Intuition vs. Rationalization and the Reflective Equilibrium of Ethics

The following is an essay I penned for my Introduction to Ethics class offered by Rutgers University, conducted by Professor Beth Henzel.

The question of whether ethics and moral judgment be based upon reason or intuition is a subject of debate as indicated in the dialogue between Joakim Sandberg, Niklas Juth and Peter Singer. The text in consideration is a response to one of Peter Singer’s papers where he argues that some interesting new findings in the field of experimental moral psychology confirms his thesis of contention that intuition should play a negligible role in adequate justifications of normative ethical positions.

Sandberg and Juth argue that even though basing ethics solely on certain kinds of intuition can be problematic, basing ethics off the standpoint of pure reason can be similarly troublesome. Instead, Sandberg and Juth suggest a more nuanced and sensible methodology to derive moral positions. They coin this methodology “reflective equilibrium” which, as the name suggests, travels the middlep path between reason and intuition taking into account both sides of the coin before settling on a decision. This is the most fair and equitable position.

In this essay I will attempt to argue on the side of Joakim Sandberg and Niklas Juth by first presenting a summary of Peter Singer’s paper and the summary of arguments against Singer raised by Sandberg and Niklas on their response to him, then providing my own argument by drawing a comparison between moral decision-making and cognitive psychological findings on how best to deal with situations that induce an emotional and a rational response.

Singer begins his paper by stating the views of moral philosopher Jim Rachel who argues that ethicists in general should not base their comments on tragic events and their moral ramifications on pure intuition subject to the orthodox view of what is right and what is wrong. Singer then goes on to say that this is a view he shares with Rachel and proceeds to explain his own standpoint by starting off with a history of moral philosophy recalling popular myths of mankind being bestowed moral guidance from a divine origin and then moving on to names of other philosophers such as David Hume and Niccolo Machiavelli. He then goes on to explanations of post-Darwinian understanding of ethics in relation to genes and reciprocity.

Following this, Singer explains the difference between “personal” and “impersonal” moral reasoning, that is, he uses the example of the “trolley problem” to show how people are quick to make personal moral decisions over impersonal ones, namely, that if a group of people are asked, assuming an empty train trolley is rolling towards a group of five and flipping a switch will save four of them but kill the fifth by diverting the path of the trolley, whether they want to flip the switch or not, majority would answer in the affirmative. However, if the group is then asked whether they want to push a large heavy man into the pathway of the trolley thus stopping the trolley at the cost of that man most would answer in the negative. Singer explains how neuroscientists have discovered that this is the case because in the latter scenario pushing the large man causes the agent to be personally involved in killing him thus stimulating more areas of the brain making the intuition against it stronger than if the agent is not personally responsible for killing one man by flipping the switch. Afterwards, Singer goes on to talk about Rawls and his analogy of normative moral theories being similar to scientific theories where he says that like scientific theories that may be best explained by plausible scenarios even if those scenarios do not comply with all the data, in which case we assume the data to be flawed and seek a balance between it and the result, moral theories have our base intuitions as raw data and we are to regulate our intuitions and our judgments until there is reconciliation between the two. Singer finds this analogy erroneous.

Singer explains the difference between a scientific theory and a theory of normative morality by expounding on their definitions. He states that a scientific theory attempts to explain why certain things happen the way they happen while normative morality does not explain why do we react the way we react to things such as abortion and voluntary euthanasia but rather what we are ought to do and how we are to react in such circumstances. This difference between the two should account for the error in Rawls’ analogy by contrasting the two.

In conclusion, Singer states that human beings may always be subject to intuition and, just like the tampering or dismissal of data to fit a plausible scientific theory, we rationalize our arguments to fit the intuition for morality. Nonetheless, Singers says there is a difference between this intuition and the base intuition that cannot be rationalized where a person says they do not know why something is wrong but they just know it is, as they did in Haidt’s experiment that Singer uses to support his paper. Singer calls the former rational intuition and concludes that this should be our methodology to arrive at moral judgments.

Sandberg and Juth start their paper off by outlining Singer’s arguments along with the experiments mentioned in his paper. They move on to explaining the two types of intuitions in Singer’s paper, namely practical and theoretical, and mentioning how Singer concludes we should derive moral codes off the latter instead of the former. Sandberg and Juth argues that Singer’s notion that practical intuitions are products of our evolutionary lineage whereas theoretical intuitions are more rationally grounded is false since the latter can be just as evolution-based as the former, also adding in the fact that for most people theoretical intuitions could be just as spontaneous as their practical ones. The gist of Sandberg Juth’s paper is basically this that both methodologies are prone to the same cons as each other.

Personally, I agree with Sandberg and Juth’s view and do believe that the reflective equilibrium approach is the best approach to arrive at moral conclusions. In the field of cognitive behavioral psychology the human mind is divided into three separated dimensions: the emotional mind, rational mind, and wise mind. The emotional mind is the loci of decisions based on emotions, intuitions, and feelings, while the rational mind is the loci of decisions derived off pure logical reasoning. The wise mind is the balance in between and, psychologists confirm, is the correct source to base our decisions off in real-life. The wise mind is the balance between validating our emotions and judging a situation properly off sound logical reasoning. Cognitive behavioral therapy attempts to teach patients to base their decisions and tackle everyday problems using the wise mind. This largely mimics the methodology of reflective equilibrium for moral reasoning.

A good example to demonstrate the contrast between the thought processes of the emotional mind, the rational mind and the wise mind is to think of a girl who walks into her room which is extremely untidy and disorganized. Looking at the room makes her feel like that there is no way she can clean up the room given how messy it is. This is the emotional mind talking. The rational mind says that just because she feels like it cannot be done does not mean it cannot realistically be done. The job is not impossible. Rationally speaking, it is, in fact, possible. The wise mind strikes a balance between the two and says that yes it is possible but it is going to be difficult which is why the first emotional instinct of the girl was to feel like it could not be done. This validates her initial emotions as well as present the reality of the situation that cleaning up the room is something that is not impossible to achieve but it is going to be a tiresome task, preparing the girl to tackle with the problem as required.

The aforementioned example can then be applied for a moral decision. Let us assume that the woman somewhere in the world is undergoing labor and her husband is frantically pleading for help. He calls the emergency unit of the closest hospital and they inform him that all their ambulances are currently engaged. Distraught, the man decides to drive his wife to the hospital himself. Rationally, at this point, the moral thing to do would probably be to follow all the driving laws for the safety of everyone on the road. However, the first intuition of the man would be to rather ignore all the laws and speed limits, and make sure that his wife is in the hospital under immediate medical attention. Nonetheless, it is morally wrong to push away the safety of everyone else on the road for the well-being of just one person, namely this man’s wife, if one were to weigh the situation logically. The best thing to do at this point would be to strike a balance and drive ignoring a few traffic rules without being too reckless while upholding a minimal level of road safety and not harm anyone else. Balance is the key.

Now, it is important to note here that just because some answers are neither black nor white, it does not mean that no answers are black or white. In other words, there can be a situation where acting upon one’s intuition is “wrong” and the rational answer is “right” or vice versa. Once again, reflective equilibrium maintains the balance by reconciling one and the other.

It can be argued that an area so gray does not provide us with a concrete understanding of what is right and what is wrong. The answers derived off such a methodology is too subjective and it does not allow us to lay down a consolidated set of ethical laws and codes of conduct for all to follow since intuition will differ from person to person and thus what may seem right to one person may be branded as ethically wrong by another. Rationally arrived codes of ethics may be more compact and therefore give us something corporeal to follow. This argument can be broken down into premises surrounding the idea that ethical codes of conduct are nomic necessary truths which can be arrived at using pure logical reasoning alone. However, this is not the case in a practical scenario, as, by pure logical reasoning alone, a person may arrive at an entirely different conclusion than another regarding the question of what is right and what is wrong. Therefore, reasoning can be just as subjective as intuition.

Also, let us assume for the sake of argument that ethical codes of conduct are nomic necessary truths that can be reached at through solely using reason. This leaves us with another problem, namely that the capability of the mental faculties of the one doing the reasoning is subject to differ from one person to another thus two people may arrive at two completely different conclusions on the matter of what is right and what is wrong due to the varying levels of their intelligence and other mental abilities.

Hence, taking all of the presented viewpoints into account it would be safest to conclude that Sandberg and Juth’s argument that rationalization is prone to similar flaws as intuition in the topic of ethics and morality, and thus, a balance between the two utilizing the methodology of reflective equilibrium is the most sound approach for an ethicist.



— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

Moral Philosophy and the Metaphysics of Ethics

Moral Philosophy

Aim: to establish the supreme principle of morality

Preface

Kant begins by systematizing knowledge (Kant is very fond of systematizing).

He makes the observation that Ancient Greek thinkers divided philosophy into three sciences:

1. Physics
2. Ethics
3. Logic

Kant agrees with this division but seeks to explain the reasoning behind this division by introducing new division.

•  Formal: concerned solely with the form of the understanding and form of reason itself;
  universal rules of thinking as such: this is logic
• Universal and necessary laws of thinking
• Can have no empirical (based on experience) component
•  So is “pure philosophy” – based on a priori principles
•  Material: concerned with specific objects and their laws (as opposed to the forms of the understanding and reason); consists of two parts
• Laws of nature: physics/natural philosophy
• Laws according to which everything happens
• Laws of freedom/moral philosophy
• Laws according to which everything ought to happen
• Does his description of ethics strike anyone as odd (laws of freedom)?
• The point: we see the importance of freedom and laws in ethics.
• Ethics differs from physics in that its laws, laws of freedom, are not descriptive but instead prescriptive.
• Both have an empirical component
• Empirical component of ethics is practical anthropology
• “Moral philosophy has to define the laws of the human will, to the extent that the will is affected by nature.”
• However, ethics can also be pure (based on a priori principles).
• When pure philosophy is limited to specific objects, it is called metaphysics. (Thus the name metaphysics of morals)
• Metaphysics of morals, and only the metaphysics, is moral philosophy.
• This part is also called the rational part.

The empirical and rational parts should not mix.
Metaphysics must precede the empirical part and must “be scrupulously cleansed of everything empirical” to know “how much pure reason can accomplish”

• He later states that anything which mixes pure and empirical principles “does not even deserve to be called philosophy…still less…moral philosophy”
• Practical judgment, sharpened by experience, is needed to discern the cases to which the moral law applies. However, the laws themselves do not draw upon experience. 

Why? Moral law, to be law, must carry absolute necessity to be morally valid – “valid, that is, as a basis of obligation.” It must also not hold only for humans but for any rational being. So, the law cannot be grounded in human nature or facts about us or our world, for these things which are contingent. Nothing empirical but pure reason only can be used in determining moral law

This “pure” moral philosophy is concerned with a “pure will” and not human volition generally.
The pure is not concerned with humans tend to do or what we often do but instead with what a rational will, free from inclinations (likes, dislikes, wants, desires, aversions, etc) can do. This will is motivated only by a priori principles.
It acts out of duty in accordance with the Moral Law; its actions are done for the sake of the moral law instead of merely conforming to it.

• There is a difference between done for sake of and conforming. If the actions is not done out of duty, then the coincidence of the action with the moral merely happens chance; it is a coincidence.
• Actions for the sake of duty are the only actions that are morally good. 

Ch. 1: Passage from the Common Rational Knowledge of Morality to the Philosophical

Good Will

Will: the ability to determine action according to principles.

• We have a will. My cat does not. 

Good will: the only thing good without qualification

• Constitutes an indispensable condition of our worthiness to be happy.
• It is the only thing with “intrinsic moral worth.”
• It is the only thing with intrinsic worth because a good will is the only thing that always has morally good ends.
• Though helpful, gifts of nature and of fortune do not; Villains can have wit, intelligence, and bravery.
• This is why it is the only thing good without qualification
• It has “intrinsic moral worth” because it “has full worth in itself” regardless of consequences.
• A good will is good even if it achieves nothing; utility adds nothing to its worth.

Since the notion that utility doesn’t matter to value at all is a bit strange, Kant presents an argument against utilitarianism (or at least a version of it).

• P1: “no instrument for any purpose will be found in that being unless it is also the most appropriate and best adapted for that purpose.”
• P2: reason is an instrument nature gave to us
• P3: Assume nature’s purpose for beings with reason and wills are their own individual preservation, welfare, or happiness. 
• P4: Reason is not the most appropriate tool for preservation, welfare, or happiness.
• Support: Instinct would be a better way of meeting these ends.
• Support: Reason is a poorly suited to achieve these ends.
• Casts reason in rather negative light here
• Reason provides “feeble and defective guidance”
• “Nature would have prevented reason from…presuming, with its feeble insights, to think out for itself a plan for happiness and for the means of attaining it.”
• Furthermore, those who devote their cultivated reason to the enjoyment of life and happiness end up far away from content.

C: So…Reason is an instrument not for happiness but for some “worthier” end; and rejection of P3.
Points to push back on:

• P1
• P4 – specifically if the focus of utilitarianism is not just on one’s own happiness but maximizing happiness.
  {as a side note, Mill wasn’t born until 2 years after Kant died} 

Kant moves from the above conclusion to the broader conclusion that since nature gave us reason, and reason controls the will, the purpose of reason must be to produce a will which is good in itself.

• Not the sole good, but the highest good and the condition on all the rest (goods of fortune and of nature)
• The will has its own kind of satisfaction – not happiness but “satisfaction from fulfilling a purpose which reason alone determines”
• Acting out of duty in accordance with the Moral Law (Note: moral law, not laws).

The Three Propositions Regarding Moral Duty

Proposition 1: To have genuine moral merit an action must be done from, not just according to, duty.

• The action cannot be opposed to duty
• The action must have a direct inclination, meaning that the actions is not done because the agent is compelled by another inclination
• Ex: hypnosis; involuntary spasms; being nice to look good in front of your boss; Kant’s example of a shopkeeper giving correct change.
• This also means that the action cannot be done out of self-interest
• Difficulty arises when direct inclination and something else is at play.  For something to be done out of duty, Kant implies that it must be done solely out of duty, out a direct inclination. So some actions can be in conformity with duty but not out of duty [so, acting out of sympathy, happiness, self-interest or self-preservation generally doesn’t count]

Proposition 2: “The moral worth of an action done out of duty has its moral worth not in the objective to be reached…but in the maxim in accordance with which the action is decided upon.”

• This proposition eliminates at least one type of moral luck. Under a consequentialist view, one can try to do the right thing and be competent in doing the right thing but, through no fault of one’s own, one brings about a worse outcome. In this case, one has acted wrongly because of bad moral luck. Under Kant’s view, the focus is only on things fully within one’s control, assuming, of course, that we have free will.

Proposition 3: “Duty is the necessity of an act done out of respect for the law.”

• Respect is an activity of the will; “it is self-generated by a rational concept.” As such we can only respect what is “conjoined with [our] purely as a ground and never as a consequence”
• Kant claims we can never respect an inclination because an inclination – and so every object of volition – is an effect of the will.
• So we are left with the law itself. (law determined solely on basis of rationality and so free from and independent of inclinations)
• Worth, then, doesn’t have anything to do with results or possible results. 
• Kant also claims in footnote 2 that respect is the consciousness of my will’s submission to the law; the respect is thus the effect of the law on a person.
• Inclinations and their objections are excluded for another reason: their result could have been brought about by other causes.
• Recall that Kant is focused on the will, and the will has a “worthier end” than pleasure or self-preservation.

The will is important because Kant holds that only in rational beings is the highest and unconditional good to be found. In other words, only in rational creatures is morality to be had, and rationality requires a will. The idea of the law must determine the will for the will to act out of duty.

• Kant claims that to act with moral merit we need no insight into the ground for this respect. We must only have the appreciation of the moral law. 
• Since inclinations and the consequences of our actions are excluded, the duty gains a univerasalizability – a necessity. What is left is reason, and that is shared among and is the same in all rational beings.
• The moral law is universal and necessary. From these descriptions we can establish a form of the moral law: I ought to never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
• This doesn’t proscribe any specific action – it only establishes a template of sorts – a form – to which maxims must comply.

Metaphysics of Ethics

Acting from Duty

The chapter starts by addressing the claim that one cannot in fact point to an example of someone acting solely out of duty.

• Kant agrees. He claims that, even with the most searching and rigorous self-examination, we cannot know for sure that our motivation is based solely in duty, for there is always what Kant calls the dear self (hidden selfish-motivation). 
• As side note, it is interesting to juxtapose his stance here with a later comment made which states: “for the pure thought of duty and of the moral law generally…has an influence on the human heart much more powerful than all other motivations that may arise from the field of experience.” Apparently it is the fault of professors that the appeal of duty is lost. (I sincerely hope that Kant is wrong on this last point!)
• He claims that this observation is not a mark against the moral theory. Even if there were never any actions which sprang from pure motives, his theory would be fine because the question is “whether reason, by itself and independently of all appearances, commands what ought to be done.” Whether this or that actually occurs, Kant claims, is irrelevant.
• A phrase often repeated in moral discourse is “ought implies can.” Loosely, the phrase means that if we are morally required to X, we must be able to do X. Morality cannot require us to do the impossible. 
• If we assume that Kant is right that we can never know for certain that we are acting purely out of duty, can we know that it is possible for beings like us to act purely out of duty? 

Rant about How an Empirical Approach to Ethics is Bad

Long story short: 

• a priori and rational = good methodology is ethics
• empirical, “popular practical philosophy,” and reasoning from cases = bad methodology in ethics

According to Kant, moral reasoning from examples is the worst advice one could give in morality. Before drawing any conclusions from the example, we must first apply some moral standard or principle to it to see if it is fitting to be used as an example.

Introduction to the Will, Reason, and Laws

Kant claims that everything in nature “works in accordance with laws” but that only rational beings have the power to act in accordance with the idea of laws. Rational beings thus have wills. Reason works on the will to influence the principles of volition and to derive actions from laws.

• There are two types of relationships between reason and the will. 
• If reason is the only thing acting on the will, then objective principles will always be subjective. 
• However, other things can determine the will. If reason is not the sole determining factor of the will – if the will “is exposed to subjective conditions”, in other words, if the agent has inclinations – then the will is not in complete accord with reason, and objective principles will not necessarily be subjective ones. 
• Objective principles, when acting as constraints, are called commandments. The will can still be determined by such objective principles. However, the will, by its own nature, is not necessarily obedient to such principles. 
• The formulation of a commandment is called an imperative. 

Imperatives

• All imperatives are marked by a “must,” which emphasizes the constraining nature of imperatives. 
• All carry at least a type of necessary and state which actions will be good (in a sense) - either good period or good for something else. Necessary period or necessary for some further end. 
• All imperatives apply to wills, but no imperatives hold for a divine, or holy, will. 
• This is because imperatives are formulations of commandments, and commandments apply only when the objective principles are not subjective principles – i.e. when the will is not in complete accord with reason. 
• A good will would still be subject to objective principles but would simply not be constrained by them because reason would already be in harmony with the will. 
• Two types of Imperatives: 
• Hypothetical Imperative (HI): “declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of something else that one wants” or may want 
• Ex: If you want to win the lottery you ought to buy a ticket. 
• Two sub-types: 
• Problematic practical principle: End is possible 
• Assertoric practical principle: End is actual 
• Names come from types of proposition in Aristotelian logic. Assertoric propositions state what is or is not the case; problematic propositions involve the possibility of something being true. 
• He mentions one type of hypothetical imperative in particular, imperatives of skill. In these imperatives there is not found a question as to whether the end is reasonable but good – only about what one would have to do to attain it.
• We thus need to be careful of how we read “good” in some passages of Kant
• Kant claims that there is one end that “we may presuppose as actual in all rational beings.” This end is perfect happiness
• We can suppose this purpose a priori; call prudence that which leads to it
• Note: Kant does not claim that this is the ultimate end of human conduct, like Mill does. He only states that it is one end that all humans share. 
• Categorical Imperative (CI): “represented an action as itself objectively necessary”
• An apodictic practical principle 
• Apodictic, like assertoric and problematic, refers to Aristotelian propositions. Apodicitic propositions are statements which assert things that are necessarily true or self-evidently true or false 
• The CI is not concerned with the material of the action or its result but instead with its form and with the principle from which the actions itself results. 
• **What is good in the action consists in the agent’s disposition.** 
• Kant slightly reconfigures the division and gives new names: 
• Rules of skill: HI 
• Also technical imperatives 
• Counsels of Prudence: HI – always assertoric practical principles 
• Involve necessity but only under a subjective and contingent condition 
• Also pragmatic imperatives 
• Commandments (laws) of morality – CI 
• Also moral imperatives 
• All recommend actions that are good either as a means to something else or good in itself. 
• How are these imperatives possible? How can we understand these imperatives to constrain our will? 
• Technical and pragmatic imperatives: whoever wills the ends also wills the means 
• He claims that the use of a mean is included in the concept of the end; when willing that an effect be the result of one’s actions, one already conceives of the causality involved. The causality involves the means. 
• Pragmatic imperatives are trickier because the concept of happiness is vague. Willing the means when one wills the end thus becomes more difficult because we don’t really know what perfect happiness requires. 
• Kant even says that determining what action will promote the perfect happiness of a rational being is “insoluble” 
• If he’s right, is this a problem for Mill? 
• Moral imperatives: 
• The response here is more difficult because objective necessity can’t rest on a presupposition like the HI can. 
• We also cannot settle the issue empirically, so…. Investigate a priori! 
• While we cannot know beforehand what a HI will contain, Kant claims that we know right away what the CI contains: a necessary conformity to it. 
• Our duties are derived from this one principle. This leads us to… 

The Categorical Imperative: 1 and 2

There are three main formulations of the CI, with a slight variation of the first one mentioned. It is important to keep in mind that Kant views each of the formulations as identical to the others. They are all formulations of the CI and not different categorical imperatives.

CI 1a: “Act only on that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law”
CI 1b: “Act as though the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature”

• What it means: We should act only if we can will that..
• 1a: everyone acts on the same principle we do without contradiction.
• 1b: the principle we act on become a law of nature. 
• While these are generally similar, there is a slight difference between the two – almost more of a slight difference in focus – that is highlighted in Kant’s discussion of the four examples. 
• Explanation of Examples:
• Borrowing Money: If we borrow money, state we will pay the loaner back, but have no intention of ever doing so, we act on a maxim that we cannot will to become universal law. Our larger goal is procuring money. If everyone acted on our maxim, then no one would ever lend money. Our maxim then undermines the practice of borrowing (and promising), creating contradiction. 
• Here, the focus is on “universal law.”
• Not helping others: If we acted on the maxim that we never help others, Kant claims we are acting on a maxim we cannot will to be universal law. This is because we sometimes seek help from others. 
• Here, the focus is on the act of what we can will to be universal. 
• Suicide: “A nature whose law was that the very same feeling meant to promote life should actually destroy life would contradict itself, and hence not endure as nature.” Basically, it would make no sense, and in a way be self-defeating, for nature to have as one of its laws “kill yourself whenever you don’t feel like living.”
• The focus here is on “law of nature.” 
• Not developing talents: even though nature could survive if everyone let their talents languish, Kant claims we cannot will that everyone would have such a natural instinct to eschew all development of talent. 
• As with the not helping others case, here the focus is on what we can will. 
• Possible Objections: 
• How do we appropriately describe a maxim? (Anscombe)
• Every action and goal has numerous descriptions. How we determine which ones are most salient? 
• Mill: “[Kant fails] to show that there would be any contradiction, and logical impossibility, in the adoption by all rational beings of the most outrageously immoral rules of conduct. All he show is that the consequences of their universal adoption would be such as no one would choose to incur.”

Moving from CI 1 to CI 2

Kant returns to the question of how a CI is possible. Can we prove, a priori, that there is an imperative that commands (1) absolutely and (2) without further motivation?

• Absolutely: 
• If the law is necessary, then the law must be connected with the concept of the will of a rational being.
• Will is a power of determining oneself to act in conformity with the idea of certain laws.
• An end is what serves the will as the objective (as in object) ground of its self-determining. 
• Basically an end is the effect which the will wills
• A necessary end is given by reason and so must be equally valid for all rational beings (since there is no inclination involved, and form of rationality same in all).
• If it is equally valid for all, then it commands absolutely. 
• Without further motivation
• You can have either a subjective ground of desiring (called a driving-spring) or an objective ground of willing (called a motivating reason).
• Practical principles are formal if they abstract from all subjective ends and material if they are based on subjective ends, or driving-springs. 
• Subjective ends only have value in relation to a subject’s desiring.
• Since CI is formal and has objective grounds, it does not have value in relation to any further desiring, and so the CI commands without further motivation. 
• Since it is possible for an imperative to command in this way, something whose existence in itself had absolute worth (as opposed to subjective value) could be a ground of the CI. 
• Kant claims as rational beings are such things. We, or our rational natures, are ends in themselves.
• Kant asserts that this is the way in which a rational agent must conceive of her own existence. Since we all must hold this on the same grounds, the subjective principle is also objective. 

CI 2: “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”

• What does CI 2 mean?
• We must always treat people as persons instead of things. While we can use others a means, we must never treat them merely as a means but instead must always treat them as beings with worth – a worth that they have independently of subjective desires. 
• In other words: how we treat a barista must differ from how we treat a coffee machine. One has dignity; the other has a price. 
• Explanation of Examples
• Borrowing money: we view the other person merely as means to our own end instead of as an agent desiring of respect. 
• Suicide: we are viewing our own selves as a means to maintaining a tolerable state of affairs.
• Cultivating talents: “It is not enough that an action that an action not conflict with humanity in our own person as an end in itself: it must also harmonize with this end.”
• Helping others: Not helping others will not conflict with humanity, but it will not harmonize with humanity either. 
• Roughly, we can avoid using ourselves or others as means, but we must be sure to also treat ourselves, others, and humanity in general as an end – as something with dignity or value – and we ought to promote things with intrinsic value. 

How do CI1 and CI2 fit together? Well, slightly different ways of looking at the CI.

• Objectively, ground lies in universality
• Subjectively, the ground of legislating lies in the end. So the ground lies in rational beings as end in themselves. 

The Categorical Imperative: 3

From the subjective ground of the CI follows that the supreme condition of the will’s harmony with universal practical reason is the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law, or…

CI3: “every human will is a will that enacts universal laws in all its maxims”
[This problem is the hardest version of the CI to follow, so just hang in there.]
What it means:

• We should reject maxims that conflict with the law-giving nature of the will. 
• A will that is a supreme law-giver cannot depend on any interest. Why? 
• Such a will would require yet another law in order to restrict the interest of self-love

In this version Kant emphasizes the self-legislating aspect of a will. The will is subject to the law but also gives the law to itself.

• When we thought of beings as merely subject to laws (without legislating such laws to themselves), “the law had to carry some interest, as stimulus or compulsion to obedience”; their will had to be compelled by something else to act in a certain way. The result was then always a conditional imperative. Do X if you have interest Y. 
• The notion of self-legislation shows how the law can constrain us in the absence of an interest or inclination: it constrains us because we give it to ourselves.

This notion of all rational agents as equal lawmakers (and, he tosses in there, as judgers of their own actions from this standpoint) leads to the concept of a kingdom of ends.

• Kingdom: systematic union of different rational beings under common laws. 
• Abstracting from “personal differences” and “private ends”, we can conceive of all ends being so systematically united. 
• This kingdom’s laws would relate to CI2, to the relation of us to each other as ends and means
• We are all members as lawgivers, and we must conceive of ourselves as lawgivers if we conceive of ourselves as ends in themselves. 

In other words, because we have dignity we are a rational being and so a member of the kingdom of ends.

• Dignity versus Price 
• Price indicates that the thing can be replaced; it has only relative worth (worth because someone values it). These things have a market price or attachment price.
• Dignity is what those things which are “exalted above all price” and have no equivalents possess. Dignity is the inner worth of ends in themselves have.
• Since “morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in itself,” morality and humanity are the only things with dignity, though morality can confer dignity to actions though intentions, or maxims of the will.
• The basis of dignity is autonomy. (Autonomy is the ability of a will to legislate as a member of the kingdom of ends.) 

Categorical Imperative: Recap

All maxims have…

• A form: universality
• A matter: an end (rational beings)
• A complete determination: see CI3b; basically refers to the totality or all-comprehensiveness of its system of ends.

Autonomy and Heteronomy of the Will (almost done with Chapter 2!!!)

This entire discussion was supposedly started by an investigation into a good will, so Kant returns to this idea and tries to tie everything together.

Good will: a will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil, which means its universalized maxims cannot be in conflict with each other.

• End of a good will is a rational nature/being. 
• Such end must be self-sufficient. If it had to be brought about, then the goodness of the will would depend on consequences, which is bad. 
• Since the good will cannot be submitted to anything lower, the end must be itself.
• This shows the move from CI 2 (humanity as end in itself) to CI 3 (humanity as self-legislating). 
• Autonomy is the ability of a will to self-legislate as a member of the kingdom of ends.
• Morality and autonomy are thus linked, and the moral law is the law of freedom.

Another way to look at the relation between morality and autonomy:

• “Whatever constitutes by itself the absolute worth of human beings is that by which they must be judged”
• Autonomy is what gives persons dignity and so constitutes the absolute worth of humans. 

Autonomy of the will – some other attributes:

• An autonomous will is free from inclinations and does not act upon them. 
• Kant claims that the will is necessarily bound to the principle of autonomy, but to prove this we would have to give a critique of practical reason. 
• He does think that we can show that the principle of autonomy is the sole principle of ethics. This, plus the claim regarding how we must conceive of ourselves as being ends in themselves, is enough to get at basically the same thing.

Heteronomy of the will

• A will governed by inclinations; a will which does something because it wants something else.
• In other words, heteronomy arises when objects have sway over the will. 
• Two types of principles of morality which are based on heteronomy as their foundation:
• Empirical: drawn from principles of perfect happiness; built on either moral (think moral intuitions) or physical feeling.
• Not fit for moral laws because they are based in human constitution and so cannot be universal 
• Rational: drawn from principle of perfection; built on either the rational concept of perfection as a possible effect of our will or on the concept of perfection (God’s will) as a determining cause of our will
• Concept of perfection better than theological conception as a basis for morality, but both are also flawed
• An account based on the concept of perfection is circular; you cannot offer a proof without assuming the consequent at some point.
• Kant isn’t fond of using God as a basis of morality because we cannot directly apprehend Gods’ perfection and can only derive it from our own concepts, and these concepts generally include things like vengefulness, lust for glory and dominion, etc. 
• So (surprise surprise) Kant thinks heteronomy is a flawed foundation of morality for the above reasons, but also because of a more general criticism: such a basis can never command categorically. It always wills for some end, which is in turn a means for some other end, the limit being given by nature, and so is contingent. 
• Morality thus cannot come from a heteronomous will but must instead be bound with an autonomous will. 

The End (of Kant, for now)

— Professor Beth Henzel, Rutgers University

Knight of Justice

Forced to witness the murder of his parents at the tender age of seven, Bruce Wayne vowed to protect Gotham City so that never would another have to suffer like him. A hardened vigilante trained in every single martial art known to man; armed with a custom-made Kevlar armor, gadgets, an utility belt and a strategic mind prepped to calculate contingency plans for any possible situation, Batman has waged a crusade to safeguard innocents and deliver criminals to justice. However, there is one thing he won't do in his mission to defend Gotham: Kill.

The Batman franchise has extended itself reaching multiple media outlets producing TV shows, an animated series, video games, comic books and movies each presenting the Caped Crusader in an exclusive light of its own but always retaining a central foundation of moral values revolving around the theme of justice. Batman is justice.

Regardless of the opponent he is facing, whether it be the maniacal Joker or the demented Scarecrow, Batman has forever remained true to his word to never kill, believing every human being, no matter how twisted, how far beyond salvage, deserves a chance to plead at a fair trial, a chance at receiving salvation. Case in point:

Even after all that Joker has done to cause death and destruction, Batman still believed he deserved a chance and he wanted to help, to dig into the Joker's psyche, claw out whatever sanity that maybe left in him to try to save him. Nonetheless, Joker refused. We do not know why, but he refused. Yet, Batman wanted to help.

Embittered by the chaos and violence constantly barraging his life, Bruce Wayne has seen it all and it is a mystery how he has managed to hang on to any sense of normalcy without being driven a deranged, raving lunatic. However, regardless of the modality, the fact of the matter is that he has maintained to preserve his mind and use it for the good of others. And that is the core goal of Batman: fight for the good others, whether they be evil or righteous.

This philosophy is nowhere more pronounced than throughout the plot of the Batman video game, Arkham City.

The story of the video game revolves around the eponymous Arkham City, close to a year after the events of the previous game, Arkham Asylum. Following the events of the preceding title, Quincy Sharpe, formerly the warden of Arkham Asylum, hands over the ownership of his institution to Hugo Strange who then proceeds to expand it over a portion of Old Gotham barricading it off from the main city. The ramifications are absolutely disastrous.

With no supervision, the criminals of Gotham are set loose to roam the decrepit streets of Old Gotham raging war against one another as Arkham City boils into a free-for-all turf-brawl between the fat slugs of Gotham's underbelly: mobster mastermind, Oswald "The Penguin" Cobblepot, fallen tragic hero, Harvey "Two-Face" Dent and unhinged anarchist, the Joker. It is pure and raw pandemonium as Hell descends on Earth leashed only by a flimsy wall, pegged to crumble down any minute, from the helpless, oblivious citizens of Gotham.

The game opens with a cut-scene of Bruce Wayne standing outside the gates of Arkham City protesting against the institution and rallying for the closure of it. Minutes later, he is attacked by TYGER guards and imprisoned within the same complex he was protesting against merely moments ago.

Following the capture, Bruce Wayne is greeted by Hugo Strange who reveals that he knows the former's secret identity along with the ominous declaration that something called Protocol 10 is going to make him famous. After this, the psychiatrist leaves and Bruce hatches his plot to escape, stealing a chip from one of the TYGER guard's communication radios in the process. He is swiftly intercepted and forced to enter through the gates of Arkham City into the main body of the prison where he is rudely welcomed by Cobblepot.

After a brief altercation, Bruce takes out all of Penguin's thugs and calls in Alfred to send in his Batsuit on top of the Ace Chemicals building within Arkham. Following the suit-up, Batman heads to the abandoned courthouse where Two-Face has Catwoman hostage.

Rescuing the latter from the disgraced District Attorney, Batman questions her about Protocol 10. She doesn't know. The rendezvous is interrupted by a bullet aimed at the thief, missing the mark.

Batman tracks down the location from where the bullet was fired using its trajectory and investigates the gun which was being remotely controlled by none other than... the Joker.

The Caped Crusader manages to track down the Clown Prince of Crime down to his hideout at the Sionis Steel Mill but he is soon taken captive, bound and injected with Joker's blood which, he soon learns, is toxic due to overdosing on the TITAN drug a year ago at the Asylum. Joker asks Batman to help him find a cure or else they both will die, along with the rest of Gotham who have also been poisoned thanks to Harley Quinn shipping samples of Joker's blood to all of the city's hospitals.

Joker informs Batman that he tasked Mr. Freeze to make the antidote for the TITAN drug but he has gone missing since. He pleads Batman to find him and acquire the cure. Batman learns Mr. Freeze, unfortunately, is under the custody of the Penguin. The Caped Crusader then goes on to seek out the mob boss who has taken over the old Gotham Museum as his base of operations.

Batman rescues Freeze from the hands of the Penguin but is soon told by the cryogenic doctor that the cure for the TITAN drug is too unstable and will break down inside the human body without the help of an enzyme which the cowled detective identifies as one found in the blood of Ra's al-Ghul, head of the League of Assassins.

Batman tracks down the bio-terrorist hiding deep within the bowels of Arkham City underneath the ruins of the ancient Wonder Tower. There, Ra's offers to give Batman his blood at one cost: Batman must take his life. Naturally, the latter refuses and the two engage in battle which ends in the Caped Crusader's favor who succeeds in pacifying the Grandmaster Assassin without killing him. The detective returns to Freeze with the blood sample.

Mr. Freeze manages to concoct the cure to the TITAN drug successfully but refuses to hand it over to Batman revealing that Nora, his wife, has been kidnapped by the Joker's men. He asks Batman to return his wife to him if he wants the antidote. Batman does not have time for negotiations. The two initiate battle.

Batman proceeds to take down Mr. Freeze but by the time he is done with him, Harley Quinn has managed to steal the antidote for the TITAN drug and is on her way to the Sionis Steel Mill. The Caped Crusader takes pursuit.

Upon reaching the Steel Mill, Batman comes face-to-face with a rejuvenated Joker all ready for a final showdown. The latter calls forth a horde of thugs and a fight ensues.

Batman deftly sweeps through Joker's hooligans eventually leaving only himself and the Clown Prince of Crime behind. The two clash forces and the Caped Crusader comes out on top. However, just as he is about to land the finishing blow, Protocol 10 begins.

Protocol 10 turns out to be a plan to destroy Arkham City with all the captives locked up within it. Hugo Strange plotted the operation to eradicate every single criminal of Gotham along with any enemies he has locked up within the compound as political prisoners.

Arkham City is bombarded with missiles from choppers and Batman is pinned down under debris as Joker taunts to kill the detective once and for all until he is stopped by Talia al Ghul, daughter of Ra's al Ghul. She offers the Joker a trip to the Lazarus Pit in exchange for him to let Batman go. He agrees but before the two leaves, Talia signals to a GPS tracker implanted on her body to let Batman know how to find her. Batman blacks out.

Batman wakes up to Catwoman removing the debris off him.

She lends him a hand and the Caped Crusader manages to get up on his feet to witness the unfolding of Protocol 10.

Arkham City is burning. TYGER choppers have blanketed the decaying urban landscape with bombs and rockets ripping and blasting the city bit by bit. Batman watches on as he has a decision to make: save Talia from the hands of the Joker or save Arkham. Obviously, at this point, anyone would go for the former and leave Arkham City to smolder into ruins. Why care for a necropolis of criminals? Well, it seems Batman didn't quite get the memo.

After a brief debate with Alfred as to what should be the best course of action, Batman decides upon the latter, heading to Wonder Tower to stop Hugo Strange and his Protocol 10. But why save the lives of those who never cared for the sanctity of another? Because he is Batman.

Throughout the entire length of the game, we now realize, that Batman has been endeavoring not only to find the cure to Joker's disease and save him but also Arkham City: a hellhole of scum and filth. And he succeeds too, eventually managing to rescue Talia as well only to watch her die as Joker shoots her in the spine and reveals his plot: Clayface has been masquerading as the Joker all night while the real Joker was hiding at the Monarch Theatre.

After a battle against the monster of mush, the Batman and the Joker find themselves underneath the subterranean levels of the theater where the Joker fails to resist the urge to back-stab Batman one more time consequently causing Batman to drop the vial of cure containing Joker's half of the potion shattering upon contact with the concrete.

Joker scampers towards the crumbled shards of glass to scoop up any measly drops of the medicine he could find but to no avail. The cure was long gone. Joker was going to die. And in his final moments, the Clown Prince of Crime and the Dark Knight share one last dialogue,

The Joker:

Quick, the cure! What are you waiting for?
Come on! I killed your girlfriend, poisoned Gotham, and hell, it's not even breakfast.
But so what? We all know you'll save me.

Batman:

Every decision you've ever made ends in death and misery.
People die. I stop you. You'll just break out and do it again.

The Joker:

Think of it as a running gag... Nooooo!
Are you happy now?

Batman:

You want to know something funny?
Even after everything you've done... I would have saved you.

The Joker:

That actually is... pretty funny...

Batman has always been a symbol of a justice but oftentimes he has been more than that. He has been many a times been an icon of hope, even for the belly-crawlers and vermin of society. He has been an icon of mercy, always willing to forgive and forget, to give them another chance.

In Christopher Nolan's epic Dark Knight Trilogy we see the eponymous Dark Knight save the Joker after a trouncing in the ending segment of the second movie even after the latter had been directly responsible for the death of the love of his life, consequences of which had the Watchful Guardian of Gotham retire into oblivion for the next eight years, drowning in everlasting sorrow and depression. Yet, regardless of that, when the time came to avenge her demise, Batman opted rather to save the Joker's life and, in the process, save his own soul from descending into the darkness of the Joker's world. It is perhaps as a plaudits to this that the Joker offers his final few lines of the movie:

Oh, you. You just couldn't let me go, could you? This is what happens when an unstoppable force meets an immovable object. You truly are incorruptible, aren't you?
You won't kill me out of some misplaced sense of self-righteousness.
And I won't kill you because you're just too much fun.
I think you and I are destined to do this forever.

And such is the morality of the Batman. He will never kill. He will never seek revenge. Only justice. His crusade against the demons of Gotham is a crusade to save the city and its people, not punish them. Every criminal of the city, every thug, every scum, to him, is a victim of the darkness that seeps through the city, not an active agent of it. And he is their savior. This is the promise he has made, as he walks the line between good and evil, that justice shall be served and not revenge. This thin line that he tiptoes delicately day after day and night after night has been made manifest by the voice of reason and sanity offered by Rachel Dawes early within the Nolan-verse movie that kicked off the franchise, "Batman Begins" when the deputy district attorney tells her seething friend Bruce Wayne who had appeared at the hearing of Joe Chill, the murderer of his parents, with a gun to exact justice that such is not justice. Such, as what Bruce was about to do, was revenge. After the death of Chill as decreed by Falcone, the two speak,

Rachel Dawes:

The DA couldn't understand why Judge Faden insisted on making the hearing public. Falcone paid him off to get Chill out in the open.

Bruce Wayne:

Maybe I should be thanking them.

Rachel Dawes:

You don't mean that.

Bruce Wayne:

What if I do Rachel? My parents deserved justice.

Rachel Dawes:

You're not talking about justice. You're talking about revenge.

Bruce Wayne:

Sometimes they're the same.

Rachel Dawes:

No, they're never the same, Bruce. Justice is about harmony. Revenge is about you making yourself feel better. Which is why we have an impartial system.

Bruce Wayne:

Your system is broken.

Rachel Dawes: 

You care about justice? Look beyond your own pain, Bruce. This city is rotting. 

People talk about the depression as if its history, and it's not.

Things are worse than ever down here. Falcone floods our streets with crime and drugs, preying on the desperate, creating new Joe Chills every day. Falcone may not have killed your parents Bruce, but he's destroying everything they stood for.

You wanna thank him for that, here you go. We all know where to find him, but as long as he keeps the bad people rich and the good people scared no one will touch him. 

Good people like your parents who will stand against injustice, they're gone. 

What chance does Gotham have when the good people do nothing?

Bruce Wayne:

I'm not one of your good people, Rachel.

Rachel Dawes:

What do you mean?

Bruce Wayne:

All these years I wanted to kill him. Now I can't.

Rachel Dawes:

Your father would be ashamed of you.

Batman ensures that his crusade is always about setting things right for the people of Gotham and not for himself. Every strike, every blow is a measure of justice, not revenge. A tale of Imam Ali from Fadhail-e-A'mal comes to mind:

In the battle of Khandaq, the Muslims dug a ditch around themselves for their defense, so that the enemy could not get across. A man from the enemy side called Amr ibn Abdul-Wud, who was known for his strength, courage and proficiency in martial arts managed to get across the ditch. All the Muslims were terrified to fight him except the valiant Imam Ali came forward to fight this man.

There was a fierce fight until at last Imam Ali threw Amr down onto the ground and mounted his chest ready to kill him. Just as Imam Ali was about to kill this enemy of Islam, he spat on the face of the Imam.

Everybody was certain that because of this insult, Amr would meet his death even faster still, but to their amazement, Imam Ali moved from Amr’s chest and walked away. Amr attacked the Imam again and after a short while, Imam Ali, once more, overpowered Amr and killed him.

After the battle was over people asked Imam Ali the reason why he had spared Amr’s life when he had first overpowered him to which the Imam replied that if he had killed him then it would have not been purely and solely for the Sake of God but also for the satisfaction of his anger and so he let him free. Then the Imam controlled his anger and killed Amr purely for the Sake of God. Such was the virtue of the exalted Imam-e-Murtaza Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Similarly, Batman, too, seeks to deliver every hit for the sake of justice and solely justice. Never revenge. And if the time ever comes that this were to be untrue, Batman would cease to be Batman and the night that overcasts Gotham would never fade away. What is it then that keeps the Watchful Guardian from transforming into a Vengeful Warlord?

I don't know. Perhaps it is what he has seen within the shadows of malevolence. Perhaps, while tiptoeing the line between good and evil, he has realized that the two sides are not very different. Perhaps he knows that if he were to mete out harshness towards the critters of the dark side, he would have to exact the same judgment upon himself because, at the end of the day, pun intended, the dawn and the dusk may perhaps be one and the same.

Batman knows that he is not very different from the ones whom he fights. The criminals, the gangbangers, all victims of a corrupt system. Perhaps something happened in their lives that caused them to snap just like him. He knows he was not far from being the same when he sat by the corpses of his parents at Crime Alley. Perhaps he did snap? Perhaps his insanity and obsession just happened to be for the good of the denizens of Gotham by chance? I mean, what else would you call a man in a suit resembling a giant bat parkouring from rooftop to rooftop beating up thugs with his bare hands other than a raving lunatic? It is perhaps by a merciful twist of fate that this insane knight of the dark stands and fights amid the angels of light.

— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

God and the Problem of Evil

"I willingly believe that the damned are, in one sense, successful, rebels to the end;
that the Doors of Hell are locked on the inside."
~ C.S. Lewis

The problem of evil has long been used against religion and the existence of God, and by all means, it is
a valid argument, but an argument does not simply triumph for its inherent validity. As powerful as the argument is,
it is absolutist in nature to believe that the mere existence of God stomps out all evil. Such an idea grossly corrupts the definition of God as presented by the majority faiths extant today such as Judaism, Islam and Christianity.

Thus, before we begin, let us take the definition of God as presented by the aforementioned religions: God is
an Eternal Force, a Merciful Creator Who crafted us to fulfill Their Design on Earth as it is done in Heaven.
Nowhere do the religions claim that God is a patrolman knocking door-to-door and smiting those who commit evil. Yes, the religions do speak of God as a Supreme Judge Who will punish the wicked and reward the good, but unfortunately the court date isn't here yet.

The religious scriptures do not proclaim that the existence of God means the absence of evil. Nowhere in
the Torah, the Bible or the Quran does God state:

"I exist and My mere existence is the end of all evil."

On the contrary, God acknowledges evil quite a substantial number of times in the Scriptures and They do not fail to explain its existence. God has stated numerous times that evil is a by-product of our failure to abide by Their Laws which makes sense, at least to me personally.

That is why, to say, that the existence of evil disproves the existence of God is somewhat inadequate. It would be like saying that the existence of bicycles disproves the existence of boats. No-one ever claimed that for bicycles to exist as a fact of reality, boats cannot. Similarly, almost no theistic faith claims that for God to exist, evil cannot.
Such is not the definition of God.

Think of it this way, evil is not a concept but a consequence of not doing the right thing. God has commanded us to
do the right thing vehemently throughout the Scriptures. Hence, evil is not an idea of Their Creation but the fruits of our misdeeds. Allow me the liberty to use an example:

Let us say that a father leaves behind enough money as inheritance for three sons. He also writes down guidelines for the sons to follow in order to use the money without creating mischief. However, the first son hoards all of it
for himself and wastes it on vain desires. This creates the problem of the two sons living in poverty and pain. Perhaps one of them turns into a criminal to survive. Did the father create the problem? No. He had left behind enough property for all three. The problem was created when the first son committed the misdeed of
squandering all the wealth on his own, not abiding by the commands of the father.

God told us, very plainly, not to murder, not to steal, not to bear false witness, yet we do so, often with glee;
these misdeeds 'create' evil. In fact, it can be argued that evil is not created but begotten as children of mischief, acts that our Creator strictly commanded us to avoid.

Therefore, it is ludicrous to blame God for all the evils of the world since They are the One Who has set forward Commandments to follow in order to stop the procreation of evil, Commandments that we deny to follow and
when our denial births evil we blame it on They Who provided substantial advice to avert the problem. It is as if
when a mother tells her child not to touch the fire lest the child get afflicted by a burn but the child touches the fire and is scalded, the mother is blamed.

The similitude of the sinning soul is akin to the story of Iblis and Adam which is precisely why I believe God relates it in the Holy Quran. The lessons to take from the story are manifold.

We have condemned ourselves by distancing us from our Creator, Their Laws and Love, and blamed Them for it.
I believe the problem of evil is a problem we have created to turn ourselves away from God and deprive ourselves of Their Grace. We have turned ourselves away from the Gift of Paradise and locked ourselves in Hell.



— Fahim Ferdous Kibria

Virtue

Next we must examine what is virtue. Since there are three conditions arising in the soul—feelings, capacities, and states—virtue must be one of these.

By feelings I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, love, hate, longing, jealousy, pity, and in general whatever implies pleasure or pain. By capacities I mean what we have when we are said to be capable of these feelings—capable of being angry, for iristance, or of being afraid or of feeling pity. By states I mean what we have when we are well or badly off in relation to feelings. If, for instance, our feeling is too interise or slack, we are badly off in relation to anger, but if it is intermediate, we are well off; the same is true in the other cases.

First, then, neither virtues nor vices are feelings. For we are called excellent or base insofar as we have virtues or vices, not insofar as we have feelings. Further, we are neither praised nor blamed insofar as we have feelings; for we do not praise the angry or the frightened person, and do not blame the person who is simply angry, but only the person who is angry in a particular way. We are praised or blamed, however, insofar as we have virtues or vices.

Further, we are angry and afraid without decision; but the virtues are decisions of some kind, or requife decision. Besides, insofar as we have feelings, we are said to be moved; but insofar as we have virtues or vices, we are said to be in some condition rather than moved.

For these reasons the virtues are not capacities either; for we are neither called good nor called bad, nor are we praised or blamed, insofar as we are simply capable of feelings. Further, while we have capacities by nature, we do not become good or bad by nature; we have discussed this before.

If, then, the virtues are neither feelings nor capacities, the remaining possibility is that they are states. And so we have said what the genus of virtue is. But we must say not only, as we already have, that it is a state, but also if what sort of state it is.

It should be said, then, that every virtue causes its possessors to be in a good state and to perform their functions well. The virtue of eyes, for instance, makes the eyes and their functioning excellent, because it makes us see well; and similarly, the virtue of a horse makes the horse excellent, and thereby good at galloping, at carrying its rider, and at standing steady in the face of the enemy.

If this is true in every case, the virtue of a human being likewise be the state that makes a human being good and makes him perform his function well. We have already said how this will be true, and it will also be evident from our next remarks, if we consider the sort of nature that virtue has. In everything continuous and divisible we can take more, less, and equal, and each of them either in the object itself or relative to us; and the equal is some intermediate between excess and deficiency.

By the intermediate in the object I mean what is equidistant from each extremity; this is one and the same for all. But relative to us the intermediate is what is neither superfluous nor deficient; this is not one, and is not the same for all.

If, for instance, ten are many and two are few, we take six as intermediate in the object, since it exceeds two and is exceeded by ten by an equal amount, four. This is what is intermediate by numerical proportion. But that is not how we must take the intermediate that is relative to us. For if ten pounds of food, for instance, are a lot for someone to eat, and two pounds a little, it does not follow that the trainer will prescribe six, since this might also be either a little or a lot for the person who is to take it—for Milo, the athlete, a little, but for the beginner: in gymnastics a lot; and the same is true for running and wrestling.

In this way every scientific expert avoids excess and deficiency and seeks and chooses what is intermediate—but intermediate relative to us, not in the object. This, then, is how each science produces its product well, by focusing on what is intermediate and making the product conform to that.

This, indeed, is why people regularly comment on well-made products that nothing could be added or subtracted; they assume that excess or deficiency ruins a good result, whereas the mean preserves it. Good craftsmen also, we say, focus on what is intermediate when they produce their product. Since virtue, like nature, is better and more exact than any craft, it will also aim at what is intermediate.

By virtue I mean virtue of character; for this is about feelings and actions, and these admit of excess, deficiency, and an intermediate condition. We can be afraid, for instance, or be confident, or have appetites, or get angry, or feel pity, and in general have pleasure or pain, both too much and too little, and in both ways not well. But having these feelings at the right times, about the right things, toward the right people, for the right end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and best condition, and this is proper to virtue.

Similarly, actions also admit of excess, deficiency, and an intermediate condition. Now virtue is about feelings and actions, in which excess and deficiency are in error and incur blame, whereas the intermediate condition is correct and wins praise, which are both proper to virtue.

Virtue, then, is a mean, insofar as it aims at what is intermediate. Moreover, there are many ways to be in error—for badness is proper to the indeterminate, as the Pythagoreans pictured it, and good to the determinate. But there is only one way to be correct. That is why error is easy and correctness is difficult, since it is easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it. And so for this reason also excess and deficiency are proper to vice, the mean to virtue; 'for we are noble in only one way, but bad in all sorts of ways.'

Virtue, then, is a state that decides, consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us, which is defined by reference to reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it. It is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.

It is a mean for this reason also: Some vices miss what is right because they are deficient, others because they are excessive, in feelings or in actions, whereas virtue finds and chooses what is intermediate. That is why virtue, as far as its essence and the account stating what it is are concerned, is a mean, but, as far as the best condition and the good result are concerned, it is an extremity.

Now, not every action or feeling admits of the mean. For the names of some automatically include baseness for instance, spite, shamelessness, envy, among feelings and adultery, theft, murder, among actions. For all of these and similar things are called by these names because they themselves, not their excesses or deficiencies, are base.

Hence in doing these things we can never be correct, but must invariably be in error. We cannot do them well or not well by committing adultery, for instance, with the right woman at the right time in the right way. On the contrary, it is true without qualification that to do any of them is to be in error.

Therefore, is like thinking that unjust or cowardly or intemperate action also admits of a mean, an excess and a deficiency. If it did, there would be a mean of excess, a mean of deficiency, an excess of excess and a deficiency of deficiency. On the contrary, just as there is no excess or deficiency of temperance or of bravery, so also there is no mean of these vicious actions either, but whatever way anyone does them, he is in error. For in general there is no mean of excess or of deficiency, and no excess or deficiency of a mean.

— Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics