People of the Flame

Mankind has long sought the source of its existence, the grand architect of its genesis and of all creation. From a droplet of energy to a hairy gigantic ogre, a myriad of theories attempted to answer the million dollar question. For many, the answer was not a singular presence, but rather a horde of celestial authorities in charge of maintaining the balance of the universe.

However, these immortal godlike beings were not always images of purity and justice. From wanton gluttony to bestial lust, the primordial pagan gods and goddesses were often imbued with dark shades of immorality. Zeus, Hera, Vishnu, Kali, Arceus, Ra – oftentimes the figurines in consideration – were synonymous with stories of wrathful vengeance and destruction. The logic was simple: that which creates, can destroy. And although the notion endures to this day, the central deity of most predominant faiths is now honored with a sense of reverence and grace. Centuries before the birth of Christ, prophet Zoroaster presented a similar dogma, and thus Zoroastrianism was born.

Good words, good thoughts, good actions – the essence of Zoroastrianism. While early paganism went on multiplying their gods and goddesses to uncountable millions and Buddhism reduced the numbers to none, from the deserts of Iran materialized a very different philosophy of the image of god and our existence: proclaimed prophet Zarathustra that there was only one god, Ahura Mazda – the Light of Wisdom, a universal deity of whom no evil can come about. His anti-thesis was Angra Mainyu – the Spirit of Destruction.

According to the Zoroastrian credo, the purpose of one's life is as guileless as this: reject evil, accept good. The prime monotheistic religions of today would grossly be in agreement with the core beliefs of prophet Zoroaster's doctrine: God is One and God creates no malice; all that is wicked originates from a being that is in rebellion against God and wishes to corrupt his creation; life is a moral battle of ethics where mankind must exercise his free-will to choose between righteousness and sin – the ones in the path of good shall be rewarded in the afterlife with peace and eternal happiness, the sinful and malevolent shall be thrown into a pit of fire as punishment for their misdeeds.

However, during the time of Zarathustra, the idea was not only radical but considered utterly revolting. In a land dominated by polytheism such faith stood in opposition to the social theological norm, going against everything the Aryans had thus far been led to believe in. And thus, conflict was imminent. Nonetheless, confident that God Himself had appointed him to preach the truth, Zoroaster did not back down even in the face of adversity.

Pitted against the civil and religious authorities in the area in which he preached, or the Followers of the Lie (dregvant) as he called them, Zoroaster succeeded in accumulating a strong following: starting from the conversion of his cousin, Maidhyoimanha, to that of King Vishtaspa, twelve years later since the day of revelation.

Iran – the land where Adam and Eve of Biblical lore is once said to have frolicked in bountiful gardens of love, wherein dwell the warrior wrestlers of Isfahan and where the Old Man of the Mountain launched a revolution painted in blood – is currently a country chiefly dominated by Shiite Muslims with Islamic traditions and ideologies embedded deep within its veins.

Islam itself is a fiercely monotheistic religion, resolute in the principle of the One True God. However, the ruins of an arcane temple in the deserts of Isfahan remind us that Iran had accepted the idea of the One True God eons before the advent of Islam, Judaism and Christianity.

It was approximately five to six centuries preceding the birth of Jesus the Messiah of Nazareth, an Aryan priest attending to the temple of the ancient Persian god of fire, sky, storm and lightning received a revelation while standing knee deep in a river drawing water for a religious ceremony, a revelation every bit as profound as that of Buddha's enlightenment at Bodh Gaya, the encounter of Moses with the Burning Bush atop the summit of Tur Sinai, and Muhammad's rendezvous with Archangel Gabriel inside Gar Hira. The revelation was this: the pantheon of Aryan gods and their ritualistic traditions were all a mistake. Human beings were not created to serve and sacrifice at the altars of created stone idols. There was a simpler, pristine truth – God was only One, Ahura Mazda the Wise Lord. Standing in rebellion against him was the great being of evil – Angra Mainyu. All the other gods and goddesses were his minions: the daevas – devils.

Drawing parallels between Zoroastrianism and Abrahamic monotheism, we come across many similarities. Aforementioned are the ideas of a One True God and a being of pure malice which can be considered similar to the God of Abraham and Satan respectively. Next, we have the concept of free-will and the luxury to choose from good and evil, a privilege first bestowed upon Adam and Eve of Biblical tradition in Abrahamic lore. Finally, we have the belief of an afterlife, the presence of Heaven for the just and Hell for the wicked, and a Day of Judgment when God shall decide who shall savor eternal joy in Paradise and who shall be damned for eternity.

Before this Final Hour there shall come a day when Ahura Mazda will ultimately prevail over the evil Angra Mainyu or Ahriman, at which point the universe will undergo a cosmic renovation and time will end. In the final renovation, all of creation — even the souls of the dead that were initially banished to "darkness" — will be reunited in the courts of Ahura Mazda, returning to life in the undead form. At the end of time, a savior-figure – Saoshyant – will bring about a final renovation of the world, in which the dead will be revived. This belief is drastically similar to that of the apocalyptic Second Coming of Jesus and the Day of Resurrection, an idea held as a core tenet of faith within the religion of Islam and Christianity.

In fact, when first exposed to the teachings of Zoroastrianism during the invasion of Persia, the Companions, or the Sahabah as they were called, of the Islamic Prophet, Muhammad ibn Abdullah, immediately entitled Zarathustra a divinely inspired prophet such as the likes of Abraham, Solomon, and Jacob, and thus they accorded the same treatment to the Zoroastrian people which they did to other "People of the Book." Though the name of Zoroaster is not mentioned in the Quran, still he was regarded as one of those prophets whose names have not been mentioned in the Quran, for there is a verse in the Quran:

"And We did send apostles before thee: there are some of them that We have mentioned to thee and there are others whom We have not mentioned to Thee."
[al-Quran 40:78]

Accordingly the Muslims treated the founder of Zoroastrianism as a true prophet and believed in his religion as they did in other inspired creeds, and thus according to the prophecy, protected the Zoroastrian religion. The Baha'i Faith also holds Zoroaster in exalted regards. Other similarities between the Abrahamic religions, specially Islam, and Zoroastrianism would be the practice of head-covering for women and the performance of prayers throughout the day.

Besides the many likenesses it shares with Abrahamic monotheism, Zoroastrianism also bears a plethora of differences. Zoroastrians are often, mistakenly and incorrectly, referred to as “fire worshippers”, hence the name “People of the Flame.” This, however, is not true. Zoroastrians do not worship the fire that is at the center of their prayers. The fire is merely a icon of God similar to the Kaaba in Islam or the Crucifix in Christianity. Zoroastrians relate to the brightness provided by the light of a flame as to that of the light of wisdom emanated by Ahura Mazda.

In contrast, Angra Mainyu is often thought of as a torrential abyss of ignorance, fear and darkness. Fire causes darkness to flee, it allows one to see, and thus it bestows the one with knowledge of what lies before him. Therefore, fire douses ignorance. Hence it can be deduced that according to the Zoroastrian creed, knowledge is the remedy to fear whereas ignorance is the source of it.

Another sacred symbol in Zoroastrianism is water. The element of water is considered a symbol of ritualistic purity as it is often used to cleanse oneself and it is seen to wield the power to support life.

Now, a crucial distinguishing feature of the Zoroastrian religion from its other monotheistic counterparts is the way Zoroastrians treat the dead. Unlike Jews, Christians or Muslims, Zoroastrians do not bury their dead. Instead, the corpse is left out in the open to be consumed by vultures – a bird considered holy by the Zoroastrian faith. As the exposed carcass turns into carrion, the soul is thought to be rid of its mortal shell and free to reach out to God for its Final Judgment.

The history of Zoroastrianism remains blurry even to this day. It is difficult, almost impossible, to pinpoint the exact date as to when Zoroastrianism emerged onto the scene as it first enters recorded history back in the mid-5th Century BCE but is obviously older than that. Approximation would put the date to somewhere back 3,500 years from now.

According to Zoroastrian tradition, the religion flourished “258 years before Alexander.” Alexander the Great conquered Persepolis, the capital of the Achaemenids, a dynasty that ruled Persia from 559 to 330 BC, in 330 BC. Following this dating, Zoroaster converted Vishtaspa, most likely a king of Chorasmia (an area south of the Aral Sea in Central Asia), in 588 BC. According to tradition, he was 40 years old when this event occurred, thus indicating that his birthdate was 628 BC.

Now, there is no official testament to attest this claim but it is made clear through what little record we have of its history that Zoroastrianism first began sometime around 575 to 578 BC or something close to those numbers. What is important, though, is the rise of Zoroastrianism which took place somewhere during the regime of the great Archaemenian kings such as Cyrus and Darius, famously pious and devout Zoroastrians themselves – Zoroastrianism prospered greatly throughout the Archaemenian Era (549–331 BCE).

However, it all came to an end when the reign of the Archaemenian family over Iran was arrogated after the defeat of Darius III in battle at the hands of Alexander the Great. The war cost the Zoroastrians dearly as it claimed the lives of many priests and resulted in a cataclysmic loss of their sacred texts – the Gathas, nonetheless, survived.

After the death of Alexander came the Greek Seleucids to rule over the Persian dominion. Their reign lasted from 311 to 141 BCE. Zoroastrianism became regionally autonomous under the Seleucids. Next came the Arcasids who overthrew the Seleucids and ruled over Iran from 141 to 224 BCE. During this period, Zoroastrianism went through an era of renovation.

The Arcasids generally kept to the tradition of tolerance towards other faiths and were known to govern within the Zoroastrian Law of Asha (truth and righteousness) – similar to the Islamic Sharia and the Judaic Mitzvot – like the Archaemenians. Hence, their reign allowed the Zoroastrians a great deal of freedom to practise the faith of Zarathustra at liberty once more. The gathering of multiple Zoroastrian texts from the provinces started under the Arcasids, including that of the Vendidad – a book used to exorcise daevas, which is said to have been compiled sometime during this era.

Zoroastrianism’s final epoch of glory came during the reign of the Sassanids over Iran lasting from 226 to 651 CE. The regime came to power when Ardashir the Sasanian succeeded the usurped throne of a Persian vassal king. He rebelled and overthrew the Arcasids. This caused shock and resentment throughout Iran. However, Ardashir was a great politician and used religious propaganda to assert his authority. He cleverly based one of his claims to the throne on Zoroastrian orthodoxy, stating that the Arcasids were not orthodox Zoroastrians. During this period, Zoroastrianism experienced a vast upsurge in power as it became the state religion of Iran.

A single Zoroastrian church was created under the control of Persia and a single canon of Avestan texts was compiled by Ardashir's chief priest and religious propagandist, Tansar. This transition is very similar to Constantine’s declaration of Christianity as the state religion of Rome and the establishment of the Council of Nicea to oversee the compilation and canon of the Christian Bible.

Along with that came the development of the Avestan alphabet and an extension of liturgies. Fire Temples were promoted and traditional tolerance towards other religions that was long practiced by the Iranians was utterly abandoned resulting in the persecution of residential Jews and Christians living within the region.

By the end of the Sassanian period the authoritarian Zoroastrian church-state was immensely wealthy but at the same time more ritualized and oppressive. The umbrella of the Persian church kept Zoroastrianism dominant in Persia. This meant Zoroastrianism stayed free from the influence of other religions becoming popular at the time such as Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, etc. However, Zoroastrianism, under this church, had also become so abusive and power-hungry that, at the end of the Sassanian period, it was considered to have been as ripe for reform as Christianity was in Europe during the Middle Ages.

The Sassanid Empire lasted in power for over 400 years, routinely handing losses to the Romans while simultaneously maintaining trading relationships with Constantinople and Beijing. Their fall, along with that of Zoroastrianism, commenced during the Islamic conquests of the 7th century. Regardless, the reign of the Sassanian still influences Persian identity to this day.

The Arab Conquest of Persia, also known as Tajavoz-e Arab meaning “Attack of the Arabs” or Zohur-e Islam meaning “Dawn of Islam”, was the prime driving force that led to the end of Sassanid Empire in 644, and the fall of the Sassanid Dynasty in 651 and the eventual decline of the Zoroastrian religion in Iran.

The incursions took place in a series of three bouts: the first led by general Khalid ibn Waleed in the year 633 CE, the second led by commander Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas in 636 CE, and the third and final one led by the second and most celebrated Caliph of Sunni Islam, Umar ibn al-Khattab in 642 CE. By end of 651 CE, the Islamic Arab invaders had succesfully won the war and taken over all of Iran.

The disastrous effect this had on Zoroastrianism surpassed that of Alexander. Many libraries were burned and much cultural heritage was lost.

The Islamic invaders treated the Zoroastrians as dhimmis (People of the Book). This meant that, like Jews and Christians, they could retain their religious practices, but must pay jizyah – a per capita tax levied on a section of an Islamic state's non-Muslim citizens who meet certain criteria. There were also many other laws and social humiliations implemented to make life difficult for the Zoroastrians in the hopes that the people would convert to Islam. Over time many Iranians did convert and Zoroastrianism became a minority religion in Iran.

Later on, Zoroastrianism suffered yet another savage blow, this time at the hands of the invading Turks. This was followed by the exceedingly more damaging Mongol invasions which destroyed further religious texts and scriptures. This time the Islamic foundation also suffered irreparable loss.

Within half a century of the conquest, Gazan Khan converted to Islam and Zoroastrianism dwindled even further through renewed persecution.

Three centuries after the Islamic Conquest, many Zoroastrians fled Iran in search of a new land to practice their faith freely. They ended up on the shores of Gujarat and founded the Indian Parsi community.

Over the next few centuries, Zoroastrianism found a foothold in India and survived throughout the years with very few cultural reforms. All of that changed, however, due to the formulaic doctrinal attacks of the Christian missionaries in the 19th Century. Soon, the Zoroastrians were forced to undergo yet another period of rectification.

The Parsi priesthood, put under pressure and confusion due to the Christian campaigns, re-examined themselves and revamped their teachings utilizing re-interpretations of the Avesta indoctrinating elements of mainstream Hinduism into the faith, the effects of which soon trickled all the way back to Iran.

In consequence, Zoroastrianism, and its followers, adapted themselves to the rapid urbanization of the world around with unprecedented flexibility and integrity. And although, Zoroastrianism stands a dying creed today, the readiness of the Zoroastrians to hold on to their faith and prevail against extreme hardship allow the devotees to persevere against the Spirit of Destruction and reach out with renewed strength towards the Light of Wisdom.

— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

A Rude Awakening for the 'Ulema of the Modern Muslim World

Muslims these days seem to create a false dichotomy between religious, 'Ilm ad-Din, and, what they call,
modern knowledge or knowledge of the temporal world, 'Ilm ad-Duniya. However, allow me to state that there is
no such thing as modern education. Creating a dichotomy between religious and modern education means that religion is not modern which is absurd; and calling the natural sciences modern is also absurd. Take a look at
the greatest and most eminent Islamic scholars of the past centuries:

• ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah
• Chemist
• Astronomer
• Theologian
• ibn Taymiyyah
• Logician
• Philosopher of Metaphysics
• Economist
• Theologian
• Abu Rayhan al-Beruni
• Physicist
• Geographer
• Historian
• Pharmacist
• Mathematician
• Astronomer
• Mineralologist
• Indologist
• Theologian
• Muhammad al-Ghazali
• Jurist
• Philosopher of Ethics
• Philosopher of Metaphysics
• Theologian
• Abu Hanifa
• Jurist
• Philosopher of Law and Legislation
• Philosopher of Metaphysics
• Theologian
• Avicenna
• Philosopher of Metaphysics
• Pharmacist
• Physician
• Astronomer
• Chemist
• Philosopher of the Sciences
• Poet
• Theologian
• Averroes
• Philosopher of Metaphysics
• Pharmacist
• Physician
• Physicist
• Psychologist
• Astronomer
• Chemist
• Philosopher of the Sciences
• Philosopher of Law and Legislation
• Mathematician
• Logician
• Music Theorist
• Geographer
• Jurist
• Poet
• Theologian

Need I go on?

Nowadays most muftis and sheikhs are usually just muftis and sheikhs with nothing else to add to their credentials. That's why when they try to make assumptions on their rulings they make hilarious claims with no basis in science.

For example, Sheikh ibn Baz trying to speculate why Islam does not allow women to be leaders, a position that is thoroughly contested and not even accepted by most schools of Islamic law, by making scientific speculations that women are born weaker mentally and physically, neither of which is true because:

1. There is no way to measure strength in either category since one person may be able to handle the death of a family member emotionally better than others but cannot handle losing a thousand dollars at the lottery.
   Same with physical strength, one person may be able to lift a hundred pounds on a bicep curl but
   cannot lift as much on a tricep dip, etc. It is all very variable.
2. If we measured the mental strength of a person by how well they can critically think, on average, women are better at detached critical thinking to the ends of a solution for a problem than men because men tend to
   think egotistically, that is, they think based on ego, as in, how the solution to the problem makes them appear.

To further explain the second point, a man may see that opening the cap of a bottle may be easier via the use of
a mechanical opener rather than wrestling with it using their bare arms but they will still opt for the latter solution because succeeding in it that way makes them appear stronger. A woman will just take up a mechanical opener to get the job done with as little effort as possible. They are better thinkers in that way.

Nonetheless, I digress. Islam thrived in its infancy on the versatility of its polymaths, the scholars of the Golden Age, whereas today most of the mullahs are blissfully ignorant of any subject related to the natural sciences or
anything outside the scriptures, a trend utterly detrimental for the Cause of the Ummah. We need to wake up.



— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

Knowledge

Knowledge is Power
~ Sir Francis Bacon

There is nothing more important than knowledge and education. What is the main cause of fear? Lack of knowledge. We fear what we don't understand.

This is why the Zoroastrians portray God as Ahura Mazda, the Light of Wisdom, whereas the Devil is depicted as Ahriman or Angra Mainyu, the Torrential Abyss of Ignorance.

Fear, hatred, sin and malevolence – they are all the products of ignorance. This is why the Devil is the Darkness for if God is Light and God is Knowledge, then Knowledge is Light and Evil is the lack of Knowledge i.e. the lack of Light which is Darkness. This is the Wisdom of the Zoroastrian faith.

There is a reason the central codex of every religion lies within a text, within words. There is a reason God did not choose to reveal Themselves to us with angels descending from the sky on a carpet of clouds. There is a reason that They chose to leave Their Mark in the hearts of humankind through the Word: the Torah, the Gospel, the Quran, the Vedas, the Avesta, whatever it may have been, it has always been in words and the richest of words at that.

The Torah laid down in the most esoteric of Hebrew words, the Quran written in the most poetic of Arabic,
the words have remained unmatched in eloquence throughout all of time and history, and what is it that you need to understand words, to read? Education. Knowledge. God wanted us to learn, to have the ability to read, to understand and comprehend. They preserved Their Remembrance throughout the ages in words and this is
what we need most to understand Them and Their creation. We need knowledge.

Knowledge is the Path to Salvation. Ignorance is the Path to Damnation.

— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

Introduction to Philosophy — What is Philosophy?

The following are my notes from the MOOC Introduction to Philosophy offered by the University of Edinburgh.
The first lecture is handled by Dr. Dave Ward.

We start with the question: what is philosophy? Philosophy is an activity. It is the activity of working out the right way of thinking about things. It is the art of thinking about philosophical problems, and the ways other thinkers have approached them. This is what we’ll be doing on the rest of the course. A bulk of philosophy is learning specific tools and techniques to reason, argue, and express oneself.

The aforementioned definition states that philosophy is the act of thinking about things. However, the case can be made that all subjects, not just philosophy, try and think about things in the right way. This is true, but we can distinguish between thinking about things and working out the right way of thinking about things. In the second case, one steps back from what they are doing, and then proceeds to ask questions about it – what it presupposes, and whether it is the right way to go about things.

Take, for an instance, physics. Physics investigates physical reality by constructing experiments, measuring, and formulating theories. When doing philosophy of physics we might ask: what do we mean by “physical reality”?; how do experimental results prove or disprove a hypothesis?, or; what distinguishes a good scientific theory from a bad one?

Another instance, medicine. When practicing medicine we try to heal or treat people according to our current best medical theories. When doing philosophy of medicine, we might step back and think about whether the concepts our best medical theories employ make sense, or what ‘health’ and ‘sickness’ really mean.

The above examples show us that the relationship between philosophy and other subjects can be blurry – we can be interested in the right way of thinking in lots of different domains; and we are often forced to do philosophy by the challenges or results that other subjects throw up for us.

It is often claimed by philosophers that philosophy, or the questions it asks, are in some sense fundamental. What might this mean? Is it true? A sense in which it is not true: there are plenty of questions you can ask, and activities that you can pursue, perfectly legitimately without doing any philosophy. A sense in which it is true: no matter what sort of questions you are asking, or activities you’re pursuing, further philosophical questions can always arise.

This is because philosophy involves stepping back and examining the presuppositions of what we are doing, or the questions we are asking. What are these presuppositions? Are they the right ones? The answers to these propounds why philosophy, as a subject, is so broad – this ‘stepping back’ is something we can always do, whatever we are asking or thinking about.

Now, another important question is, is philosophy important? As with the claim that philosophy is fundamental, when trying to define philosophy, it is often said that the subject, or the questions it inquire, have some special importance. Is this true?

Again, there is a sense in which it is clearly not – because philosophical questions can arise about anything. There will be many that are too trivial or boring to bother asking. However, there are reasons for thinking philosophy, at its best, often is important:

• Most philosophy aims at thinking clearly about the things that matter most to us.
• Thinking philosophically can help us to question or see past dogma or accepted wisdom that may not be the best thing for us to think or believe.

Now, moving on to the procedure of philosophy. One, usually, has a good idea of how philosophy is done because trying to think about things in the right way is something we do all the time.

For example, suppose you are trying to decide whether to go to the cinema tonight.
Your decision process will involve:

• Looking around for evidence
• Why you should?
• Why you should not?
• What is on?
• Have you seen it before?
• Do you have enough money?
• Thinking about what that evidence gives you reason to do
• Perhaps you have seen that film before but it was so great that you would like to see it again;
• Perhaps you do have enough money but you should really be saving up for something else
• Coming to a conclusion about what to do, or to think, on the basis of that evidence

Suppose that, in deciding whether or not to go to the cinema tonight, one reasons like this:

1. They have good hot dogs at the cinema
2. I like hot dogs
3. Therefore I should go to the cinema

In doing so, one has given a very simple argument for the conclusion that they should go to the cinema. Looking at this, we can see that an argument, in philosophy, is just a sequence of evidence and reasoning designed to support a particular conclusion. This argument has two premises, point number-1 and 2 on the list above, as well as its conclusion, point number-3.

A very important part of doing philosophy is thinking about whether or not particular arguments do a good job of establishing their conclusions. How might we question the above argument? One way is to question whether the truth of the conclusion follows from the truth of its premises. That is, if the premises are true, does the conclusion have to be true? If it does, then we say that the argument is valid. In the case of the argument above, it looks like there are lots of cases where the premises could be true, but the conclusion might not be true. The argument is invalid.

Another way is to question the truth of the premises. In the above case, this would involve finding out about the hot dogs at the cinema, and whether or not I really like hot dogs. When an argument is valid with true premises, we say that it is sound. So an argument can fail to be sound by having one or more false premises, or by being invalid.

Now let us think about a more difficult and, perhaps, more interesting argument to assess: do we have free-will?

It seems to all of us that we have a lot of freedom as to what we choose to do, or not do.
But there are arguments that try to call this into question:

1. The way the world was in the past controls exactly how it is in the present, and how it will be in the future
2. We’re part of the world, just like everything else.
3. We can’t control how things were in the past, or the way the past controls the present and future
4. Therefore, we don’t control anything that happens in the world, including all the things that we think, say, do.

It’s a lot more difficult to work out whether this argument is a good or a bad one than it was for our first argument – but we assess it in just the same ways:

• Are the premises 1-3 true?
• Does the past really fix the present and the future?
• Are we really parts of the world just like everything else?
• Does the truth of the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion?
• Does ‘control’ mean the same thing in ‘1’ as it does in ‘4’?
• If not, then perhaps what ‘1’ tells us about control does not lead to the conclusion in ‘4’.

It is not part of our task this week to think through the ways of responding to this argument in detail. But we should take note that each of the ways of responding suggested above has some work attached to it – each of the ways of responding to the argument need explained and defended in much more detail. This sort of work is what we do when we do philosophy.

In trying to come to think about some topic in the right way, we attempt to get the clearest possible understanding of the evidence in favor of our thinking as we do, and the way it supports the conclusions about the topic we arrive at.

Though trying to construct and assess arguments in favor of some view or conclusion is a crucial part of philosophy, there is more to the subject than this. A quote from the philosopher Hilary Putnam expresses this well:

Philosophy needs vision and argument … there is something disappointing about a philosophical work that contains arguments, however good, which are not inspired by some genuine vision, and something disappointing about a philosophical work that contains a vision, however inspiring, which is unsupported by arguments … 

Speculation about how things hang together requires … the ability to draw out conceptual distinctions and connections, and the ability to argue … But speculative views, however interesting or well supported by arguments or insightful, are not all we need. We also need what Burnyeat called ‘vision’ – and I take that to mean vision as to how to live our lives, and how to order our societies.

We should bear in mind the ‘big picture’ when putting forward or criticizing philosophical arguments:

• Sometimes this might involve stepping back and thinking about why a topic is an interesting or useful one to be considering in the first place
• Sometimes this might involve thinking about the vision that might have inspired an argument that we’re criticizing or evaluating – can thinking about that vision help us to understand an argument better, or perhaps do a better job of expressing what the argument is getting at?

Now we’ll move on to the question: is there a ‘right way’ of thinking about things?

We have tried to define philosophy as the activity of working out the right way of thinking about things. And we have just seen that constructing and assessing arguments is an important part of this activity. But is there a right way of thinking about things? And if there is, how do we know that we can get at the right way just by thinking?

These are really important questions for philosophy. We bring them up not because we think we can answer them, but because they emphasize something I already mentioned about philosophical questions – they can arise anywhere, even in response to the definition of philosophy I’ve been trying to give.

One motivation for asking these questions might be the thought that there is something suspicious about the notion of a ‘right way of thinking’ that we have used in our my definition – so perhaps my definition is not the right way of thinking about philosophy.

Instead of trying to answer these important questions, we want to finish by quickly considering what two great past philosophers have said about them.

The great Edinburgh-based philosopher David Hume would have agreed with the skeptical spirit of the above questions – he was pessimistic about the notion of a ‘right way’ of thinking about things, and even more pessimistic about the idea that such a ‘right way’ could be something our minds could grasp.

As a good empiricist philosopher, Hume thought that it was crucial that philosophy stay true to our sensory experience of the world. However, he argued that our experience tells us much less about the world than we usually think.
For example:

• Causation
  We never really observe one thing causing another to happen. We might see one billiard ball roll into another, and then see the second billiard ball roll off. But all we really observe are the billiard balls at various times and places.
• Our experience of one ball causing the other to roll off is something extra, over and above the times and places we see the billiard balls occupying.
• So, for Hume, causation is not something we observe in the world. It is something extra that our minds add to the events we observe.
• Ourselves
  We never really observe ourselves – we might observe various thoughts, feelings, impressions as they pass through ‘our’ mind, but we never observe the single subject that is supposed to unify all these.
• So, for Hume, the idea of a persisting self, over and above the various thoughts and feelings that pass through ‘our’ minds is something extra that our minds add to what we really observe. Do these habits of our minds – to experience the world as if it contained causally connected events; to experience ourselves as more than bundles of impressions and feelings – corresponded to the way things really are in the world? In other words, are they the right ways of thinking about causation and ourselves?

Hume thought that we could not know the answer to these questions – all we can know is that these are the habits our minds do have, not whether those habits are the right or the wrong ones.

This led Hume to the gloomy conclusion that,

The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy, and meets us at every turn, in spite of our endeavors to elude or avoid it.

The great German philosopher Immanuel Kant said that these ideas of Hume’s awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers. Previously Kant had assumed that philosophical thinking could put us in touch with the world, but he now realized he had to prove this.

Kant’s views are very complicated – but, in a nutshell, he tried to show that the possibility of a world that did not conform to the rules and patterns that our mind imposes on experience was nonsensical.

Hume was right to point out that philosophical reflection uncovers ways that we can’t avoid thinking about and experiencing the world – as stretching through space, as unfolding over time, as containing causally connected events. But he was wrong to suggest that these might just be facts about us – arbitrary habits of our minds. Kant tried to show that they were also facts about what it is for a world to be there to think about in the first place.

If we try to think about a world that doesn't conform to the above ways of thinking, we find we can’t do it. Perhaps we think we can imagine the bare possibility that the world does not conform to these ways of thinking, even if we can’t imagine exactly how that would go. But we can understand Kant as suggesting that, if we can do that, we’re no longer thinking about some way our world might be.

Put even more briefly, Kant tried to show that the rules that govern our thought are the same as rules that govern the world, and that we can know this just by thinking about it. So, for Kant, there is a right way of thinking about things, and we can arrive at it by the clear and careful use of reason.

We have barely scratched the surface of the complex and interesting ideas of Hume and Kant above – but these quick sketches show us that one of the exciting and challenging aspects of philosophy is the way it can bring us into dialogue with great thinkers of the past as we try to clarify our own ideas.

— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

History and Source of Islamic Law

As a religion which includes doctrine, law and ethics, Islam forms a complete and comprehensive worldview for human life. Islamic Law, fiqh, for its part, is the means by which we are capable of producing appropriate rulings through derivation from the revelatory foundational texts of prophecy. Such foundational texts come in two forms, which are, the ‘recited,’ that is, the Holy Qur’an, and the ‘unrecited,’ that is, the pure Prophetic Traditions, Sunnah.

After its initial period of direct legislation in the time of the Prophet, Islamic Law has undergone many stages, each of which has its own distinctive features and impact on its current form. It is appropriate, then, that there be a study of these stages, which is not simply a description and explanation of the past, but which also serves the present by contributing to greater expertise and depth in understanding the Shari’ah.

The purpose of studying the history of any science is to come to know its foundational principles, central concerns, and ultimate goals and benefits so that we may better learn from it. Islamic Law is no exception to this, for it is not simply a collection of legal rulings in matters of ritual worship or transactions; rather, it is a complete methodology for all the various facets of human life: doctrine, ritual worship, society, economics, law-making, and politics. Indeed, in its later stages, Islamic Law evolved to be an impressive edifice, organizing civilization in all of its social interactions and human relationships with sophistication and nuance.

This, of course, gives the study of the history of Islamic Law a great importance, because fiqh treats human life in all its details and forms, such that it might be said that the Shari’ah is the basis upon which the entire ummah is built, and the logic that serves as the focal point for Islamic Civilization.

Linguistically speaking, the word shari’ah has two meanings. The first is ‘a source of flowing water meant for drinking.’ Secondly, it means a ‘straight and unwavering path,’ as Allah Almighty Says:

Then We put thee on the Path: so follow thou that…
[Quran 45:18]

Thereafter, Shari’ah came to express, in the language of the jurists, the rulings prescribed by Allah for His servants, so that they may become proper believers. These rulings are known as the Shari’ah because they are decisive – there is no deviance from their program, nor divergence from their objectives.

Tashri’, legislation, is the enacting of the Shari’ah, that is to say, the setting down of its principles and explication of the order and system that both individuals and groups are to comply with. Of course, in this manner of speaking, Islamic Legislation properly existed only in the lifetime of the Prophet, because Allah has not given the power of legislation to anyone other than His Prophets. And in this, the Prophet Muhammad relied on two types of revelation: ‘the recited,’ the Qur’an itself; and the ‘unrecited,’ the Sunnah.

Based on this, it might be said that the history of Islamic Legislation refers only to that which took place during the Prophet Muhammad’s life, and does not include the many discrete rulings which thereafter revealed themselves to the minds of the mujtahidun. However, the scholars have tended to expand the referent of this branch of knowledge. As Sheikh Muhammad ‘Ali as-Sa’ayis said,

“The history of Islamic Legislation is a discipline in which is treated the nature of Islamic Law during the lifetime of the Prophet, as well as in subsequent eras. It specifies the different time periods in which rulings came to be, and elucidates what occurred during them with respect to abrogation, specification, expansion, etc. It also discusses the jurists and mujtahidun and their relationship to these rulings.”

The Islamic Shari’ah is a Divine Law, meaning that it is prescribed by Allah Himself. The differences between it and the positive law are as follows:

1. The Shari’ah is a sacred religious law, through which one is taught how to worship Allah, compliance with which is considered obedience to Allah deserving of reward, and violation of which is sinful disobedience meriting punishment.
   Although it may also specify worldly punishments, it is connected to the afterlife in terms of reward and punishment, as opposed to positive legislation which does not deal with what is in people’s hearts.
2. Islamic Law seeks to elevate Man, purify his heart, and refine his soul. Positive legislation simply strives to regulate society without regard to individual’s character and ethics.
3. Islamic Law commands the good and forbids the evil, whereas positive legislation is concerned only with prohibitions. It does not compel good works except incidentally.
4. Islamic Legislation pronounces on both the internal and external actions of man, whereas positive law restricts itself to the external and observable.
5. The Principles of Shari’ah do not apply to one people at the exclusion of another, or to one time period at the exclusion of another. They are universal principles to fulfill the needs of all people regardless of nation or era, and raise their standing in all eras.
   As for positive legislation, it is specific to a given group in a given time, and so is in need of change whenever that constituency evolves and their particular demands change.

Regarding the sources of Islamic Legislation, the first source is the Qur’an. The Qur’an is the Revealed Speech of God which is inimitable, whose recitation is considered worship, and which has been mass-transmitted to us. It is definitively authentic, qat’iy ath-thubut, though some of its verses may not be completely definitive in their meaning, qat’iy adh-dhalalah, but only probable.

The Word of Allah, the Qur’an, is absolute; that is to say, it is independent of time and place; it addresses all, not just those at the time of the Prophet Muhammad, nor simply those in the Arabian Peninsula but the Qur’anic discourse is catered to all of humanity belonging to all regions and generations.

The Qur’an was revealed to the Prophet in portions over twenty-three years, the majority of which he spent in Mecca. Allah says in the Qur’an:

It is a Recitation which We have divided, in order that thou might recite it to men at intervals...
[Quran 17:106]

For this reason, scholars have partitioned the Qur’an into two phases, the Meccan and the Medinan, though they have differed on the precise criteria for this categorization.

The most accepted opinion is that the Meccan is that portion of the Qur’an revealed before the Prophet’s migration, hijrah, and the Medinan is that which was revealed after it even if some of it was technically revealed in Mecca.

An alternative opinion is that the Meccan is whatever was revealed in Mecca even if it was after the migration, and the Medinan is that which was revealed only in Medina.

A third opinion is that the Meccan is that which is addressed to the people of Mecca, and the Medinan is that which was revealed addressing the people of Medina.

The benefits of understanding this categorization are the following:

1. We come to know which verses came later, thus reliably consider what to abrogate, qualify or specify.
2. We come to know the history of legislation, and the wisdom of its gradual application.
3. We come to develop a confidence in the Qur’an, and its sound transmission to us without any alterations.

Anyone who has read the Qur’an will have noticed that the Meccan verses have their own exclusive characteristics not found in the Medinan, even though the latter are an extension of the former in terms of rulings and legislation.

Since the pre-Islamic Arabs were idolaters, associating partners with Allah, while denying the Day of Judgement, and because their eloquence was well-known, the Meccan Revelations were concerned with addressing them with that which was appropriate for their situation: providing proofs and clear-cut arguments in an effort to invite them to monotheism, to make clear their evil ways, to prove Muhammad's Prophethood, to offer them parables, to admonish them with lessons from previous nations, to establish proofs for Creation, and to engage in rational debate.

It is only upon the formation of a group of believers in Allah, His Angels, His Scriptures, His Appointed Messengers and the Day of Judgement, and their subsequent enduring of extreme difficulties, and migration to Medina, that the Medinan verses were revealed, comprising the rulings of Islam, and its limits and penal codes; explaining the principles of legislation; setting out rules for society, relationships between family members, and the connection between individuals and groups.

Below are the most prominent features of the Meccan and Medinan verses respectively:

Regarding the Meccan Revelations, they can be recognized by their distinguishing features that,

1. Through the Signs of Allah in Creation, they call to monotheism, the exclusive worship of Allah, the affirmation of Prophethood, the prophetic mission, and rewards and punishments; through rational proofs, they respond and debate with the polytheists; they also mention the Day of Judgement and the Hellfire.
2. They establish the general principles of legislation and ethics upon which society is based; they expose the scandals of the polytheists in terms of bloodshed, unjustly usurping the wealth of orphans, burying their daughters alive, and other practices.
3. They recount stories of the prophets and past nations, so that unbelievers may come to know the fate of those who came before them; they also console the Prophet Muhammad and his companions so that they may endure their abuses, and be assured of victory over them.
4. They appeal to the reader aesthetically by using powerful language, short verses, and choice words.
5. The mode of address in the Meccan verses are very broad and general, often taking the form of “O mankind,” or “O Sons of Adam.” In contrast, the Medinan verses primarily address the believers, very often with the phrasing, “O you who believe,” or the Jews and Christians referred to as, “O People of the Book”
6. Covenants recur often in Meccan verses. There are approximately thirty examples of establishing covenants in this period, whereas there is only one example in the Medinan verses, which is:

The unbelievers think that they will not be raised up for Judgment.
Say, "Yea, by my Lord, ye shall surely be raised up: then shall ye be told the truth of all that ye did..."
[Quran 64:7]

Regarding the Medinan Revelations, they can be recognized by their distinguishing features that,

1. They are an explanation of laws governing rituals, transactions and relationships, penal codes, inheritance, virtues of struggling in the Path of Allah, family structure, and the relationship between state and society, along with the principles and main concerns of lawmaking.
2. They address the People of the Book, the Jews and Christians, inviting them to Islam, making clear the manner in which they have handled previous scriptures, and indicting them for deviating from the truth, dissenting among themselves out of envy after knowledge had come to them.
3. They reveal the real behavior of the hypocrites, munafiqun, exposing that which they tried to conceal, analyzing their mentalities, and making clear their danger to true religious traditions.
4. They are lengthy passages setting down the Shari’ah, and clarifying its objectives and goals.

Regarding the objectives of the Qur’an, there are three principal objectives:

• That it serve as Guidance for Mankind, which can be further categorized into two types:

• A general Guidance for all people, as Allah Himself says:

Ramadan is the month in which was sent down the Qur'an as a Guide to Mankind with manifest Signs for Criterion and Judgment...
[Quran 2:185]

And again:

Verily this is no less than a Message to the worlds:
[Quran 81:27]

•  A specific Guidance catered for believers, as Allah also says:

It is a Guide and Glad-Tidings for the believers
[Quran 27:2]

And Allah doth advance in Guidance those who seek guidance...
[Quran 19:76]

… Say: "It is a Guide and a Healing to those who believe…"
[Quran 41:44]

• That it be a manifest sign in support of the Prophet. In other words, the Qur’an stands in the world as a Sign attesting to the Message of the Prophet Muhammad, and endures throughout all of time forever as an Everlasting Miracle articulating Guidance and the True Faith, superior to all others, as Allah says:

It is He Who has sent His Messenger with Guidance and the Religion of Truth, to proclaim it over all religion: and enough is Allah for a Witness.
[Quran 48:28]

• That creation is capable of worshiping Allah through its recitation, and that they may be rewarded for simply repeating His Words.

Those who rehearse the Book of Allah, establish regular prayer, and spend in charity out of what We have provided for them, secretly and openly, hope for a commerce that will never fail: for He will pay them their meed, nay, He will bestow unto them even more so from His Infinite Bounty; for He is the Oft-Forgiving, Most Ready to appreciate service.
[Quran 35:29-30]

The second source of Islamic Legislation is the Prophetic Tradition, that is, the Sunnah of Hazrat Muhammad.

The Sunnah is defined as statements, actions, tacit approvals, or qualities related about the Prophet. In terms of statements, we may take the example of that which is related from ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, who said,

I heard the Prophet say: “Actions are by intentions. So, every person will have that which he intended.”

In the category of actions are included all actions of the Prophet that have reached us, such as his manner of doing ablution, wudu’, and of performing the pilgrimage, hajj and so on and so forth. As an example, we have a hadith from the Prophet saying,

“Pray as you have seen me pray.”

Similarly in his final pilgrimage, he said,

“Take the hajj rituals from me.”

Tacit approvals consist of the Prophet’s affirmations of the statements or actions of some of the companions, either through his silence and, therefore, lack of repudiation, or through his expressed agreement and commendation. Examples of this include the narration of Abu Sa’id al-Khudri who said,

Two men set out on travel. When the time for prayer came, neither of them had any water in their possession. So they performed tayammum and prayed. Thereafter, they came across water while the time of prayer had not expired. One of them performed his regular ablutions and repeated his prayer, while the other did not do so. Then, they came to the Prophet and mentioned to him what had transpired. He said to the one who did not repeat the prayer,

You have achieved the Sunnah, and your prayer was valid.

And to the one who performed the ablutions and prayed again, he said,

You have two rewards.

As for qualities, many of the Prophet’s qualities and characteristics have been related. Some scholars have even taken to compiling these, such as Imam at-Tirmidhi in his work, ash-Shama’il.

Regarding the types of rulings found in the Sunnah, we have many:

• Rulings that echo and emphasize the rulings of the Qur’an. An example of this is a hadith related by the Companion Anas ibn Malik who said that the Prophet said,

“The wealth of a Muslim is not permissible to another except with his agreement and permission.” 

This is in agreement with the verse:

O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities; but let there be among you traffic and trade by mutual good-will...
[Quran 4:29]

• Rulings that clarify and explain general Commandments in the Qur’an. An example of this is that which clarifies the amounts for zakat.

• Rulings that restrict or specify general commands of the Qur’an. An example is the general Qur’anic Command to amputate the hand of the thief, which the Sunnah specified is to be done at the wrist. Another example is the general Qur’anic prohibition against eating carrion
  However, the following hadith from Abdullah ibn ‘Umar exempts seafood from this prohibition.
  According to ibn ‘Umar, the Prophet said,

“Two types of blood and two types of carcasses have been made permissible for us to eat:
of the carcass, fish and locusts; and of the blood, liver and spleen.”

Forbidden to you are carcasses, blood, the flesh of swine, and that on which hath been invoked the name of other than Allah...
[Quran 5:3]

• New rulings not mentioned in the Qur’an, because the Sunnah is an independent source of legislation. In this regard, it is not unlike the Qur’an. It is reliably transmitted that the Prophet said,

“I have been given the Qur’an and something like it with it... So mandatory upon you is the Qur’an. What you find deemed permissible in it has been made permissible for you, and what you find deemed impermissible in it has been made impermissible for you. So, neither the domesticated donkey nor any predator with fangs is permissible for you.” 

This means the Prophet was given the Qur’an and something like it, the Sunnah. The rulings of both must be followed, and from this we come to know of the prohibition against eating both domesticated donkeys and fanged predators, as well as the prohibition against eating birds with claws, and the rulings on the inheritance of the grandmother, and so forth.

We may categorize the rulings mentioned in the Qur’an and Sunnah as follows,

• Doctrine: Belief in Allah, and His Angels, Scriptures, Prophets, as well as the Day of Judgement, and Fate, the good and the bad, and all that follows from the above, such as belief in the Unseen, matters of eschatology, Allah’s Reckoning, Paradise and Hell.
• Ritual worship: Rulings about the relationship between Allah and His servant, in terms of their exclusive worship of Him. These include prayer, alms-giving, fasting, pilgrimage, and all the conditions, constituent parts, obligations, and encouragements associated with the above.
• Personal status: Rulings related to the regulation of family matters. These include marriage, dowries, divorce, the rights and obligations of married life, maintenance obligations, inheritance laws, and things related to these matters.
• Transactions: Rulings concerning people’s relationship with one another, and their financial transactions like sale, interest, loans, pawning, sureties, representationship and proxy, partnership, and agricultural contracts; as well as the economic principles of Islam in general.
• Public policies and governance: Rulings related to the system of governance, and the principles of political leadership towards their constituents; as well as the rights and obligations of each. These include discussions on the status of the ruler, governors, and viziers and the judiciary.
• Punitive law: Rulings on punishing criminals, including lex talionis, blood-money, and mandatory and discretionary punishments.
• International law: Rulings related to the relationship between Islamic polities and others in terms of war, peace, security, and treaties.
• Rulings related to eating, drinking, and clothing: what is permissible and what is not. The general rule is that of permissibility unless textually proven to be forbidden.
• Ethics, virtue, and social protocol: These include the etiquette of social gatherings, visiting one another, greetings, seeking permission in some matters, and eating and drinking in gatherings, as well as encouragement to virtues such as humility, forbearance and patience.

The third source of Islamic Legislation is Consensus,  Ijma’. Linguistically, it means to be determined and tenacious. In fiqh terminology, it is the agreement of the Ummah of Muhammad on a matter of religious significance.

Imam al-Ghazali maintains in his al-Mustasfa min ‘Ilm al-Usul that this agreement removes any doubts or alternative possibilities that might arise through an exclusive reliance on the proof itself. For this reason, an object of such a consensus must be acted upon; it is impermissible to oppose it.

A consensus must be based on evidence, for it is wrong to adopt an opinion without evidence in matters of Shari’ah. The Islamic Nation cannot unanimously agree on an error, as is narrated in numerous ahadith. An example is that which is narrated by ‘Abdullah ibn Dinar on the authority of ibn ‘Umar, who said that the Prophet said,

“Allah will not unite my ummah on misguidance. The Hand of Allah is with the greater group, and whoever deviates from it, takes himself to Hell.”

Sheikh Abu ‘Isa explained that, according to scholars, the ‘group’ refers to the people of fiqh and ahadith.

Another example is narrated by Anas ibn Malik who said,

“I heard the Prophet saying,

My ummah will not unite on misguidance; if you see them differing, follow the majority.” 

The basis of ijma’ may be a text from the Qur’an or Sunnah, or it may equally be an analogical argument, custom, or other types of ijtihad. There are two types of ijma’:

1. Express consensus, which is when all mujtahidun agree on a matter in an explicit and clear manner; each of them articulates his opinion, and they all coincide.
2. Tacit consensus, which is when some mujtahidun offer their opinion on a matter, all the others come to know of it and they remain silent, offering neither objection nor corroboration.

There is still great importance for ijma’ in our times. Consensus is a valid legal source, from which we can come to know the legal rulings about new occurrences happening in our day and age. We believe this is only possible in the present circumstances through the formation of fiqh councils encompassing all mujtahidun from the different parts of the Muslim World. There should be a specific place set aside for these councils, and they must be given what they need to carry out their research. They must carefully study these new matters, arrive at the proper rulings, and disseminate them in regular periodicals or specialized works so that people can refer to them and other scholars may further offer their opinions in them. If what is arrived at amounts to a consensus, and this consensus corresponds to that of the texts of the jurists, the ruling must be followed and acted upon.

The fourth source of Islamic Legislation is Analogical Reasoning known as Qiyas. Imam al-Ghazali in his al-Mustasfa defined Qiyas as the application of one case to another because of a common element between them for the purposes of affirming or denying a judgement on both of them.

The scholars proved the authoritativeness of qiyas through many evidences. These include the verse:

…take warning then, O ye with eyes to see!
[Quran 59:2]

Here, the ‘warning,’ or in other translations, the ‘lesson,’ means to apply the moral of a tale from one account to another like it if they share a common meaning, as ibn ‘Abbas maintained. Other proofs include the verses:

… if they had only referred it to the Messenger or to those charged with authority among them, then the ones who can draw correct conclusions from it would have known about it.
[Quran 4:83]

And,

… nothing have We omitted from the Book...
[Quran 6:38]

The latter means that the narrations in the Qur'an speak of every matter in the world one may encounter even if it is not directly spoken of. There may be accounts within the Qur'an, the moral message of which could be applied elsewhere due to a share commonality of the events.

We may add to these verses other evidences, such as the hadith about the Prophet sending Hazrat Mu’adh ibn Jabal to Yemen. Before he did so, he asked him,

“If a judicial matter comes to you, how will you judge?”

Hazrat Mu’adh replied,

“I will judge by the Book of Allah.”

The Prophet questioned again,

“And if you don’t find it in the Book of Allah?”

Hazrat Mu’adh responded,

“Then, by the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah.”

The Prophet questioned once more,

“And if you find it neither in the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah nor His Book?”

Hazrat Mu’adh answered,

“I will exercise my judgement, and will not refrain from doing so.”

The Prophet struck his chest, and said,

“Praise be to Allah Who endowed the messenger of the Messenger of Allah with that which pleases the Messenger of Allah.”

There are evidences other than these four, though they are disagreed upon. Some have reckoned them to number over forty. There are additional sources of Shari’ah, adopted by some and rejected by others. These include juristic discretion, istihsan; the presumption of continuity, istishhab; cutting off means to the forbidden, sadd adh-dhara’i; public welfare, al-masalih al-mursala and many others.

Now let us move on to the great historical periods of Islamic Legislation.
The first of them is the Prophetic Epoch. This was during the lifetime of the Prophet himself, peace be upon him.

The manner of legislation in the time of the Prophet did not depend on legal reasoning based on hypothetical circumstances and occurrences, nor was there a codification of the law and rulings as was the case in subsequent periods. Rather, legislation in this period proceeded in step with the reality of the Prophet’s worldview.

It was clear to the Muslims at the time that if they were confronted with a matter requiring a judgement, they were to refer it to the Prophet, and it would be answered through a verse, or some verses, revealed to him from Allah, or through a hadith. On occasion, the ruling would be clarified to them through the Prophet’s own actions, or through his approval or rejection of the actions of another.

Regardless of what the Prophet’s response was, it would not emanate except from a Revelation from his Lord either through the Qur’an or his Sunnah, as Allah says in the Qur'an:

Nor does he speak of his own desire. It is no less than Inspiration sent down to him.
[Quran 53:3-4]

We may draw three conclusions from this discussion:

1. Legislative authority in this period rested exclusively with the Prophet. And the reference for legislation at this time was revelation in its two forms, the Qur’an and the Sunnah.
2. The verses of the Qur’an were revealed according to specific circumstances, or as a response to a question. Very few were not preceded by an event or query which motivated it. This is what the scholars mention in the science of asbab an-nuzul, the Circumstances of Revelation.
3. Islamic Law was not all revealed at once.
4. Rather, it came gradually in parts in the form of Qur’anic verses and ahadith.

Next comes the Epoch of the Salaf as-Salehin helmed by the Noble Companions, Sahaba; the Followers, Tabi’un; and the Righteous Caliphs, al-Khulafa Rashidun.

With the death of the Prophet came an end to active revelatory legislation of the Qur’an and Sunnah. However, these were the two great resources left behind for subsequent generations from that period. And so, law began to develop and expand in the period of the companions and followers.

This happened because the jurists encountered new circumstances which were not present during the lifetime of the Prophet, but they remained duty-bound to come to know Allah’s Ruling in these new matters. These new matters arose in part as a result of the wars of this period, and so, they had to address the nature of relations among Muslims, and between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially during war. This, in turn, led to a number of legal matters, such as rules relating to the Islamic Conquests, and the expansion of the Islamic Empire and Muslims’ interactions with the people of those lands, for every land has its own customs and traditions, ʿUrf.

As a result, the companions and followers embarked on the task of determining the rulings concerning these matters. So they performed ijtihad, made use of their opinions in light of the principles and objectives of the Shari’ah. This is how the notion of ijtihad bi'r-ra’y or independent reasoning arose as an independent source of Islamic Law; of course, it did not exist during the time of the Prophet when recourse could be made to Revelation.

Evidently, any ijtihad based on ra’y will give rise to differences of opinion, and this is what happened in this period. In some cases, though, the jurists engaged in ijtihad and found themselves in agreement. This agreement is considered a consensus, ijma’; this is how ijma’ came to be a source of law; this also did not exist during the Prophet's lifetime.

In addition, challenges emerged to the Sunnah as a result of the jurists being spread out in different locales and encountering different occurrences. So, the need was felt to investigate the Principles of the Sunnah and ensure that there existed some who preserved it by discussing and relating it, and by extracting rulings from it. In this period, the jurists treated novel matters by searching for a ruling in the Book of Allah. If they did not find it there, they turned to the Sunnah. If they still did not find an appropriate ruling, they turned to ra’y and ruled according to their ijtihad.

There is no doubt that this is a sound methodology, for the jurists did not resort to their own ra’y unless they could not find anything in the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Although, they were not all equal in this matter, for some of them made extensive use of ra’y, and some used it sparingly.

Imam ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah said in ‘Ilam al-Muwaqqi’in,

“The task of issuing fatawa then fell to the companions – the elite of Islam and faith, the army of the Qur’an and ar-Rahman.
They were amongst the ummah, the most tender of hearts, the most profoundly knowledgeable, the least pretentious, the most eloquent, the truest in faith, the most general in giving advice, and the closest to Allah.
They varied between those who issued numerous fatawa, those who gave only a few, and those who occupied an intermediate position between these.”

We may enumerate seven companions who used ra’y extensively:

1. ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab
2. ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib
3. ‘Abdullah ibn Mas’ud
4. ‘Aisha binte Abu Bakr
5. Zayd ibn Thabit
6. ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas
7. ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Umar

Those who occupied an intermediary status in this regard included:

1. Abu Bakr as-Siddiq
2. Umm Salamahsour
3. Anas ibn Malik
4. Abu Sa’id al-Khudri
5. Abu Hurayrah
6. ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan
7. ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Amr ibn al-‘As

The rest gave fatawa only occasionally, such as the likes of:

1. Abu ‘Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah
2. Abu Talha
3. Abu Dharr
4. Umm ‘Atiyyah
5. Safiyyah

Following the Epoch of the Salaf comes the Epoch of the Two Parties of Ijtihad bi'r-Ra’y.

Ijtihad bi'r-ra’y in this period was based on an assessment of the underlying causes, ‘illas, of rulings and a consideration for public welfare. The jurists were in one of two camps in this regard:

1. Those who were cautious of ra’y and made only occasional recourse to it
2. Those who were not intimidated by the use of ra’y and resorted to it whenever they felt the need

The majority of the first camp, known as the school of the people of ahadith, was in Medina and the Hejaz.

Their major representative was Imam Sa’id ibn al-Musayyib, one of the famed seven jurists who learned fiqh from the companions and spread it in Medina. Imam Sa’id was one of the most prominent followers in terms of learning, religiosity, piety and virtue, and so is often known as the jurist of jurists. The seven jurists are:

1. Imam Sa’id ibn al-Musayyib
2. Imam ‘Urwa ibn Zubayr
3. Imam Qasim ibn Muhammad
4. Imam Abu Bakr ibn Muhammad ibn al-Harith
5. Imam ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Utba ibn Mas’ud
6. Imam Sulayman ibn Yasar
7. Imam Kharija ibn Zayd ibn Thabit

The majority of the second group, the school of the people of ra’y, could be found in Kufa and Iraq. Their principal proponent was Imam Ibrahim ibn Yazid an-Nakha’i, the sheikh of Imam Hammad ibn Abu Sulayman.

This period came to an end without there being any codification of either of the sciences of fiqh and ahadith. There were, however, some preliminary attempts. Caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz, for example, wrote to his representative in Medina, Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn ‘Umar ibn Hazm, to look for what there was of the ahadith, or Sunnah, of the Prophet and write it down. However, the Caliph died before his agent could complete what he was ordered to do.

Next came the Epoch of the Mujtahidun. This period began at the outset of the second hijri century and extended to the middle of the fourth. In this period, fiqh grew and flourished, and the questions it treated multiplied in an unprecedented manner. This phenomenon is due to a number of reasons, including:

• The regard of the Abbasid Caliphs for law and the jurists. This is evident in their closeness to the jurists, and their resorting to them for their opinions.
• The expansion of the Islamic Empire which stretched from Spain to China. In these vast lands, it became necessary to take account of the various customs and traditions of the people as long as they did not contravene the foundational texts. Therefore, people’s ijtihad differed based on the variation of their customs and traditions.

• The emergence of great mujtahidun with superior qualifications and talents, and their work in developing fiqh in order to respond to the needs of the state for organization and laws. Furthermore, they formed schools which were populated by distinguished jurists.
• The compilation of the Sunnah, which enabled the jurists to distinguish the sound from the weak ahadith, and, so, make better use of them in a more convenient fashion. The Sunnah, of course, is the very subject matter of fiqh, and one of its most important sources.

After the Epoch of the Mujtahidun came the Era of Taqlid

This period began midway through the fourth century and continued until the fall of Baghdad in 656 AH. This is the period of the stagnation of fiqh, for the jurists tended towards taqlid although the standard until then was that there be an independent mujtahid not bound to a specific madhhab, juristic school of thought, but rather restricted only by the texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah and that which acceptable ijtihad leads him to – acceptable ijtihad being an extraction of legal rulings from the two great sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah.

In this period, the ambitions of the jurists were weak. They considered themselves deficient, and incapable of following in the footsteps of previous mujtahidun, despite their mastery in fiqh, and the ease with which they could now access the Sunnah source material.

Among the reasons for the prevalence of taqlid among all but a rare few of the jurists were:

1. The weakness of the political power wielded by the Abbasid Dynasty. The Islamic Empire was no longer what it once had been – it had now been split up into portions with small states governing the many fractured areas. This has a serious impact on the lives of jurists, and the development of law.
2. The various schools of thought had now been codified in a comprehensive manner, after a refining of its major issues and concerns, and the organization of its content. This led to a certain contentment with this juristic heritage, and a feeling of being able to dispense with further investigation and derivation of rulings.
3. A lack of confidence in oneself, and a fear of ijtihad. The jurists accused themselves of weakness and deficiency, and considered themselves incapable of taking the rulings directly from the original sources. They thought it best and most suitable that they restrict themselves to a well-known madhhab, to stick and abide by to its rulings, and to learn its methodology, usul, without diverging from them.

In this period, the gate of ijtihad was closed. For, when the jurists saw that the claims to ijtihad were being made only by those who were incapable of it, they feared that the religion of the people would be corrupted by inferior fatawa based on neither knowledge nor understanding. So, they pronounced on the closing of the gate of ijtihad, to safeguard from this corruption and to protect the people.

However, the truth is that ijtihad persisted and did not disappear entirely. It was simply that ijtihad had to be preceded by the fulfillment of certain conditions – whoever possessed the requisite capacities was entitled to perform ijtihad; whoever did not, it was prohibited for him to issue fatawa without knowledge.

Despite this stagnation, the jurists undertook many beneficial tasks, including:

1. Determining the operational legal causes for rulings transmitted from their a’immah, for not every position had been transmitted with its reasoning.
2. Extracting the principles of derivation from the rulings of the madhhab, so that the methods of ijtihad adopted by the imam may be known.
3. Weighing the different opinions transmitted from the imam, and choosing some over others. For it could have been that the transmitted opinion was retracted without the transmitter knowing this fact; or alternatively that there was a subtle difference between two variant opinions which explained the difference between them; or again that one opinion was adopted according to a strict analogy, while another was adopted for other considerations out of a jurist’s discretion. So, the jurists of this period would grant preponderance to some of these opinions over others in light of the principles of their established madhhab.
4. Organizing the fiqh of their madhhab, by categorizing, explaining and commenting on the rulings, and supporting them with evidences; and mentioning points of conflict with other madhahib, the reasons for these disagreements, and the evidences in support of their madhhab’s positions.

There is no doubt that these contributions constituted a great service to fiqh, by expanding and explaining the field.

Finally, we have the Modern Epoch. This period begins with the fall of Baghdad in the seventh century and extends to our times. Fiqh did not recover from this stifling environment and the jurists did not change their approach. So restrictiveness became widespread.

There were, though, a few individuals here and there who were dissatisfied with taqlid and called for unrestricted ijtihad based on direct interaction with the Qur’an and Sunnah, and not restricting oneself to a specific madhhab. However, these were few in number, and the majority of the muqallid jurists did not accept their criticisms. So, the jurists of this period oriented themselves towards writing, specially towards statements of doctrine which came to be so terse that they began to impair and obscure the intended meanings, resembling instead aphoristic writing. These texts, called the mutun, were in need of commentaries, shuruh, to explain their meanings and clarify ambiguities. Then, notes and comments appeared in the margins of these commentaries: these were called glosses, hawashi.

Writing, however, was not restricted to these genres. There were also books of fatawa: responses to questions posed by the people as to their daily practical lives. These individual responses were gathered either by their author or by others, and organized according to the chapter scheme of books of fiqh. Also, many of these fatawa were accompanied either by evidences from the texts of the school, madhhab, or the mufti, or by evidences from the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and other primary sources without reference to a specific madhhab.

The Modern Epoch also consists of the Modern Revival Epoch which we are in today. In our era, we are witnessing a revival of fiqh from a variety of perspectives: a greater regard for the discipline of fiqh in university teaching; the comparative study of fiqh; an exposure to its distinguishing characteristics and features; and an attempt to reconcile the culture of law with the culture of the Shari’ah. We hope for an increase in the regard being accorded to the Shari’ah and fiqh so that it reclaims its original standing as law proper, and that the state undertakes appropriate legislation as was the case in the past.

One of the phenomena of the contemporary revival of fiqh is the resurgence of writing in the discipline. Among the reasons for this is the storming of the field by extreme tendencies, who have sought to critique religious texts. And so many serious writings have emerged as a sort of response to this orientation, delineating the manner of interacting with the Shari’ah texts, and presenting the Principles of Islam. This genre has fulfilled its role of strengthening the confidence of Muslims in their religion and heritage.

Other phenomena include the formation of fiqh councils, scientific meetings, Islamic universities. In addition, there have been other institutions which have played the crucial role of bringing the different schools of thought together, and teaching fiqh according to the different madhahib, and so contributing greatly to minimizing and limiting partisanship between the schools.

Many contemporary scholars have distinguished themselves in this field in both the east and the west, contributing to this revival, and to the study of fiqh from a variety of directions. An example of this is Dr ‘Abdul-Hakim Jackson, professor at the University of Michigan in the United States. He has many studies of fiqh, including his book titled Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihabuddin al-Qarafi.

A genre that has emerged as part of this revival is the fiqh of minorities. The word ‘minorities’ is a political term indicating a constituency within a nation-state that belongs to a linguistic, ethnic, or religious group other than that of the majority. It is best to include this as a sub-genre of fiqh in the general sense – which includes both the doctrinal and practical aspects of the Shari’ah. This is the meaning intended by the Prophet when he said,

“He for whom Allah wishes good, He gives him understanding in religion.”

So, the fiqh of minorities is that portion of fiqh which evinces a regard for the connection of the legal ruling with the circumstances of such a group and the place in which they live. It is, in other words, a fiqh for a group that finds itself in special circumstances: some things may be appropriate for it that are not appropriate for others. The one who treats such matters is in need also of knowledge of the social sciences, especially sociology, economics, finance, law, political science and international relations.

Today, we are in need of placing such a fiqh on a strong footing, which in reality is already well established in a number of legal principles, such as:

• Legal obligation is based on one’s capacity to fulfill the obligation, as in the verse,

On no soul doth Allah place a burden greater than it can bear...
[Quran 2:286] 

• The Shari’ah is built on ease and facility. The Qur’an says,

…Allah intends every facility for you, He does not want to put you to difficulties...
[Quran 2:185]

…and has imposed no difficulties on you in religion…
[Quran 22:78]

• There are both supererogatory actions and dispensations in the religion. People of strength are entitled to perform the former, while people of weakness are entitled to take advantage of the latter. In both cases, what is sought is ease. As such, it is necessary to make things easy for those living outside Muslim lands.
• The scholars have also settled on a famous principle, namely that fatawa change with time, place, custom and circumstances. This is what is meant when we differentiate between those who live within Muslim countries and those who live outside of them.

— Mufti Ali Goma'a, transmitted via Sidi Terence Helikaon Nunis of A Muslim Convert Once More