurists were weak. They considered themselves deficient, and incapable of following in the footsteps of previous mujtahidun, despite their mastery in fiqh, and the ease with which they could now access the Sunnah source material.

Among the reasons for the prevalence of taqlid among all but a rare few of the jurists were:

1. The weakness of the political power wielded by the Abbasid Dynasty. The Islamic Empire was no longer what it once had been – it had now been split up into portions with small states governing the many fractured areas. This has a serious impact on the lives of jurists, and the development of law.
2. The various schools of thought had now been codified in a comprehensive manner, after a refining of its major issues and concerns, and the organization of its content. This led to a certain contentment with this juristic heritage, and a feeling of being able to dispense with further investigation and derivation of rulings.
3. A lack of confidence in oneself, and a fear of ijtihad. The jurists accused themselves of weakness and deficiency, and considered themselves incapable of taking the rulings directly from the original sources. They thought it best and most suitable that they restrict themselves to a well-known madhhab, to stick and abide by to its rulings, and to learn its methodology, usul, without diverging from them.

In this period, the gate of ijtihad was closed. For, when the jurists saw that the claims to ijtihad were being made only by those who were incapable of it, they feared that the religion of the people would be corrupted by inferior fatawa based on neither knowledge nor understanding. So, they pronounced on the closing of the gate of ijtihad, to safeguard from this corruption and to protect the people.

However, the truth is that ijtihad persisted and did not disappear entirely. It was simply that ijtihad had to be preceded by the fulfillment of certain conditions – whoever possessed the requisite capacities was entitled to perform ijtihad; whoever did not, it was prohibited for him to issue fatawa without knowledge.

Despite this stagnation, the jurists undertook many beneficial tasks, including:

1. Determining the operational legal causes for rulings transmitted from their a’immah, for not every position had been transmitted with its reasoning.
2. Extracting the principles of derivation from the rulings of the madhhab, so that the methods of ijtihad adopted by the imam may be known.
3. Weighing the different opinions transmitted from the imam, and choosing some over others. For it could have been that the transmitted opinion was retracted without the transmitter knowing this fact; or alternatively that there was a subtle difference between two variant opinions which explained the difference between them; or again that one opinion was adopted according to a strict analogy, while another was adopted for other considerations out of a jurist’s discretion. So, the jurists of this period would grant preponderance to some of these opinions over others in light of the principles of their established madhhab.
4. Organizing the fiqh of their madhhab, by categorizing, explaining and commenting on the rulings, and supporting them with evidences; and mentioning points of conflict with other madhahib, the reasons for these disagreements, and the evidences in support of their madhhab’s positions.

There is no doubt that these contributions constituted a great service to fiqh, by expanding and explaining the field.

Finally, we have the Modern Epoch. This period begins with the fall of Baghdad in the seventh century and extends to our times. Fiqh did not recover from this stifling environment and the jurists did not change their approach. So restrictiveness became widespread.

There were, though, a few individuals here and there who were dissatisfied with taqlid and called for unrestricted ijtihad based on direct interaction with the Qur’an and Sunnah, and not restricting oneself to a specific madhhab. However, these were few in number, and the majority of the muqallid jurists did not accept their criticisms. So, the jurists of this period oriented themselves towards writing, specially towards statements of doctrine which came to be so terse that they began to impair and obscure the intended meanings, resembling instead aphoristic writing. These texts, called the mutun, were in need of commentaries, shuruh, to explain their meanings and clarify ambiguities. Then, notes and comments appeared in the margins of these commentaries: these were called glosses, hawashi.

Writing, however, was not restricted to these genres. There were also books of fatawa: responses to questions posed by the people as to their daily practical lives. These individual responses were gathered either by their author or by others, and organized according to the chapter scheme of books of fiqh. Also, many of these fatawa were accompanied either by evidences from the texts of the school, madhhab, or the mufti, or by evidences from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and other primary sources without reference to a specific madhhab.

The Modern Epoch also consists of the Modern Revival Epoch which we are in today. In our era, we are witnessing a revival of fiqh from a variety of perspectives: a greater regard for the discipline of fiqh in university teaching; the comparative study of fiqh; an exposure to its distinguishing characteristics and features; and an attempt to reconcile the culture of law with the culture of the Shari’ah. We hope for an increase in the regard being accorded to the Shari’ah and fiqh so that it reclaims its original standing as law proper, and that the state undertakes appropriate legislation as was the case in the past.

One of the phenomena of the contemporary revival of fiqh is the resurgence of writing in the discipline. Among the reasons for this is the storming of the field by extreme tendencies, who have sought to critique religious texts. And so many serious writings have emerged as a sort of response to this orientation, delineating the manner of interacting with the Shari’ah texts, and presenting the Principles of Islam. This genre has fulfilled its role of strengthening the confidence of Muslims in their religion and heritage.

Other phenomena include the formation of fiqh councils, scientific meetings, Islamic universities. In addition, there have been other institutions which have played the crucial role of bringing the different schools of thought together, and teaching fiqh according to the different madhahib, and so contributing greatly to minimizing and limiting partisanship between the schools.

Many contemporary scholars have distinguished themselves in this field in both the east and the west, contributing to this revival, and to the study of fiqh from a variety of directions. An example of this is Dr ‘Abdul-Hakim Jackson, professor at the University of Michigan in the United States. He has many studies of fiqh, including his book titled Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihabuddin al-Qarafi.

A genre that has emerged as part of this revival is the fiqh of minorities. The word ‘minorities’ is a political term indicating a constituency within a nation-state that belongs to a linguistic, ethnic, or religious group other than that of the majority. It is best to include this as a sub-genre of fiqh in the general sense – which includes both the doctrinal and practical aspects of the Shari’ah. This is the meaning intended by the Prophet when he said,

“He for whom Allah wishes good, He gives him understanding in religion.”

So, the fiqh of minorities is that portion of fiqh which evinces a regard for the connection of the legal ruling with the circumstances of such a group and the place in which they live. It is, in other words, a fiqh for a group that finds itself in special circumstances: some things may be appropriate for it that are not appropriate for others. The one who treats such matters is in need also of knowledge of the social sciences, especially sociology, economics, finance, law, political science and international relations.

Today, we are in need of placing such a fiqh on a strong footing, which in reality is already well established in a number of legal principles, such as:

• Legal obligation is based on one’s capacity to fulfill the obligation, as in the verse,

On no soul doth Allah place a burden greater than it can bear...
[Quran 2:286] 

• The Shari’ah is built on ease and facility. The Qur’an says,

…Allah intends every facility for you, He does not want to put you to difficulties...
[Quran 2:185]

…and has imposed no difficulties on you in religion…
[Quran 22:78]

• There are both supererogatory actions and dispensations in the religion. People of strength are entitled to perform the former, while people of weakness are entitled to take advantage of the latter. In both cases, what is sought is ease. As such, it is necessary to make things easy for those living outside Muslim lands.
• The scholars have also settled on a famous principle, namely that fatawa change with time, place, custom and circumstances. This is what is meant when we differentiate between those who live within Muslim countries and those who live outside of them.

— Mufti Ali Goma'a, transmitted via Sidi Terence Helikaon Nunis of A Muslim Convert Once More

The Four Great Imams of Islamic Law and Jurisprudence

Why do we need to follow a specific madhhab when we have direct access to Qur’an and Hadith, which are the sources of this knowledge?

This question that echoes in the minds of many Muslims is of great importance as it directly relates to our lives in this world as well as in the Hereafter. It is possible for all Muslims to learn about the fundamental beliefs of Islam like Tawhid and about general ethics directly from the translations of Qur’an and Hadith.

However, understanding Islamic jurisprudence, fiqh, which forms the foundations of our everyday life, isn’t practically possible for most, except a very small number of scholars who have the requisite knowledge base and training. This is a slippery slope because while the text of Qur’an and authentic ahadith is free from error, its interpretations aren’t. So anybody who tries to deduce conclusion without proper training in ijtihad is liable to make errors.

Not all of the believers should go to fight. Of every section of them, why does not one part alone go forth, that the rest may gain understanding of the religion, to admonish their people when they return, that perhaps they may take warning.
[Qur’an 9:122] 

Ask those who recall if you know not.
[Qur’an 16:43]

Any mention of fiqh can’t be made without talking about the four great imams of fiqh and their schools of thought. Imam Abu Hanifa, Imam Malik ibn Anas, Imam Idris Shafi`i, and Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal are the luminous stars of the sky of Islamic jurisprudence. It is very important to note and realize that despite the differences of opinion in the matters of fiqh, these blessed souls had nothing but the utmost respect for each other.

Imam Abu Hanifa

First of the four great imams of fiqh, Nu`man ibn Thabit, Imam Abu Hanifa was born in 80 A.H. in Kufa. He is known as Imâm-e-A`zam, the Greatest Imam. His school has the second largest number of followers among the four imams with most adherents from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Turkey. He was the only tâbi`i, those who met with the Companions of the Prophet peace be upon his soul, out of the four exalted luminaries. He had the privilege of seeing Anas ibn Malik, Sahl ibn Sad as-Sa’idi, ‘Abdullah ibn Abi Awfa and Abul-Fadl Amir ibn Wasila.

Hammad Basri, Ata bin Abi Rabah, Imam Baqir, Imam Ja`far as-Sadiq, Abdullah ibn Umar, Aqabah ibn Umar and many other distinguished scholars are among the teachers of Imam Hanifa. Qadi Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad are among his famous students.

Imam Abu Hanifa was the pioneer in compilation, classification and codification of fiqh. One of his biggest contributions to the field of Islamic Law is that he organized fiqh into functional categories and sub-categories starting with ritual purification, tahara. All other imams and scholars followed his organization. He is known for his unparalleled knowledge of fiqh and skill in analogical reasoning, qiyas, as well as piety, taqwa, and memory.

A quote attributed to Imam Shafi’i states that a person who wanted to specialize in fiqh should read Abu Hanifa’s books. `Abdullah ibn Mubarak said,

"I have not seen another specialist as learned as Abu Hanifa in the knowledge of fiqh."

Sufyan ath-Thawri encapsulated all of the qualities of Imâm-e-A`zam in this statement,

"This man holds a high rank in knowledge, and if I did not stand up for his science, kalam, I would stand up for his age, and if not for his age then for his God-consciousness, wara`, and if not for his God-consciousness then for his jurisprudence, fiqh."

Qadi Abu Yusuf, while describing Imam Abu Hanifa’s personality, said,

"As far as I know, Abu Hanifah was extremely pious, avoided forbidden things, remained silent and absorbed in his thoughts most of the time, and answered a question only if he knew the answer.

"He was very generous and self-respecting, never asked a favor of anybody, shunned the company of the worldly-minded and held worldly power and position in contempt. He avoided slander and only talked well of people. He was a man of profound learning and was as generous with his knowledge as with his money."

Imam Shafi`i openly acknowledges the stature of Imam Abu Hanifa.

"People are all the children of Abu Hanifa in fiqh."

During the reign of Caliph al-Mansur of the Umayyad dynasty, Imam Abu Hanifa was offered the seat of Chief Judge, Qadi, but he refused and was imprisoned thereafter. In 150 A.H. he was reportedly poisoned by the orders of the Caliph and passed away.

Imam Malik ibn Anas

Imam Malik ibn Anas was the second of the four great imams of fiqh. He was born in 93 A.H. in Medina. He had great reverence and respect for his birthplace and, to show his respect, he never rode an animal within the city limits. He studied under the finest teachers like Nafi’Abul-Zanaad, Hisham ibn Urwah ibn Zubair, `Abdullah ibn Dinar, Muhammad ibn Muslim ibn Shihab az-Zuhri and a number of other notables.

"The Approved," al-Muwatta, is his seminal work that contains the most authentic and sound sayings and narrations of the Companions of Prophet Muhammad. Imam Shafi`i considers it the most correct and the most beneficial book on Earth after Qur’an. According to Imam Malik, he had seventy jurists of Medina examine the Muwatta and each one of them approved it. He was extremely careful in narrating ahadith and said,

"I do not accept knowledge from four types of people:
A person well-known to be foolish, even though all the other people narrate from him;
A person involved in committing heresy and calling others towards innovation in deen;
A person who lies in regular conversation with people, even though I do not accuse him as a liar in regards to hadith; and,
A person who is a pious worshiper or scholar, but does not correctly memorize what he narrates."

His chain of narration, the chain relayed from himself relayed from Nafi’ relayed from ibn Umar, was called the Golden Chain of Narrators by Imam-e-Hadith al-Bukhari.

He was regarded in the highest esteem by the other three of the great imams.
Imam Shafi`i says,

"If Malik and ibn Uyainah were not here, the knowledge of Hijaz would have perished."

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal praised him saying,

"I compared Imam Malik to Awza’i, Thawri, Laith, Hammad, and al-Hakam in knowledge, and he is the leader in hadith and fiqh."

Imam Abu Hanifa said while acknowledging his qualities,

"I have never seen anyone more understanding, proper and patient than Imam Malik."

After a brief illness he passed away on the 11th of Rabi’ul-Awwal in the year 179 A.H. and was buried in the Wahhabi-mandated demolished cemetery of Jannatul Baqi in Medina.

Imam Idris Shafi`i

Imam Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafi`i was one of the greatest jurists. He was born in 150 A.H. in Gaza, Palestine, the same year as Imam Abu Hanifa died. He shared the lineage with Prophet Muhammad. With very humble beginnings, he came to Mecca at the age of ten where he began his formal education. He studied fiqh from teachers like Imam Shaybani who was one of the famous scholars of the Hanafi school of fiqh, Muslim ibn Khalil az-Zanji, Sufyan bin Uyainah and Imam Malik ibn Anas. He had an amazing memory which enabled him to memorize the entire Qur’an by the age of seven and by the time he turned fifteen, he had memorized all of the Muwatta.

Imam Shafi`i is attributed with two madhahib; al-Qadîm, the Old, from his stay in Iraq, and al-Jadîd, the New, from his stay in Egypt. al-Jadid forms most of the Shafi`i fiqh except in a limited number of cases where scholars have followed al-Qadîm.

The most famous works of the Imam include Kitab al-Umm, the source for al-Qadîm, and Kitab al-Hujja, the source of al-Jadîd. A significant contribution of imam Shafi`i is the distinction between innovation in religion that is good, bid`atul hasanat, and innovation in religion that leads to heresy which is referred to simply as bid`a. In his words,

"Therefore, whatever innovation conforms to the Sunnah is approved, mahmûd, and whatever opposes it is abominable, madhmûm."

He is known for his mastery of the Arabic language, eloquence, humility, and knowledge of hadith. As acknowledged by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal,

"Our napes were in the hands of the Companions of Abu Hanifah when it came to hadith until we saw Imam Shafi`i: he was the most knowledgeable in the Book of Allah and the Sunnah of Rasulullah that he would even suffice one who was not well informed in Hadith."

On another occasion Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal said,

"When I am questioned about some matter that I do not know of I say to myself that Imam Shafi`i knows about this and he will have some say in it because he is an ‘Alim of Quraish, and the Prophet said that an Alim of Quraish fills the Earth with knowledge."

He met with his Creator on the last day of Rajab in Egypt in the year 204 A.H.

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal

Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, also referred to as Sheikh al-Islam and the Imam of Ahlus-Sunnah, was born in Baghdad in 164 A.H. He started learning fiqh from the famous Hanafi scholar Qadi Abu Yusuf but later discontinued the study of fiqh in favor of hadith. He was an authority in many disciplines including narration, hadith; jurisprudence, fiqh; exegesis, tafsir; abrogation, naksh; theology, aqeedah; recitation, qiraat; and the Arabic language.

In addition to the Musnad, his exceptional collection of hadith, Kitab az-Zuhd is also considered to be an influential work in Islamic heritage as well as his Kitabul-A’mal, Kitabut-Tafsir, Kitabul-Nasikh w'al-Mansookh, Kitabul-Masaa’il and Kitabul-Fadaa’il.

Imam Hanbal strongly believed in the orthodox doctrine of Islam and propagated it. He wrote two important books on the orthodox religious doctrine, the Kitab as-Sunnah and ar-Rad ‘Ala az-Zanaadiqah w'al-Jahmiyyah.

He was a great jurist but was reluctant to give fatwa. al-Mukhtasar by al-Khiraqi is the first written manual of fiqh and an introductory work on Hanbali fiqh. Some of the notable Hanbali scholars include Waliullah Abdul-Qadir al-Jilani, Allama ibn al-Jawzi, Sheikh ibn Taymiyah, Imam ibn Qayyim al-Jawziya, Sheikh Sulayman ibn Abdul-Wahhab.

One of the most significant events of his life was the trial of ‘Khalq-e-Qur’an’ resultant of the creedal dispute over the argument of whether the Quran is the Eternal Word of God or created. It was during the reign of the Abbasid Caliph, al-Ma’mun. The Mu`tazilah of then had instigated the belief that Allah created His Speech as a distinct entity and called it the Qur’an. This was against the orthodox Muslim belief. The Caliph forced all of the scholars of the time to accept this belief and most of them did but Imam Ahmad completely disregarded the pressure and refused to accept this heresy. As a result, he was imprisoned and severely tortured for over two years.

He was highly regarded by the likes of Imam Shafi`i, who said,

"I left Baghdad, and I did not leave behind me a man better, having more knowledge, or greater understanding, nor having greater piety than Ahmad Ibn Hanbal."

According to Abu Dawud,

"The lectures of Ahmad were sittings of the Hereafter. He would not mention in them anything of the worldly affairs; and I never saw him mention this world."

The famous Hanafi scholar Yahya ibn Ma’in praised him in these words,

"I have not seen the like of Ahmad; we have accompanied him for fifty years, and he never boasted about anything from the good which he was characterized with."

After a brief illness he took his last breath on Friday the 12th of Rabi’ul-Awwal, 241 A.H. His funeral procession was perhaps the largest in the history of Arabia; over one million people attended it.



— Hasan Saleem, Pakistan Insider